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Abstract
This thesis deals with physical attacks on implementations of cryptographic algo-
rithms and countermeasures against these attacks. Physical attacks exploit proper-
ties of an implementation such as leakage through physically observable parameters
(side-channel analysis) or susceptibility to errors (fault analysis) to recover secret
cryptographic keys. In the absence of adequate countermeasures such attacks are
often much more eﬃcient than classical cryptanalytic attacks. Particularly vulne-
rable to physical attacks are embedded devices that implement cryptography in a
variety of security-demanding applications.
In the area of side-channel analysis, this thesis addresses attacks that exploit
observations of power consumption or electromagnetic leakage of the device and tar-
get symmetric cryptographic algorithms (at the notable example of the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES)). First, this work proposes a new combination of two
well-known techniques of such attacks: diﬀerential side-channel analysis and side-
channel collision attacks. The combination is more eﬃcient than each of the at-
tacks individually. As a further improvement, new dimension reduction techniques
for side-channel acquisitions are introduced for side-channel collision detection and
compared using an information-theoretic metric. Second, this work studies attacks
exploiting leakage induced by microprocessor cache mechanism. We present an al-
gorithm for cache-collision attacks that can recover the secret key in the presence
of uncertainties in cache event detection from side-channel acquisitions, which may
happen in a noisy measurement environment. Third, practical side-channel attacks
are discovered against the AES engine of the AVR XMEGA, a recent versatile
microcontroller for a variety of embedded applications.
In the area of fault analysis, this thesis extends existing attacks against the RSA
digital signature algorithm implemented with the Chinese remainder theorem to a
setting where parts of the signed message are unknown to the attacker. The new
attacks are applicable in particular to the randomized ISO/IEC 9796-2 encoding
variant used in the EMV standard, and to the PKCS#1 v1.5 standard in the setting
when the message is totally unknown. Both standards are widely used in modern
smart card applications.
In the area of countermeasures, this work proposes a new algorithm for random
delay generation in embedded software. Random delays can be inserted into the
execution ﬂow of a cryptographic algorithm to break synchronization in physical
attacks and therefore increase their complexity. The new algorithm is based on the
idea of generating individual random delays non-independently. It is more eﬃcient
than the previously suggested algorithms since it introduces more uncertainty for
the attacker with less performance overhead.
The results presented in this thesis are practically validated in experiments with
general-purpose 8-bit AVR and 32-bit ARM microcontrollers that are used in many
embedded devices.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis deals with implementation security aspects of cryptography. It is not
about how to design a secure cipher, but rather how to implement an existing one so
that the implementation is still secure. Physical security of a cryptographic imple-
mentation along with an adequate speed and size are often harder to achieve today
than pure algorithmic security. Practical importance of implementation issues has
led in the recent decades to the development of cryptographic engineering, a dis-
tinct discipline concerned particularly with security and eﬃciency of cryptographic
implementations.
Contents
1.1 Cryptography and applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Research motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Implementation security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3.1 Historical and modern examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3.2 Classical and physical cryptanalytic scenarios . . . . . . . 6
1.3.3 Classiﬁcation of implementation attacks . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.4 Side-channel analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.5 Fault analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4 Challenges and research directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.5 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.1 Cryptography and applications
For centuries cryptography (initially the art of keeping information secret) was done
with paper and pencil or at most with appliances like the ancient Greek scytale or
the Girolamo Cardano’s XIV century grille. The amounts of transferred information
were small. From the modern perspective ciphers were rather unsophisticated but
it must have been far easier to eavesdrop a secret rather than to recover it from an
encrypted message (a task for cryptanalysis). In the beginning of the XX century,
the advent of telecommunications caused a dramatic increase in the amount of
2 Introduction
exchanged information and in the rate of its transmission. Naturally, cryptographic
hardware appeared in the form of mechanical and electromechanical machines that
performed semi-automated or automated encryption of a stream of symbols, with
the most famous example to be the German Enigma.
Cryptography however was still the prerogative of the military and the diplo-
matic corps. Security was of paramount importance at the time of the two World
Wars and the Cold War because technical development, and especially advances in
radiocommunications, made sophisticated means and techniques of eavesdropping
possible, which spies immediately employed. Computers were created in defense
and intelligence centers to “break” increasingly strong ciphers. It was military and
intelligence engineers who ﬁrst discovered that eavesdropping can be successfully
applied not only to voice communications but also against cryptographic hardware,
which made it possible to recover secrets where mathematical methods of “breaking”
ciphers alone were failing.
At the end of the XX century, computers became much smaller and cheaper
and made their way to the public market. At the same time, the end of the Cold
War led to the relaxation of the major diplomatic strain. State regulations were
loosened and cryptography followed computers.
Today cryptography has evolved beyond just ciphers. In addition to secrecy (or
more formally confidentiality), cryptography provides data integrity, authentication,
electronic signatures, anonymity, access control and many other security objectives.
Applications utilize diﬀerent cryptographic protocols, e.g. Transport Layer Security
(TLS) protocol that is used in a web browser or an e-mail client when connecting
to a personal electronic mailbox on a remote server which in turn use cryptographic
algorithms, for instance Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cipher or Rivest,
Shamir and Adleman (RSA) algorithm to achieve the above objectives.
Cryptographic algorithms run on many types of computing devices with various
security features. Enterprise servers and personal computers are ﬁrst to come to
one’s mind, but there are numerous embedded devices—compact appliances with
an on-board computer serving a dedicated task, for instance, electronic keys, radio
frequency identiﬁcation (RFID) tags, smart cards1, mobile phones, wireless routers.
Modern transport vehicles are literally stuﬀed with microcomputers, and embed-
ded devices are spread even more widely in industrial applications. The recent term
pervasive computing describes this situation well. Computing platforms are diverse,
including pure hardware as application-speciﬁc integrated circuits (ASIC), recon-
ﬁgurable hardware (ﬁeld-programmable gate arrays, FPGA), software running on
a microprocessor, and combined solutions.
Several concrete examples of embedded devices along with their secure applica-
tions are:
• subscriber identity module (SIM) card that personalizes a mobile handset,
enables access to the cellular network and provides privacy of voice and data
sent over the air;
1Smart cards are usually considered separately from more complex embedded devices, but for
now we omit this difference.
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• a bank card with a built-in chip, used to withdraw cash from an ATM or to
pay in a shop;
• an electronic passport with a built-in contactless chip;
• an electronic key used to open a car and start its engine.
• a pay-TV set-top box that provides the subscriber with set of TV channels
that she paid for;
• a smart meter that records consumption of electric energy in a household or a
company building and regularly sends the results to the central energy oﬃce;
• a sensor node for environmental surveillance that transfers data securely over
the air;
• an industrial or medical apparatus with a secure ﬁrmware update to prevent
unauthorized modiﬁcations.
1.2 Research motivation
Advances in cryptography currently enable building cryptographic algorithms that
are reasonably secure against a variety of purely mathematical cryptanalytic attacks.
However there are two problems when it comes to applications.
First, cryptographic algorithms should be fast but consume a reasonable amount
of device resources, and the overall cost of the system must be adequate. Sec-
ond, modern electronic devices that implement cryptography are more advanced
than previous electromechanical machines, but they are still vulnerable to physical
eavesdropping and tampering.
Physical cryptanalytic attacks pose a particular threat to embedded devices that
implement cryptography, since embedded devices are almost always exposed to the
environment that is out of the owner’s control and is therefore considered untrusted.
For example, a payment terminal accepting bank cards in a shop can be modiﬁed in
a malicious way to extract information from the card, and this can be later used for
stealing money from the owner’s account, and real cases of such fraud have taken
place in the recent years. Conventional computers such as desktops and servers are
also at risk: they are exposed to the network, and this situation makes possible to
remotely observe execution timing and protocol messages which can be used in a
more general class of implementation attacks.
In general, there is an inherent trade-oﬀ between security (both algorithmic and
physical) and eﬃciency of cryptographic implementations. Expensive, slow and
insecure systems will equally likely lose in the market competition. Today, designing
physically secure and eﬃcient implementations of cryptographic algorithms is a
challenge for cryptography and cryptographic engineering in particular. In this
thesis, we speciﬁcally address implementation security.
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1.3 Implementation security
In a nutshell, an implementation attack can be explained by an example of lock
picking from [57]. Let us assume that we are to open a safe protected by a com-
bination lock of several discs. A straightforward way to open the lock is to start
trying every combination of the discs’ positions. At some point we will succeed, but
this might take a long time. The process can be sped up with a stethoscope: due
to the mechanics of some locks a click will be heard when a single disc is placed in
a correct position. The full correct combination can be recovered sequentially by
listening to the individual discs. A similar approach can be used for picking ordi-
nary locks: the small backlash between the lock parts usually makes it possible to
determine the correct positions of all individual pins independently. The uninten-
tional (for the lock designers) acoustic signal or mechanical response coming from
the lock enables us to open the lock. The lock physically leaks information related
to the correct combination and we exploit this leakage to ﬁnd that combination.
Same things take place when we turn to cryptography.
1.3.1 Historical and modern examples
To show what implementation attacks are in practice, how they evolved and how
diverse they are, we give several examples. We refer the reader to [90] and [143] for
a more detailed historical overview.
WWI: Eavesdropping field telephones. The earliest reported example of ex-
ploiting compromising emanations dates back to the World War I and is described
in [13, 166]. The German army was successfully overhearing telephone communi-
cations of the adversaries from a distance using ground currents. This was possible
since the ﬁeld phones were connected only with a single insulated wire to reduce the
weight of the cabling; the return current was ﬂowing through the ground. Eaves-
droppers were using a valve ampliﬁer to pick up a voltage drop between the two
“search electrodes” put into the ground close to the front line, on the other side
of which an adversary’s observer with a phone would usually be located. Though
this was eavesdropping of voice communications rather than an attack against a
cryptographic implementation, the same principle is used nowadays in side-channel
attacks where a voltage drop-oﬀ is measured over a resistor inserted in the ground
line of a target device.
As a technical protective measure, ﬁeld telephone circuits were converted to
a twisted pair cable conﬁguration. So this historical case also serves as an early
example of the trade-oﬀ between design cost (cable length and weight of cable
drums) and security, and of a countermeasure.
WWII: Bell Labs electromagnetic side-channel attack. This example is
from a recently declassiﬁed NSA paper [154]. The papers reports that a researcher
noticed in 1943, quite by accident, the electromagnetic leakage of a Bell-telephone
mixing device 131-B2 which was used during World Was II for encryption in the
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backbone systems for the US Army and Navy. Each step of the machine was causing
a spike on an oscilloscope in a distant part of the lab. By examining the spikes, it
was possible to read the plaintext encrypted by the device. This was veriﬁed in a
dedicated experiment at a distance of about 25 meters.
Bell Labs explored the phenomenon and suggested the basic suppression mea-
sures (shielding, ﬁltering and masking), which however made the machine bulky
and rendered it diﬃcult to use, so in practice it was recommended just to keep a
100-feet controlled zone around the working machine. After the war the problem
was apparently forgotten but then rediscovered in 1951 by the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA).
MI5/GCHQ acoustic side-channel attacks. The next example is described in
[162] and dates back to 1956, when the British intelligence service MI5 together with
GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters) tried to decipher messages
sent from the Egyptian Embassy in London and encrypted with Hagelin machine.
The intelligence ﬁgured out that the initial positions of several Hagelin wheels (a
parameter crucial in cryptanalysis) could have been determined by registering the
sound of the machine during the reset of the wheels with an acoustic microphone
and an oscilloscope. The hidden microphone was installed in the Embassy, which
made possible reading the Egyptian cipher during the Suez Crisis. The same tech-
nique was used by MI5/GCHQ in 1960-63 to read a French cipher from the French
Embassy in London.
TEMPEST in the USA. In 1950s, US government started a classiﬁed program
under the name TEMPEST. This program was aimed at studying and preventing
compromising emissions. Later the word became a synonym for compromising
emanations. The TEMPEST was the source of the red/black separation principle,
red standing for classiﬁed, black—for unclassiﬁed data. According to [90], by 1990
the yearly market of TEMPEST-certiﬁed equipment in the US exceeded 1 billion
dollars. TEMPEST standards that contain concrete details still remain classiﬁed.
A collection of declassiﬁed documents is available [110].
Public attention to compromising emanations was drawn by van Eck in his
paper [157] that describes a practical technique of cathode ray tube (CRT) display
contents eavesdropping from a distance.
Implementation attacks in open research and industry. In the open com-
munity, intensive study of implementation attacks started in 1990s. In 1996 Boneh,
DeMillo and Lipton reported an ingenious attack against RSA based on introducing
a single error into the computation and exploiting the erroneous result [29]. This
fault attack worked against RSA implementations that used Chinese remainder
theorem for eﬃciency reasons. In 1997 Kocher presented attacks against RSA and
several other cryptographic algorithms [87]. These timing attacks exploited varia-
tions in the execution time of the algorithms that depended on the secret data. In
1999, he proposed an attack that exploited multiple observations of the power con-
sumption of a smart card to recover the secret encryption key [88]. This differential
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power analysis attack (DPA) by now remains the most practical and inexpensive
physical attack against many devices implementing cryptography. Since then im-
plementation attacks and countermeasures have been a prominent topic both in
research and in industry; being today the leading topics of CHES (Cryptographic
Hardware and Embedded Systems), FDTC (Fault Detection and Tolerance in Cryp-
tography) and COSADE (Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design)
workshops. After 10 years of research in the area, a book about power analysis of
smart cards was published [101], followed by several other books on cryptographic
engineering covering the subject of implementation security [34, 159, 62].
Information leakage from optical emanations. In 2002, paper [96] reported
that LED status indicators on data communication equipment, under certain con-
ditions, were shown to carry a modulated optical signal that was signiﬁcantly cor-
related with information being processed by the device. The attacker could gain
access to all data going through the device, including plaintext in the case of data
encryption systems. Experiments showed that it was possible to intercept data un-
der realistic conditions at a considerable distance. Many diﬀerent sorts of devices,
including modems and Internet Protocol routers, were found to be vulnerable.
Leakage of encrypted VoIP communications. This recent example demon-
strates that not only devices but also protocols may exhibit leakage. In 2007 paper
[161] showed that the encrypted Voice over IP network traﬃc carries enough in-
formation to reliably identify the language of a conversation. Another work [50]
demonstrated on the concrete example of a widely used VoIP application (Skype)
that it is possible to classify isolated phonemes and identify speciﬁc sentences.
1.3.2 Classical and physical cryptanalytic scenarios
Cryptographic algorithms are designed to withstand cryptanalysis following the
keystone rule formulated in the end of the XIX-th century and known as (second)
Kerckhoﬀs’ principle [79], which states that a cryptosystem should be secure even if
everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge. A cryptographic
key is a piece of information which in the case of a cipher is used to uniquely encrypt
a plaintext to obtain the ciphertext, and perform the inverse action. Among the
keyed algorithms, there are symmetric cryptographic algorithms where encryption
and decryption are performed with the same secret key, and public key cryptographic
algorithms that use a pair of a public and a private key. Secret keys and private keys
are targets of key recovery attacks, with which this work deals. There are unkeyed
cryptographic algorithms, e.g. hash functions, but we do not consider them in this
work, though physical attacks on some of them, for instance on physical random
number generators, are possible.
A brute force attack by trying every key against a plaintext-ciphertext pair is
always possible against cryptographic algorithms. So one speaks about an attack
when the complexity expressed in some basic operations such as encryption algo-
rithm executions or processor clock ticks is below the brute force complexity. With
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the modern computational resources, attacks are practical only up to about 264
basic operations (this is a rough estimate, for more details refer to [55]). Typical
key sizes for symmetric algorithms range today from 80 to 256 bits. Since a large
amount of keys of such length can hardly be memorized by humans, they are stored
within the device implementing an algorithm.
key
implementationinput output
(a)
key
input output
leakage modiﬁcation
(b)
Figure 1.1: Classical (a) and physical (b) cryptanalytic scenarios
In the classical cryptanalytic scenario an attacker tries to recover the secret key
knowing the algorithm description and having (depending on the concrete scenario)
some inputs to the algorithm, the corresponding outputs, or both. A physical
implementation of an algorithm is considered to be a black box in the sense that
only inputs and outputs are observed, but not the internal variables or any other
information about what is happening during the execution.
In contrary to the classical scenario, in the physical cryptanalysis scenario an
adversary observes or manipulates some physical parameters of the device running
the algorithm. For instance, one can observe power consumption, electromagnetic
radiation, execution duration, or tamper with the supply voltage or the clock signal.
Since the access is typically not complete, a term grey box is sometimes used, though
not being quite correct, since the box in this case is rather semi-transparent, which
reveals some part of the inner workings. A usual target of implementation attacks
is to extract a secret key which is stored by the device. The two scenarios are
schematically shown in Figure 1.1.
Note that for the practical implementation security the violation of the Kerck-
hoﬀs’ principle is justiﬁed if done properly. Indeed, the lack of knowledge about
the implementation in most cases would require an adversary to spend some non-
negligible eﬀort on reverse-engineering. But obscurity in this case should be an
additional, and not the only way to achieve security. In fact, recovering unknown
cryptographic algorithms by reverse engineering is the other target of physical at-
tacks. Note also that countermeasures, for instance randomization of the execution
time, do not count as such violation.
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1.3.3 Classification of implementation attacks
All implementation attacks fall into two large groups depending on whether an
adversary just observes some parameters of the implementation or inﬂuences its
execution. Passive implementation attacks exploit results of observing an imple-
mentation while it works (largely) as intended. The adversary can feed inputs but
does not interfere with the execution of an algorithm or a protocol. This group in-
cludes side-channel attacks, where physical leakage of a device during an algorithm
execution is observed, and higher-level logical attacks, where some parameters of a
protocol execution, for instance error messages, are observed. Active implementa-
tion attacks exploit results of inﬂuencing an implementation, or manipulating with
it, such that it behaves abnormally. They comprise fault attacks where errors are
introduced into an execution of a cryptographic algorithm or a protocol, and other
attacks that do not directly exploit the properties of a cryptographic algorithm or
a protocol, such as dumping the device’s memory that contains the secret key.
Another dimension of classiﬁcation concerns the level of intrusion into an im-
plementation. There are non-invasive attacks where a device remains intact and
only the environmental parameters are observed or changed, semi-invasive attacks
where device’s case or package is removed, for instance a microchip is decapsulated,
to get better access to the internals, and invasive attacks where a direct contact to
device internals is established.
These two dimensions are not independent in practice, and the classiﬁcation is
not complete. side-channel attacks are mainly non-invasive, whereas semi-invasive
and invasive attacks are mainly active, but there are special cases. For instance,
attacks exploiting electromagnetic radiation of a device often beneﬁt from partially
removing the package of an integrated circuit that enables to register stronger ﬁelds
close to the silicon chip surface. Probing attacks [69] where the adversary physically
connects to wires of an integrated circuit (decapsulating the device and cutting into
the silicon chip) to read the transferred bits, can hardly be categorized as either
side-channel (since this is a direct connection) or fault attacks (no errors are intro-
duced). Attacks exploiting data remanence [68, 146] are another special category of
implementation attacks. Bug attacks [19] that exploit production- or design-stage
defects of a device are similar to fault attacks but are passive. Furthermore, active
and passive techniques can be combined [4, 40, 147].
A large subset of implementation attacks are physical attacks that are charac-
terized by a physical contact with a device. Since this mainly means proximity to
the device, side-channel attacks observing timing variations of the implementation
remotely over the network can be viewed as a special case.
Figure 1.2 shows the approximate taxonomy of implementation attacks. The
attacks with which this thesis deals are highlighted in grey. They are electromag-
netic and power analysis side-channel attacks, and non-invasive fault attacks (the
countermeasure developed in this thesis is also applicable to other implementation
attacks).
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Figure 1.2: Approximate taxonomy of implementation attacks (based on [54])
1.3.4 Side-channel analysis
Side-channel attacks are passive attacks where the adversary only observes the
physical parameters of the device and uses the observations to perform the key
recovery. Despite the fact that such scenario is weaker than active attacks where
the adversary can inﬂuence the execution of a cryptographic algorithm, side-channel
attacks usually cost less since they require cheaper equipment. Another advantage
of side-channel attacks is that they can be hard to detect since they are mainly
non-invasive and do not interfere with the normal device operation.
For many details on side-channel analysis, we refer the reader to the book [101],
which reﬂects the state of the art in the ﬁeld for the year 2007. Books [159] and
[34] both contain introductory chapters on side-channel attacks; another overview
is given in a recent paper [86].
Leakage sources and leakage models
Physical observables that are usually exploited in side-channel attacks are timing
[87], power consumption [88], and electromagnetic radiation [122]. This is because
they are relatively easy to register for a variety of devices. Other more speciﬁc
leakage types were exploited in research papers, for instance, acoustic [145], optical
[56, 148] and thermal [32], but to our knowledge they are rarely used in practice
for attacking electronic devices.
Attack algorithms diﬀer depending on the leakage source and not on the physical
leakage type, since diﬀerent sources leak diﬀerent kinds of information through the
same physical observables. So a side channel can be viewed as a combination of a
leakage source with the physical leakage type.
An often exploited source is switching gates and wires of electronic circuits,
which leak information about the processed internal variables through power con-
sumption and electromagnetic radiation. The (data-dependent) sequence of oper-
ations of an algorithm is another source. It can leak information both through
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timing and through power consumption and EM radiation. Yet another source is
the features of a microprocessor such as cache [115], branch prediction unit [1], or
early terminating instructions [66] all exploited by a special group of microarchi-
tectural side-channel attacks. The leakage from these sources can be observed in
power, electromagnetic, and timing side channels. Note that power and electro-
magnetic leakages are linked, since moving electric charges in the device is a source
of electromagnetic radiation.
Some attacks require some knowledge of the dependency between the value
of an internal variable processed by the algorithm and the corresponding physical
observable. This dependency is called a leakage model. The two commonly used are
Hamming weight model and Hamming distance model. In the former, the leakage is
assumed to depend on the Hamming weight of a processed variable, that is, on the
number of ones in the binary representation of the variable. This model holds for
most of the electronic circuits since the variable with a higher Hamming weight will
cause more individual gates in the circuit to switch to a high state and therefore
consume more power. The Hamming distance model holds for the circuits where a
gate switches to a new state without an intermediate precharge. In this situation,
the number of gates that switched is proportional to the number of diﬀering bit
values in the old and the new variable. Namely, if a byte a is loaded into a register
after a byte b, the Hamming distance between the two is the Hamming weight of
the XOR diﬀerence a⊕ b. Dependencies between the leakage and the intermediate
variable are not necessarily linear. Other models have been proposed that take into
consideration the properties of some devices, for instance the switching distance
model [118].
Attack flow
A typical side-channel attack consists of several stages.
1. Profiling stage (optional). This stage takes place if an attacker has a copy of
the attacked device which can be used to characterize the leakage. The result
of this stage is a profile (a characteristic) for the leakage of the device.
2. Online stage. In this stage, the attacker performs measurements (acquisi-
tions) of a certain physical observable while the target device is processing
some inputs. The result of this stage is a set of side-channel traces and the
corresponding algorithm inputs or outputs. A side-channel trace is a vector of
leakage samples observed over a period of time. In some attacks, knowledge
of the inputs or outputs may not be required.
3. Oﬄine stage. In this stage, the traces and the corresponding inputs or outputs
are used in a certain attack algorithm to recover the key. The result of this
stage is one or several key candidates.
This stage usually includes pre-processing of side-channel traces. Typically
pre-processing is required to reduce the dimensionality of the traces (i.e. re-
duce the number of leakage samples per trace, selecting the most informative
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Figure 1.3: High-level scheme of a typical measurement setup for power analysis
and EM attacks
ones), to align traces in time dimension, or to apply ﬁlters for de-noising and
extraction of speciﬁc features.
These are the basic stages. Paper [86] suggest a more ﬁne-grain ﬂow.
Each stage has the corresponding complexity. The complexity of the online
stage, or the online measurement complexity, is the number of acquisitions per-
formed, or equivalently the number of (not necessarily) diﬀerent inputs submitted
to the target device during the online stage. This is an important parameter, since
in many cases it is crucial to have a successful attack with as little measurements
as possible.
Measurement setup
Acquisition of physical parameters such as power consumption or electromagnetic
radiation is done with a measurement setup. Figure 1.3 shows a scheme of a typical
measurement setup for side-channel attacks.
The setup consist of a digital sampling oscilloscope (DSO), a host PC and a
target device. The host PC governs the acquisition campaign, sending inputs to
the device, controlling the DSO and receiving side-channel traces from it. The DSO
performs side-channel acquisitions, digitizing the analogue signal and storing it as a
sequence of samples. Power consumption is typically registered as a voltage drop-oﬀ
on a resistor inserted in the ground or voltage line of a target device. EM radiation
is measured with an electric or a magnetic ﬁled probe; the signal from the probe
is usually weak and requires ampliﬁcation before entering the DSO. Modern DSOs
are PC-based and thus can carry out the functions of the host PC, simplifying the
scheme.
A very important aspect of side-channel acquisitions is synchronization, since
most attacks require corresponding leakage samples across diﬀerent side-channel
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traces to be aligned in time dimension. In research settings where one has full con-
trol over the studied implementation, a dedicated trigger signal is usually used that
is generated by an implementation at the start of the target algorithm execution.
In real-world applications, the explicit trigger source is often not available; there
exist passive [127] and active [149] solutions to achieve synchronization. However,
traces would often be misaligned, so additional alignment is necessary during the
pre-processing step.
Measurement setups that were used in this work varied from task to task and
are described in detail in corresponding Chapters. When building the setups, we
largely relied on the detailed description of a measurement setup and measurement
process presented in [144].
Attack algorithms
Simple side-channel analysis The ﬁrst thing the adversary can do in a side-
channel attack is to explore a single side-channel trace, or several side-channel
traces individually. This setting is called simple side-channel analysis. It was ﬁrst
described in [88]. In the case of a speciﬁc leakage, one speaks of simple power
analysis (SPA) or simple electromagnetic analysis (SEMA).
An example of SPA and SEMA is shown in Figure 1.4 which presents power and
electromagnetic traces acquired while an 8-bit AVR microcontroller was executing
a modular multiplication of two long integers followed by a modular squaring. We
can see that the two operations yield two diﬀerent patterns both in the power and
in the EM trace. Note that the pattern diﬀerence in the EM trace is stronger since
EM leakage is not aﬀected by the chip and board capacitances that act as a low-pass
ﬁlter when measuring the power consumption.
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Figure 1.4: SPA (top) and SEMA (bottom) example (from [95])
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This was an example of exploiting the dependency of the leakage on the oper-
ations or instructions. Consequently, if the ﬂow of the algorithm (the sequence of
instructions) depends on the secret key, one can recover the key or part of it. This
is mostly the case for the public key algorithms, which are a usual target of SPA. A
recent paper [48] shows that despite its simplicity, SPA can overcome certain coun-
termeasures. In the case of secret key algorithm implementations, the instruction
dependency is normally not present. Data dependency can still be used in SPA,
which was shown in [99]. Simple power analysis can be also used as a preliminary
step to identify the location of the entire algorithm execution and of the algorithm
parts in time.
Differential side-channel analysis. Diﬀerential power analysis (DPA) tech-
nique was suggested in [88] and ahs been extensively studied since then. The name
unites many speciﬁc attacks that all follow the same general scheme. Usual targets
for DPA attacks are symmetric ciphers implemented using lookup tables, since the
latter usually implement nonlinear functions that facilitate DPA [120].
DPA is a divide-and-conquer attack, namely, it independently recovers the in-
dividual chunks of the key. This is possible because in a cryptographic algorithm,
small chunks of the secret key would be at some point processed independently.
The side-channel leakage is used to build a distinguisher for the chunks of the key.
In a DPA attack, the adversary guesses the value for the chunk of the key and,
for a set of known input (or output) values, calculates the values of the intermediate
variable (called a target variable) that depends on this key chunk. Then he calculates
the predicted leakage of the device using an appropriate leakage model. Finally,
using a certain statistical test, he compares the predicted leakage with the observed
leakage. From all the possible candidates for the chunk of key, those exhibiting
higher correlation values are more likely to be correct.
The original DPA paper [88] used diﬀerence-of-means test as a distinguisher.
Later, Pearson’s correlation was suggested along with the Hamming weight leakage
model in [31]. This attack is known under the name of correlation power analy-
sis (CPA). These and many other suggested attack variants are univariate, which
means they work when the leakage of individual samples is correlated to an interme-
diate variable. In the recent works [102] and [5] it was shown that most univariate
attacks are equivalent, namely they can be expressed as correlation power analyses
with diﬀerent leakage models. An important practical property of univariate DPA
attacks is that they work without requiring the a priori knowledge of the precise
time moment when the intermediate variable is processed. They do not necessarily
require perfect synchronization of traces, though alignment and signal reconstruc-
tion can reduce the measurement complexity [39, 100].
Univariate DPA attacks do not work when intermediate variables of an algorithm
are randomized by a masking countermeasure (see Section 1.3.4). In this case, one
has to look at the joint behaviour of several leakage samples within a trace. This
is done in higher-order DPA attacks [106] by combining several leakage samples
using a combining function, for instance, the absolute diﬀerence of leakage samples.
The value of the combining function is correlated to the intermediate variables, but
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combination results in the loss of information. This disadvantage of higher-order
DPA attacks can be avoided in mutual information analysis (MIA) [63] which uses
a generic distinguisher that does not necessarily require a leakage model. Note
that correlation-based distinguishers are still superior to mutual-information based
distinguishers when the leakage is a linear function of the attacker’s predictions
[121], which is often the case in practice. Other generic distinguishers were suggested
in [137] and [11].
Template attacks. These attacks [35] work in the proﬁled scenario, i.e. when the
leakage of the device can be characterized in advance. During the proﬁling stage,
the adversary obtains leakage templates knowing the values of the intermediate
variable. During the oﬄine stage, the acquired leakage samples for the unknown
value of an intermediate variable are compared with the templates to determine the
most likely candidates for the value using a statistical test.
Template attacks are optimal an the information-theoretic sense with the respect
to the exploitation of side-channel leakage. They do not necessarily require a leakage
model. Knowledge of inputs or outputs for the attacked algorithm is also not
necessary [71].
Like DPA, template attacks are based on the divide-and-conquer principle. For
the evaluation and comparison of divide-and-conquer attacks, a framework of several
metrics was suggested [152, 151].
Other attacks. Collision attacks, initially studied in [142], use the fact that an
equality of intermediate values (an internal collision) can be detected by comparing
the side-channel leakage corresponding to these values. A speciﬁc leakage model is
not required for collision detection in side-channel traces. The key is recovered from
a set of equations that result from observed collisions. That is, these attack are not
of the divide-and-conquer type; we call them analytic. In Chapter 2 we show how
to combine collision and divide-and-conquer attacks to obtain a new more eﬃcient
attack.
Algebraic attacks [126, 125] are also of the analytic type. Unlike collision attacks,
they require a leakage model: the key is recovered from the set of equations that
originate from Hamming weights of the internal variables.
Timing attacks were initially suggested in [87]. They exploit the dependency
of the execution time of an algorithm on the secret key. This dependency origi-
nates from the execution ﬂow mainly in public key algorithms. For symmetric key
algorithms, the timing leakage is usually due to the cache mechanism of a micro-
processor.
Cache attacks form a special group of attacks. It would be more correct to
call them cache-collision attacks since the cache mechanism reveals collisions in the
higher order bits of the internal variables. The cache can leak information through
timing, which is exploited in cache timing attacks [115, 15], through pattern of
accesses that can be monitored with a dedicated process [109, 114], or through
power and EM side channels [16]. In Chapter 3 we suggest cache-collision attack
algorithms that can work with the noisy side-channel traces.
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Countermeasures
Countermeasures against side-channel attacks fall into two groups [101].
The countermeasures of the ﬁrst group aim at making the leakage of the device
independent of intermediate variables processed by the device. This is called hiding.
The countermeasures of the second group make intermediate variables processed by
the device independent of the internal variables of the algorithm. This is called
masking. Hiding does not change variables processed by the device but alters the
leakage so that it is less correlated to the variables, whereas masking does not change
leakage characteristics but removes the informative signal from the instantaneous
leakage. Masking uses the approach of secret sharing; provably secure masking
schemes exist [130, 131].
Both hiding and masking can be implemented on diﬀerent levels of an implemen-
tation: at the circuit level, where hardware countermeasures are only possible, and
at the architecture level, where both hardware and software countermeasures are
possible. At the circuit level both masking and hiding are implemented by secure
logic styles. At the architecture level, masking can be implemented both in software
and in hardware. Hiding can be implemented in time and amplitude dimensions.
In the time dimension, insertion of random delays through dummy instructions and
shuﬄing the order of operations are used in software; in hardware one can addition-
ally randomize clock signal parameters. In the amplitude dimension, signal ﬁltering
and noise generation can be done hardware, and certain programming techniques
can be used in software [101]; hiding is also possible on the microarchitectural level
[65]. In Chapter 6 of this thesis, we present an eﬃcient random delay generation
algorithm as a software hiding countermeasure.
Additionally, there are protocol-level countermeasures, which are neither hiding
nor masking. They usually limit the usage of a single cryptographic key to a certain
number of executions [67, 105].
Finally, leakage-resilient cryptography [51, 153] aims at designing cryptographic
primitives that are provably secure in the model where the bounded amount of
information is leaked by an implementation.
1.3.5 Fault analysis
Fault attacks usually require more expensive equipment than side-channel attacks
but due to their active nature are harder to counter. They consist of two stages.
First, fault injection is performed to disturb the normal execution of an algorithm
and introduce errors into it. Second, the result of the faulty behaviour (usually
along with the result of the correct behaviour for the same inputs) is exploited in
an attack, for instance, for key recovery.
Physical fault injection
Injecting faults into the execution of an algorithm on an electronic device can be
done at diﬀerent levels of invasion.
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A non-invasive way to inject faults is tampering with the power supply or the
clock signal of the device [9, 138]. A short change in the power supply line is
usually referred to as spike (even if it is a power cut-oﬀ). A modiﬁcation of the
clock signal is called a glitch. In a microprocessor, a spike usually aﬀects data
transferred over the buses; depending on the bus type, it can lead to corruption of
the data, or to the change or skipping of an instruction. A glitch usually leads to
skipping an instruction. Note that a glitch in the clock signal can be induced by a
spike in the power supply line. In the work described in Chapter 5 of this thesis,
we have implemented fault injection using spikes. Strong electromagnetic radiation
[123, 139] can also be used for non-invasive fault injection.
Decapsulating a chip makes optical fault injection possible [150, 9, 139]. A ﬂash
of light or a laser beam can disturb the operation of the chip. Laser beam can be
focused on a particular region of the chip, for instance on the memory or register
ﬁle, so laser fault injection provides an attacker with an additional spatial control
compared to light ﬂashes and to spikes/glitches where one can vary the timing only.
An injection may result either in a transient fault when it disappears if no fault
injection is performed, or in a permanent fault when a non-volatile memory cell
contents is changed or the hardware is damaged in a irrecoverable way and the
fault persists even if fault injection is not performed any more. An example of an
attack that creates and exploits permanent faults can be found in [140].
In some attacks the knowledge of the concrete eﬀect of the fault is not necessary.
Other attacks work under a certain fault model, that is, under assumptions that fault
injection leads to a particular kind of corruption. One example of a fault model is
a ﬂip of a single bit within an operand. Another example is the change of all the
bits in a byte or a word to 0 or to 1, which is known as the stuck-at fault model.
The choice of a realistic fault model is crucial for developing an attack, otherwise
the attack will not work in practice.
Exploitation of faults
Fault attacks fall into two main categories. Attacks of the ﬁrst category use the
faulty output values of the algorithm. For symmetric algorithms, such attacks are
known as differential fault analysis (DFA). They are based on the techniques of
diﬀerential cryptanalysis [20] and exploit diﬀerences between faulty and correct
outputs of the cipher. DFA was introduced in [21] against DES and later improved
and applied to AES and several other symmetric algorithms (see recent works [128]
and [80] for a comprehensive bibliography).
For public key algorithms, there is no special name for the attacks of the ﬁrst
category. The most powerful is probably the attack on RSA presented in [29] and
known as the Bellcore attack. This attack applies to implementations that use
Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) for eﬃciency reasons. It recovers the private
key from a single faulty output and does not require a speciﬁc fault model. In
Chapter 5 of this thesis, we show how to extend the Bellcore attack to certain RSA
signature schemes where messages are only partially known to the attacker. Several
kinds of fault attacks on RSA implemented without CRT exist (see recent papers
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[129] and [17] for an overview). In contrary to the Bellcore attack, they work under
certain fault models and require several faulty outputs. Fault attacks on other
public key algorithms were also studied [81].
Attacks of the second category use not the faulty output values themselves but
the only fact whether the fault injection resulted in the faulty result or not. For
symmetric algorithms, an example of such attacks can be found in [38] under the
name ineffective fault analysis (IFA). For public key algorithms, they are referred
to as safe-error attacks and can be further subdivided into C-safe error [164] and
M-safe-error [83, 163] attacks. The former exploit the presence of dummy computa-
tions that are usually used to achieve constant running time and thus thwart timing
and/or SPA attacks, the latter exploit memory or register operations. Safe-error
fault attacks speciﬁcally apply to a standard countermeasure that returns an error
message instead of the computation result if a fault is detected.
Other fault attacks target protected implementations. For instance, second-
order fault analysis [82] uses two fault injections in a single algorithm run. The
ﬁrst fault injection causes computations to go wrong and produce the faulty result,
the second fault is used to skip the checking procedure.
Countermeasures
Countermeasures to fault attacks can be implemented on the hardware level and/or
on the algorithmic level.
On the hardware level, countermeasures aim mainly at preventing physical fault
injection. Examples are ﬁlters in power supply and clock lines, sensors for detecting
variations in power supply voltage and clock frequency to protect from spikes and
glitches, and tamper-resistant techniques to protect from optical and other semi-
invasive and invasive fault injection techniques. There are also solutions on the
hardware level to detect and correct faults.
Algorithm-level countermeasures generally aim at detecting faulty values. They
are based on introducing redundancy and checks into computations, and on ran-
domization of the operands. This can be done in a generic way, or in an algorithm-
speciﬁc way. Additionally, a generic countermeasure preventing fault injection is
desynchronisation [3]. The desynchronisation algorithm we suggest in this work
(see Chapter 6) can be used to decrease fault injection precision.
Countermeasures against semi-invasive and invasive attacks are generally re-
ferred to as tamper resistance and are related to physical design of computing de-
vices.
1.4 Challenges and research directions
There are two main directions of research in implementation security. First, we
should know what to protect from, so implementation attacks should be studied.
A designer should ﬁnd a weakness and ﬁx it earlier than the malicious attacker
who will exploit it. Therefore, one has to improve already existing attacks, ﬁnd
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new attacks and identify sources of physical leakages and vulnerabilities, analyse
physical security of existing devices.
Second, one has to develop and improve means of countering implementation at-
tacks. Countermeasures must be secure, that is provide the good level of protection,
and eﬃcient, that is, cause a minimal possible performance overhead.
Other directions of research include ﬁnding the ways of estimating attack com-
plexity to be able to compare between the attacks, designing provably secure coun-
termeasures, and generalizing attacks.
1.5 Contributions
In response to the challenges mentioned above, in this thesis we elaborate on side-
channel attacks, fault attacks and eﬃcient countermeasures. The primary targets
are software implementations of cryptographic algorithms on various embedded
devices. The contributions are arranged into Chapters as follows.
• In Chapter 2 we present a novel technique of combining side-channel colli-
sion attacks with divide-and-conquer side-channel attacks such as diﬀerential
power analysis. The combination of diﬀerent side-channel techniques allows
us to use more key-relevant information contained in the side-channel traces
than by stand-alone application of the techniques. We theoretically com-
pute the success probability and the expected computational complexity of
combined collision attacks. We also suggest a new technique for dimension
reduction of side-channel traces to improve collision detection using Euclidean
distance, and an information-theoretic metric for the comparison of diﬀerent
collision detection methods. All these solutions lead to the reduction of the
measurement complexity compared to the stand-alone attacks. We practically
demonstrate that DPA-combined collision attacks are more eﬃcient than both
conventional collision attacks and DPA. The results of the Chapter are pub-
lished in [28] (partially) and [27].
• In Chapter 3 we develop attacks exploiting the side-channel leakage of the
microprocessor’s cache mechanism that are tolerant to noisy measurement
conditions. These attacks target symmetric encryption algorithms such as
AES implemented in software using lookup tables. We suggest key recovery
algorithms for AES that are tolerant to uncertainties in distinguishing cache
misses from cache hits when observing power consumption or electromagnetic
radiation of an embedded microprocessor. Previous works were assuming
perfect cache event detection. Our algorithms also work in the setting when
the cache is not clean of the lookup table lines prior to the execution. We
describe the theoretical model of the attack. We investigate in practice the
leakage of a cache on a 32-bit ARM microcontroller. The Chapter is based
on the papers [60] and [59].
• Chapter 4 presents a practical side-channel attack against the cryptographic
engine of AVR XMEGA, a recent versatile 8-bit microcontroller with a rich
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set of features for embedded applications. We discover that the AES engine
of AVR XMEGA succumbs to an eﬃcient diﬀerential power analysis attack.
Our practical implementation of the attack requires about 3000 power con-
sumption measurements to recover the full AES-128 secret key stored in the
microcontroller. The attack was developed without any particular knowledge
about the AES implementation. This result was published in [85].
• In Chapter 5 we propose new fault attacks against the randomized ISO/IEC
9796-2 padding scheme used for digital signature generation with the RSA
algorithm. The existing fault attacks on RSA with the Chinese remainder
theorem can factor an RSA modulus (and therefore recover the signer’s pri-
vate key) only when a deterministic padding scheme is used; they do not work
when messages contain some randomness which is recovered only when veri-
fying a correct signature. Our new attacks apply to a large class of partially
known message conﬁgurations. They rely on Coppersmith’s algorithm for
ﬁnding small roots of multivariate polynomial equations. We illustrate the
approach by successfully attacking several randomized versions of the ISO
9796-2 encoding standard and carry out practical fault injection experiments
on an 8-bit microcontroller. The Chapter is based on the paper [43].
• In Chapter 6 we suggest a new algorithm for random delay generation in em-
bedded software as a countermeasure against side-channel and fault attacks.
Random delays can be inserted into the execution ﬂow of a cryptographic
algorithm to break synchronization in a physical attack. The idea behind our
new algorithm is to generate individual random delays non-independently,
which is diﬀerent from the previously existing methods. This solution allows
to introduce more uncertainty for the attacker with less performance over-
head. We analyse the properties of the algorithm and show how to choose the
correct parameters for its implementation. We also suggest an information-
theoretically sound criterion for estimating the eﬃciency of the random delay
countermeasure. We provide an eﬃcient reference implementation for an 8-
bit microcontroller. Practical side-channel attacks that we mount against an
embedded software AES implementation protected with random delays show
that the new algorithm is more eﬃcient and secure than the previously exist-
ing methods. The Chapter is based on the papers [44] and [45].

Chapter 2
Combined side-channel collision
attacks
A fundamental problem of extracting the highest possible amount of key-related
information using the lowest possible number of measurements is central to side-
channel attacks against embedded implementations of cryptographic algorithms. To
address it, in this Chapter we propose a novel framework enhancing side-channel
collision attacks with divide-and-conquer attacks such as diﬀerential power analysis
(DPA). An information-theoretical metric is introduced for the evaluation of colli-
sion detection eﬃciency. Improved methods of dimension reduction for side-channel
traces are developed based on a statistical model of Euclidean distance.
Experimental results of this work conﬁrm that DPA-combined collision attacks
are superior to both DPA-only and collision-only attacks. The new methods of di-
mension reduction lead to further complexity improvements. All attacks are treated
for the case of AES-128 and are practically validated on a wide-spread 8-bit RISC
microcontroller.
This is a joint work with Andrey Bogdanov, published in [28] (partially) and
[27].
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2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Motivation
Keyed cryptographic algorithms employ secret information to protect user data
and can provide its conﬁdentiality, integrity, authenticity, non-repudiation—services
crucial for almost any security-related application. Numerous analysis methods
have been proposed for cryptographic algorithms. While the traditional mathemat-
ical attacks are solely based on the inputs and outputs of an algorithm, side-channel
attacks rely upon the fact that any real-world implementation of the algorithm is
not ideal and leaks some physically observable parameters that are dependent on
the key processed. Such parameters can include time [87], power consumption [88],
electro-magnetic radiation [122] and algorithm behaviour under actively induced
execution faults. Since the attacker often has immediate physical access to em-
bedded systems, they are most vulnerable to side-channel attacks. A fundamental
problem of side-channel analysis is as follows:
Problem 1 (Fundamental for side-channel analysis). Extract the highest possible
amount of key information given the lowest possible amount of side-channel infor-
mation for a fixed implementation of a cryptographic algorithm.
Side-channel collision attacks provide a natural basis for solving this problem,
possessing the unique combination of three important properties which are not
simultaneously present in any other side-channel analysis technique known today:
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First, they are essentially based on the algorithmic properties of the attacked crypto-
graphic algorithm, which allows the adversary to use more side-channel information
from one algorithm execution. Second, they are not based on any particular leak-
age model which opens up the possibility of using relevant side-channel information
not limited to a speciﬁc model. Third, they do not require any significant a priori
knowledge of the implementation (a major limitation in many side-channel attacks),
however, being able to proﬁt from proﬁling. Side-channel collision attacks have also
further attractive features such as that essential parts of the cryptographic algo-
rithm can remain unknown to the attacker which makes many algorithmic masking
techniques transparent to collision attacks.
In this work, we come up with two novel techniques signiﬁcantly enhancing
side-channel collision-based analysis and propose a general framework naturally
incorporating them.
2.1.2 Collision attacks in the context
In this Subsection, we aim to draw attention to some of the beneﬁcial features of col-
lision attacks mentioned above that they exhibit in the context of other approaches
to side-channel analysis.
Regarding the method of extracting key-related information, there are two large
classes of side-channel attacks: leakage-model oriented and pattern-matching ori-
ented. With respect to the key-recovery procedure, side-channel attacks fall into
two categories: divide-and-conquer attacks (which provide distinguishers for small
key chunks) and analytic attacks (which recover the entire key e.g. by solving sys-
tems of equations). Correspondingly, when classifying according to information
extraction method and key-recovery procedure, one can speak about the four types
of side-channel attacks represented in Table 2.1. Note that, optionally, side-channel
attacks can use proﬁling, which we consider here without introducing a separate
dimension in the table.
Diﬀerential power analysis (DPA) [88] and correlation power analysis (CPA)
[31], a generalization of DPA, are probably the most wide-spread practical attacks
on numerous embedded systems such as smart-card microcontrollers and dedicated
ASICs. They are based on guessing a chunk of the key, classifying traces accord-
ing to this hypothesis and performing a statistical test in a leakage model such as
Hamming weight or Hamming distance. Statistical tests in DPA attacks are essen-
tially correlation-based [102] and thus can capture only linear dependencies between
the intermediate variables and the leakage. Similarly to DPA, mutual information
analysis (MIA) [63, 121, 12] is based on subkey guessing and classifying traces.
However, the test performed for each key hypothesis uses an information-theoretic
metric which works with more generic leakage models.
Template attacks [35, 6] belong to another class of powerful side-channel attacks
and are optimal in an information-theoretic sense. They do not rely on any partic-
ular leakage model but require a proﬁling stage and, as DPA, are mainly limited
to key chunks. Stochastic methods [137, 64] can be seen as a version of template
attacks allowing one to simplify template building, further increase the resolution
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and, thus, decrease the total number of measurements needed.
Algebraic side-channel attacks [126] use Hamming weights of intermediate vari-
ables detected by observing side-channel traces to simplify the systems of nonlinear
equations on the full key. Thus, algebraic side-channel attacks imply that the im-
plementation leaks Hamming-weight related side-channel information.
Side-channel collision attacks [24, 25, 28, 142, 141] use pattern-matching tech-
niques (like template attacks) being however essentially based on the cryptanalytic
properties of attacked cryptographic algorithms (by attacking key as a whole as
in algebraic side-channel attacks) and not relying on any complex proﬁling stages
(similarly to DPA).
Table 2.1: Side-channel attacks: methods of extracting key-related information and
key-recovery procedure
Leakage model Pattern-matching
Divide-and-conquer
DPA[88]
CPA [31]
MIA [63]
template [35]
stochastic [137]
Analytic algebraic [126] collision [24, 141]
Side-channel attacks with analytic key-recovery tend to be more eﬃcient in
terms of measurement complexity. Side-channel attacks using pattern-matching
information extraction are independent of a concrete leakage model (such as Ham-
ming weight or Hamming distance), thus, being a way more universal. Collision
attacks share both these beneﬁts.
At the same time, collision attacks have certain important limitations that in
some cases might make them inapplicable in practice. Namely, they require knowl-
edge of time moments when the leakage of a certain event occurs (e.g. S-box exe-
cutions), they are more eﬃcient on an 8-bit architecture than on architectures with
wider buses, ﬁnally, they are highly sensitive to type-II errors in collision detection.
Recently, some side-channel techniques using more than one method of extract-
ing key-related information have been proposed. For instance, diﬀerential cluster
analysis [11] is a divide-and-conquer attack that generally uses pattern-matching
but can beneﬁt from the knowledge of leakage model. However, these attacks do
not use the advantages of analytic key recovery.
In this work, we show that the analytic key-recovery procedures of collision
attacks allow for extensions and propose a general framework for incorporating
key-related information resulting from divide-and-conquer attacks such as DPA and
template attacks into collision techniques.
2.1.3 Our contributions
In this work, we introduce the combined collision attack which is a novel technique
for combining side-channel collision attacks with divide-and-conquer attacks such
as DPA and template attacks, thus, using both divide-and-conquer and analytic
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key recovery as well as both leakage models and pattern-matching extraction (Sec-
tion 2.3). This combination of very diﬀerent side-channel techniques allows us to
use more key-relevant information contained in the side-channel traces, omitted by
each of these techniques when applied separately. We theoretically compute the
success probability and expected computational complexity of combined collision
attacks (Section 2.4).
Starting from the basic Euclidean distance, we propose new techniques of eﬃ-
cient dimension reduction for collision detection. We study some of their statistical
properties in a formal way. We propose the usage of λ-divergence as a metric for
the comparison of diﬀerent collision detection methods (Section 2.5).
We practically demonstrate that DPA-combined collision attacks are more ef-
ﬁcient than both conventional collision attacks and DPA (Section 2.6). On the
theoretical side, this fact naturally implies that a DPA-combined collision attack
uses more key information contained in the traces than both a stand-alone conven-
tional collision attacks and a stand-alone DPA attack. On the practical side, the
new ﬁndings allow us to further reduce the measurement complexity of side-channel
collision attacks. We conclude with a discussion and open problems in Section 2.7.
2.2 Preliminaries
2.2.1 Internal collisions
An internal collision in a cryptographic algorithm A occurs with respect to a target
function φ, if φ delivers the same output y given some two inputs x1 and x2:
y = φ(x1) = φ(x2) that are not necessarily equal.
Generally speaking, if A is an iterative cipher and φ is applied in its ﬁrst it-
erations, it can be very diﬃcult for the attacker to say if φ(x1) = φ(x2) using
black-box queries (plaintext-ciphertext pairs) only. However, side-channel leakage
can help him to detect internal collisions. Assume that some function ψ processes
the output of φ. If φ returns an equal value y for two inputs, A performs two iden-
tical calculations ψ(y) in these two cases. If φ returns two unequal values y1 and
y2, the corresponding calculations ψ(y1) and ψ(y2) are distinct. The attacker can
observe this behaviour in the power consumption or electromagnetic radiation of
the device implementing A during the application of ψ—similar side-channel traces
for equal outputs of φ and diverse side-channel traces for unequal outputs of φ.
Because of this, ψ is called a collision detection function.
Once an internal collision is detected, it can be interpreted as a key-dependent
equation φ(x1) = φ(x2) delivering some information about the key, if φ and/or x1
as well as x2 are key-dependent.
However, if there are several applications of φ within the algorithm A and φ
is invertible, one does not need a separate collision detection function ψ and can
employ φ as both a target function and a collision detection function. Moreover,
a collision now leads to a much simpler algebraic equation x1 = x2. The latter
observation has yielded the idea behind generalized collisions proposed in [24] and
provides a major advantage over other collision-based attacks such as [141].
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2.2.2 Previous work on collision attacks
The principle of using internal collisions in cryptanalysis is due to Hans Dobbertin
and was also discussed in the early work [160]. In [142], a collision attack on DES
was proposed, several adjacent DES S-boxes representing the target function φ.
This attack was enhanced in [93] using the notion of almost collisions which are
internal states of an algorithm that are very similar. In [141], the separate bytes
of each of the four 4-byte linear MixColumn mappings in the ﬁrst AES round are
treated as target functions φ, S-boxes of the second round representing the collision
detection function ψ. In [22], it is shown that similar side-channel collision attacks
can be applied to AES-based MACs such as Alpha-MAC to mount selective forgery
attacks that do not require any knowledge of the secret key. The results in [23]
suggest that collision attacks can help overpass the random masking of some AES
implementations. Overpassing random masking with collision attacks for the case
of DES was done in [70] and improved in [84], but these works consider collisions
in Hamming weights and therefore imply the leakage model. In [107] collision
attacks were applied to a masked S-box implementation, exploiting the remaining
minor leakage. Another work [117] also employed pattern matching in a step of
the attack against a masked and shuﬄed S-box implementation to remove masking
after recovering the masked subkeys and overcoming shuﬄing with DPA.
As mentioned above, side-channel collision attacks on AES were improved in
[24] by introducing the notion of generalized collisions that occur if two S-boxes
at some arbitrary positions of some arbitrary rounds process an equal byte value
within several runs. Here both the target and collision detection functions φ and ψ
coincide being the 8-bit AES S-box. The S-box remains the same for all executions,
rounds and byte positions within the round (as opposed to DES). This increases
the number of function instances to compare, i.e. the number of potential collisions
to be used afterwards for key recovery.
While [24] treats the linear collisions (resulting in linear equations on the key)
of AES which are generalized collisions that occur in the ﬁrst AES round only,
the work [28] also considers nonlinear collisions (respectively, resulting in nonlinear
equations). A set of such collisions can be considered as a system of equations over
a ﬁnite ﬁeld. Ways to deal with unreliable collision detection are discussed in [25],
including the techniques of binary and ternary voting.
2.2.3 Linear collision-based key recovery for AES
To simplify representation, we chose to study collision attacks at the notable ex-
ample of the U.S. encryption standard AES [171]. More precisely, we use the key-
recovery [24] for AES-128 based on linear collisions for this purpose. Note that all
techniques of this work can be successfully applied to other ciphers as well as to
other collision-based key-recovery techniques.
We use the following notation to represent the variables of AES. K = {kj}16j=1,
kj ∈ F28 is the 16-byte user-supplied key (the initial AES subkey). AES plaintexts
are denoted by P i = {pij}16j=1, pij ∈ F28 , where i = 1, 2, . . . is the number of an AES
execution.
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Figure 2.1: A linear collision for a pair of AES executions
Given a collision within the ﬁrst round of AES (linear collision)
S(pi1j1 ⊕ kj1) = S(pi2j2 ⊕ kj2), (2.1)
one obtains a linear equation with respect to the key over F28 of the form
kj1 ⊕ kj2 = pi1j1 ⊕ pi2j2 = ∆j1,j2 for j1 6= j2. (2.2)
If D collisions have been detected, they can be interpreted as a system of linear
equations over F28 : 
kj1 ⊕ kj2 = ∆j1,j2
. . .
kj2D−1 ⊕ kj2D = ∆j2D−1,j2D
(2.3)
This system cannot have the full rank due to the binomial form of its equations.
Moreover, for small numbers of inputs to AES the system is not connected and
it can be divided into a set of h0 smaller independent (with disjunct variables)
connected subsystems with respect to the parts of the key. Each subsystem has one
free variable. Let h1 be the number of all missing variables, and h = h0 + h1. We
call each of these h subsystems or missing variables a chain.
Without loss of generality, a chain ζ of length n can be represented as the
following subsystem of the equation system (2.3):
kj1 ⊕ kj2 = ∆j1,j2
kj2 ⊕ kj3 = ∆j2,j3
. . .
kjn−2 ⊕ kjn−1 = ∆jn−2,jn−1
kjn−1 ⊕ kjn = ∆jn−1,jn ,
(2.4)
or alternatively as an n-tuple of byte indices ζ = (j1, . . . , jn) in a short form. Each
chain (2.4) has 28 possible solutions, since it is suﬃcient to guess one key byte in
the chain to unambiguously determine all other n − 1 bytes of the chain. If the
system (2.3) has h chains, then it has 28h solutions.
That is, 28h guesses have to be performed, which is the oﬄine computational
complexity of this basic key-recovery method. Each key hypothesis is then tested
using a known plaintext-ciphertext pair with the full AES to rule out wrong candi-
dates. Note that 28h quickly becomes feasible as the number of distinct inputs P i
grows. In a nutshell, it has been shown in [24] that 6 randomly drawn plaintexts
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P i generate enough byte collisions in AES-128 to cover the full 128-bit key by just
h = 5 or less chains. This drives the oﬄine computational complexity down to at
most 240 AES runs.
2.2.4 Collision detection with Euclidean distance
For a collision attack to be successful, one has to decide if two S-boxes accept equal
inputs using side-channel information obtained from the side-channel leakage (of the
implementation) of the attacked cryptographic algorithm. Given two side-channel
traces
τ1 = (τ1,1, . . . , τ1,l) ∈ Rl and τ2 = (τ2,1, . . . , τ2,l) ∈ Rl,
respectively corresponding to a pair of S-box executions with some unknown inputs
a1 and a2, it has to be decided whether a1 = a2 for collision detection.
The two traces can be considered as two vectors in the Euclidean space of
dimension l. The Euclidean distance E between them is deﬁned as
E(τ1, τ2) =
l∑
r=1
(τ1,r − τ2,r)2.
One expects that E will be higher for non-collisions and lower for collisions. Our
experiments with a popular AVR microcontroller (µC) (see Figure 2.2; the imple-
mentation will be described in detail in Section 2.6.1) show that this intuition is
indeed justiﬁed, at least when noise is somewhat reduced by averaging traces. Note
that regular patterns observed in the non-collisions in Figure 2.2 are presumably
due to a special implementation of the ﬁfth bit of one of the buses in the 8-bit AVR
core.
Most papers on collision attacks [141, 24, 25, 28] use the Euclidean distance
between two noisy traces as the basic metric for collision detection. In [107] and
[117], Pearson’s correlation was employed. We have found that collision detection
can be signiﬁcantly improved by dimension reduction for side-channel traces based
on the properties of the Euclidean distance, which is therefore the metric of our
choice. We detail this in Section 2.5.
2.2.5 Differential side-channel analysis
The technique of diﬀerential side-channel analysis was suggested in [88] as DPA
and has been extensively studied since then. Now the name unites several speciﬁc
attacks that follow the same general scheme. As in the case of collision attacks,
here we describe diﬀerential side-channel analysis at the example of AES-128.
As already mentioned, diﬀerential side-channel analysis is a divide-and-conquer
attack. Namely, it recovers each of the AES key bytes k1, . . . , k16 independently. For
each byte kj , the attack takes a set of known plaintexts P
i and a set of corresponding
side-channel traces. The attack algorithms diﬀer between speciﬁc attacks, but are
all essentially based on comparing the hypothetical leakage of an intermediate key-
dependent target variable (usually the ﬁrst round S-box output) predicted for each
of the 256 key byte candidates with the actually observed leakage (represented by
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Figure 2.2: Inverse Euclidean distance 1/E between power consumption traces for
all input pairs of the AES S-box as implemented on 8-bit RISC µC ATMega16
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the side-channel traces) by means of a speciﬁc statistical test, e.g. correlation [31].
Higher values of the statistic suggest that the candidate is more likely to be correct.
In the context of this work, it suﬃces to represent the output of the diﬀerential
side-channel attack for a byte kj of the key as the list Kj = (κ1j , . . . , κ256j ) of 256
key byte candidates sorted by the output of the statistical test in the descending
order. Then the correct key byte candidate is more likely to be closer to the top of
the list.
In the simplest case, the attack is limited to considering only the topmost can-
didate κ1j for each key byte, such that there is a single candidate for the full key.
In general, if one considers m topmost candidates for each key byte from the cor-
responding list, there will be m16 full key candidates. An oﬄine exhaustive search
among these m16 candidates is then necessary to determine the correct one with a
plaintext-ciphertext pair at hand. For example, if m = 5 candidates for each key
byte are considered, the oﬄine computational complexity is about 237 AES runs.
2.3 Framework for combined attacks
In this Section, we propose a general framework for the side-channel analysis of
cryptographic algorithms based upon internal collisions. This framework allows
the adversary to amplify collision attacks by any divide-and-conquer side-channel
attack. We refer to such ampliﬁed attacks as combined collision attacks.
Later, we will study the core test of the framework presented in this Section
(Section 2.3.4) and evaluate it, combined with our novel collision detection tech-
niques (Section 2.5), also in a practical setting (Section 2.6).
2.3.1 The idea in a nutshell
In the combined collision attack, we use two building blocks: the linear collision-
based key recovery of Subsection 2.2.3 and a divide-and-conquer attack, such as
DPA of Subsection 2.2.5. The major idea is to test chains of key bytes in colli-
sion attacks using key byte ranking from DPA. This reduces the required oﬄine
computational complexity of collision-based key recovery.
For instance, if just h = 5 chains cover the entire 16-byte key of AES-128, the
pure collision attack has to perform 28h = 240 full key tests (see Subsection 2.2.3),
since all key byte candidates are equiprobable. However, DPA outputs a ranking of
candidates for each key byte, Kj = (κ1j , . . . , κ256j ) as shown in Subsection 2.2.5. So
if this DPA information is available in the collision attack, the adversary can test
only the most probable candidates of key byte chains. If the number of surviving
chain candidates is reduced from 28 to 24 for each chain, the oﬄine computational
complexity will be just 24h = 220 AES runs. Equivalently, this reduces the online
measurement complexity by keeping the budget of oﬄine computational complexity
at the level of 240. We use this fact to address Problem 1.
2.3 Framework for combined attacks 31
2.3.2 Attack flow
All collision techniques of this work are studied at the example of the U.S. encryption
standard AES, which is a highly relevant target, and experimentally veriﬁed on a
wide-spread 8-bit platform. For the sake of simplicity, we will deal with AES-128
in this work, though having in mind that the collision techniques are actually much
more generally applicable.
Let the AES-128 implementation have a 16-byte key ﬁxed for the entire at-
tack and leak a key-dependent side-channel parameter (e.g. power consumption or
electromagnetic radiation).
A collision attack consists of an online stage, signal processing stage, and key-
recovery stage. Its procedure is outlined in Algorithm 1 and is explained here:
• In the online stage (steps 1-2 of Algorithm 1), N chosen 16-byte plaintexts
P i are sent to the attacked device implementing AES (ChooseInputs).
The side-channel traces T i (e.g. power consumption or electromagnetic ra-
diation) are acquired by the measurement equipment (AcquireTraces) for
these plaintexts. Each trace T i contains 16 subtraces, one for each S-box:
T i = {τ ij}16j=1.
That is, Ti is a set of 16 individual traces τ
i
j for each of the 16 S-box instances
in the ﬁrst AES round. The trace τ ij is a real-valued vector of length l, τ
i
j ∈ Rl,
thus, containing l samples.
In our attacks, we will send γ randomly drawn 16-byte plaintexts to the AES
encryption, each repeated t times, which yields N = γ · t.
• In the signal processing stage (steps 3-6 of Algorithm 1), collisions are de-
tected in the target traces T i (DetectCollisions) and the divide-and-conquer
attack is applied to sort the key-byte candidates in each of the 16 byte po-
sitions (SortKeyByte). Before applying the signal processing, the traces
corresponding to each of γ unique plaintexts are averaged t times to decrease
noise. The output of the signal processing stage is the set of detected colli-
sions C containing 4-tuples (pi1j1 , pi2j2 , j1, j2) and 16 sorted lists K of 256 key byte
candidates for each of the 16 byte positions. Depending on the measurement
setup and implementation, one might choose to perform trace decimation and
denoising in this stage.
• In the key-recovery stage (step 7 of Algorithm 1), an AES key candidate K ′
is computed using the list of detected collisions C and sorted candidates K
(RecoverKey detailed in Algorithm 2). Note that RecoverKey can return
either the right 16-byte key, a wrong 16-byte key or an empty set of keys ∅, if
no key candidate has passed the ﬁnal key testing. By π we denote the success
probability of Algorithm 1 which is the probability thatRecoverKey returns
the right key.
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Algorithm 1: Collision attack based on linear collisions combined with a
divide-and-conquer test for AES-128
1: P = (P 1, . . . , PN )← ChooseInputs()
2: T = (T 1, . . . , TN )← AcquireTraces(P)
{each trace T i contains 16 subtraces, one for each S-box}
3: C ← DetectCollisions(P, T )
{each collision in C is a four-tuple (pi1j1 , pi2j2 , j1, j2), see (2.1)}
4: for each kj of 16 key bytes do
5: Kj = (κ1j , . . . , κ256j )← SortKeyByte(j,P, T )
6: end for
{now K = (K1, . . . ,K16) contains 16 sorted lists of key byte candidates of
length 256 each}
7: K ′ ← RecoverKey(C, K)
8: return K ′ as a key candidate
Algorithm 2: Key-recovery RecoverKey based on linear collisions and
sorted key-byte candidates from a divide-and-conquer test for AES-128
Input: Collisions C and sorted key-byte candidates K
1: build h chains ζ1, . . . , ζh from collisions C
{a chain ζi of length ni is an n-tuple (j1, . . . , jni), see (2.4)}
2: for each ζi of h chains do
3: Gi ← {0, . . . , 28 − 1}, i.e. all 28 chain guesses
4: for each chain guess g ∈ {0, . . . , 28 − 1} do
5: if not TestChain(ζi, g,K, C) then
6: remove chain guess g, Gi ← Gi\{g}
7: end if
8: end for
{now Gi only contains survived guesses for chain ζi}
9: end for
10: unite chain guesses to full key guesses, G ← ∪hi=1Gi
{G contains full key guesses that survived chain filtration}
11: K ′ ← TestKeysWithAES(G)
12: return K ′ as a key candidate
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2.3.3 Combined key recovery
The procedure of the combined key recovery is provided in Algorithm 2 and mainly
relies on the test of each chain TestChain introduced and analyzed in Subsec-
tion 2.3.4. This is the major advantage of our approach compared to the conven-
tional collision attacks where it is not possible to test the correctness of each chain
separately and steps 4-8 of Algorithm 2 are missing. As opposed to that, the avail-
ability of divide-and-conquer information in the combined key recovery allows to
test for each chain separately which can provide a signiﬁcant eﬃciency gain. This
can be reﬂected in the increased success probability of the attack given some mea-
surement complexity or in the reduced measurement complexity given some success
probability, thus, delivering a better solution to Problem 1. We will theoretically
compute the success probability for a combined attack in Section 2.4 and practically
evaluate it in Section 2.6.
2.3.4 Test of chain
TestChain has as input:
• Chain ζ of length n consisting of key byte indices j1, . . . , jn.
• Guess g of the chain. Without loss of generality, we assume that it is the ﬁrst
byte j1 of the chain and kj1 = g.
• The list of (linear) collisions C to be able to compute all the other n− 1 key
bytes in the chain from kj1 .
• The lists of sorted key-byte candidates K coming from a divide-and-conquer
test (e.g. DPA). Only lists Kℓ with ℓ ∈ {j1, . . . , jn} are needed for the chain
to be tested. Each Kℓ is a sorted list of 256 candidates for the key byte kℓ.
The output of TestChain is true, if the chain ζi has passed the test, or false
otherwise.
The idea of the test of chain is to ﬁlter out those guesses of chains that are less
probable to be compatible with the key information obtained from a divide-and-
conquer test.
In each list Kℓ, we will consider values among the top m positions. These are
the most probable candidates for the key byte kℓ as suggested by the divide-and-
conquer test. We superpose the guess of the chain, computed from the byte guess g
for kj1 , and n corresponding sorted lists Kℓ of length 256 bytes each, see Figure 2.3.
Now the test of chain can be described as follows:
• The guess of chain is accepted if all key bytes of the chain are among the top
m candidates, each in the corresponding list Kℓ.
• The guess of chain is rejected if at least one key byte of the chain falls outside
the m top candidates in its corresponding list Kℓ.
The threshold m of the test of chain has an impact on the attack complexity
and success probability. We detail on this in the next Section.
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Figure 2.3: Test for chain ζ: the guess of chain is rejected if at least one key byte falls
outside the most probable m byte values as suggested by the divide-and-conquer
test
2.4 Attack complexity and success probability
According to the three stages of a collision attack outlined in Subsection 2.3.2, its
complexity is deﬁned by three parameters (see Algorithm 1):
• Conline is the number of inputs to AES for which measurements have to be
performed in the online phase (AcquireTraces).
• Cprocessing is the computational complexity of signal processing on side-channel
traces needed to detect collisions (DetectCollisions) and sort key-byte can-
didates within the divide-and-conquer attack (SortKeyByte).
• Crecovery is the computational complexity of RecoverKey (Algorithm 2), that
is, the number of operations needed to solve the resulting systems of linear or
nonlinear equations and to identify the most probable solution.
For collision attacks in this work, we bound Crecovery by 2
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which can be performed within several hours on a PC. Given this restriction on
Crecovery, the online complexity Conline = N = t·γ becomes the major limiting factor
of collision attacks, since Cprocessing, mainly determined by γ, will be negligible for
our choices of γ.
The success of an attack is often of probabilistic nature and the success proba-
bility π of the attack has to be considered along with Conline. In this work, our main
goal is to reduce Conline and increase π, given the above admissible upper bound on
Crecovery.
2.4.1 Success probability of a combined attack
The threshold m of the test of chain described in Subsection 2.3.4 has to be chosen
in a way that the probability to ﬁlter out the correct key is small. This probability
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depends on the distribution of the position for the correct key byte of the divide-
and-conquer test used.
Let α be the probability that the correct key byte is among the topm candidates
in the sorted divide-and-conquer list. (In terms of the uniﬁed framework [152], α
is exactly the m-order success rate for a single key byte recovery.) Under the
assumption that all chain tests are independent, the probability for the full correct
key to survive after passing the tests with all h chains can be computed as
Pr[correct key survives after h chains] =
h∏
i=1
αni = α
∑h
i=1
ni = α16 ,
since the sum of all chain lengths is
∑h
i=1 ni = 16. Moreover, if all collisions
have been detected correctly (i.e. collision detection yielded no false positives), this
determines the success probability of the full combined collision attack
π = α16, (2.5)
which is in fact equivalent to the success probability of the divide-and-conquer
attack.
As a practical example, our experiments with DPA attacks against an AES
implementation on the 8-bit ATmega16 µC show that the chances for the correct
key byte guess to be among the top m candidates in the sorted DPA list are quite
good already for small values of m (which are preferred to have low Crecovery, as we
will detail in the next Subsection) and small values of N , i.e. low Conline. Figure 2.4
depicts the dependency of α upon m for diﬀerent numbers of inputs N in our DPA
attack.
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Figure 2.4: Empirical dependency of α upon m for diﬀerent numbers of traces N
in a DPA attack
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2.4.2 Complexity of key recovery for a combined attack
Without the test of chain, the complexity of the collision attack is 28h AES com-
putations, since each chain suggests 28 candidates for the respective subset of key
bytes and there are h disjunct chains. In the combined approach, we eﬀectively
test m candidates for each chain. Moreover, we ﬁlter our improbable chain candi-
dates separately for each chain. This results in a lower number of full 16-byte key
candidates to be tested with AES at the end which determines Crecovery. Since the
chain evaluation is much less complex than the testing of a full 16-byte candidate
with the full AES, we can win in the total attack complexity signiﬁcantly. Here we
estimate Crecovery given m and α.
The expected number of wrong chain guesses to be tested in the test of chain
can be computed as
(1− α)m+ α(m− 1) = m− α .
The probability for a wrong chain guess to survive one element of chain can be
derived as
α
(
m− 1
255
)
+ (1− α)
(
m
255
)
=
m− α
255
,
since a wrong chain guess results in wrong key byte candidates suggested along the
entire chain.
The expected number of correct chain guesses to be tested in the test of chain
is α. The probability for a correct chain guess to survive one element of chain is α.
Then the expected number of chain candidates to survive the test of chain ζi
can be estimated as
ηi = (m− α)
(
m− α
255
)ni−1
+ α · αni−1 .
Assuming the independence of all chain tests, we obtain an estimation of the key-
recovery complexity for the combined attack:
Crecovery ≈
h∏
i=1
max (1, ηi) , (2.6)
where the maximum is taken since one has to test at least one candidate for each
chain in practice.
2.5 Collision detection
In this Section, we propose improved techniques of collision detection by dimension
reduction specially tailored for the Euclidean metric. The practical evaluation of
the dimension reduction techniques in a full (combined) collision attack will be
given in Section 2.6.
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2.5.1 Dimension reduction in side-channel attacks
Dimension reduction is the selection of samples from side-channel traces, usually
with the purpose of improving the eﬃciency of an attack. In a typical setting,
the clock frequencies of electronic devices are in the range of at least several MHz.
Therefore, the side-channel trace acquired by the digital oscilloscope at an appropri-
ate sampling rate of at least ten million samples per second will contain thousands,
if not millions, of samples. In the presence of noise, when many traces are required,
this makes the trace processing a determining part of the attack complexity and
may sometimes even render the attack infeasible. On the other hand, it has long
been known that only few samples in a trace would exhibit the leakage, the others
being redundant. An example is the dimension reduction for a DPA attack (trace
compression) [101], where we can limit ourselves to points at clock cycle maxima or
to points exhibiting the highest variation across the traces corresponding to diﬀer-
ent input values. Note that while DPA is still feasible without dimension reduction,
attacks employing multivariate methods (e.g. template-like and MIA attacks) are
infeasible without an appropriate point selection.
Besides the reduced signal processing complexity, another eﬀect of dimension
reduction is the potential increase in the attack success rate. The points removed
from the side-channel traces would normally carry more noise than the informative
signal, while the opposite applies to the selected points. Therefore, dimension
reduction would lead to the overall increase in the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). In
most cases, this will lower the number of measurements required to reach a given
success rate. Again, DPA attacks are a good example: in our experiments, selection
of cycle maxima or points with the largest variation across the power traces reduces
the trace count for the key-byte recovery.
We would like to stress that dimension reduction is not a full-scale proﬁling;
it indeed requires some additional knowledge about the implementation, but this
knowledge is much less than one would normally impose in traditional proﬁled
attacks to build templates. As opposed to that, in its essence, dimension reduction
can be seen as knowledge about the time moments when certain computations are
carried out, not values being processed.
Collision attacks can beneﬁt a lot from the dimension reduction. First, in the
following, we show how to select the points from the traces to improve collision
detection. We utilize Euclidean distance for trace comparison to distinguish between
collisions and non-collisions. We also deal with this in the information-theoretic
sense by introducing a metric for comparing our dimension reduction techniques.
Second, collision detection demands for higher sampling rates (as compared to DPA
or other attacks working in the Hamming weight/distance leakage model) [28] to
capture subtle diﬀerences between the traces, so reduction in the number of samples
in a trace is desirable to decrease Cprocessing, which is quadratic in the number of
samples and traces.
We start with a statistical model of Euclidean distance that we ﬁrst introduced
in [28] and provide here for completeness to support our intuition behind the choice
of dimension reduction techniques in the sequel.
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2.5.2 Statistical model for Euclidean distance
Given two traces τ1 = (τ1,1, . . . , τ1,l) ∈ Rl and τ2 = (τ2,1, . . . , τ2,l) ∈ Rl, we assume
that each point τi,j can be statistically described as τi,j = si,j + ri,j , where si,j
is signal constant (without noise) for the given time point i as well as some ﬁxed
input to the S-box, and ri,j is Gaussian noise due to univariate normal distribution
1
with mean 0 and some variance σ2 remaining the same for all time instances in our
rather rough model. Let τ1 and τ2 correspond to some S-box inputs a1 and a2.
If a1 = a2, the corresponding deterministic signals are equal (that is, s1,j = s2,j
for all j’s) and one has:
E(τ1, τ2)a1=a2 =
l∑
j=1
(τ1,j − τ2,j)2 =
l∑
j=1
ξ2j = 2σ
2
l∑
j=1
η2j ,
where ξj = r1,j − r2,j , ξj ∼ N
(
0, 2σ2
)
and ηj ∼ N (0, 1). That is, statistic
E(τ1, τ2)a1=a2 follows the chi-square distribution with l degrees of freedom up to
the coeﬃcient 2σ2. As the chi-square distribution is approximated by normal dis-
tribution for high degrees of freedom, one has the following
Proposition 1. Statistic
E(τ1, τ2)a1=a2 =
l∑
j=1
(τ1,j − τ2,j)2
for τi = (τi,1, . . . , τi,l) ∈ Rl with τi,j ∼ N
(
si,j , σ
2
)
can be approximated by normal
distribution N (2σ2l, 8σ4l) for sufficiently large l’s.
Alternatively, if a1 6= a2, one has
E(τ1, τ2)a1 6=a2 =
l∑
j=1
(τ1,j − τ2,j)2 =
l∑
j=1
(
δ
(1,2)
j + ξj
)2
= 2σ2
l∑
j=1
ν2j ,
where
δ
(1,2)
j = s1,j − s2,j , ξj = r1,j − r2,j ,
ξj ∼ N
(
0, 2σ2
)
and νj ∼ N
(
δ
(1,2)
j /
√
2σ, 1
)
.
That is, statistic E(τ1, τ2)a1 6=a2 follows the noncentral chi-square distribution with
l degrees of freedom and λ =
∑l
j=1
(
δ
(1,2)
j /
√
2σ
)2
up to the coeﬃcient 2σ2. Again,
we have an approximation using
Proposition 2. Statistic
E(τ1, τ2)a1 6=a2 =
l∑
j=1
(τ1,j − τ2,j)2
1The real measured power consumption is often due to the generic multivariate normal distri-
bution. However, almost all entries of the corresponding covariance matrix are close to zero. Thus,
the model with independent multivariate normal distribution seems to be quite realistic.
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for τi = (τi,1, . . . , τi,l) ∈ Rl with τi,j ∼ N
(
si,j , σ
2
)
can be approximated by nor-
mal distribution N (2σ2(l + λ), 8σ4(l + 2λ)) with λ = ∑lj=1 (δ(1,2)j /√2σ)2 for suf-
ficiently large l’s.
2.5.3 Dimension reduction with signal variance (SV)
Signal variance is known [101] to be an adequate indicator of the points leaking
information in DPA. We will refer to signal variance as SV . More formally, given
a ﬁxed level of noise, the points of traces with higher values of var(si,j) correspond
to higher values of SNR [101]. An estimation of variance var(si,j) is computed for
each point j of the trace over input values ai ∈ F28 .
In the sequel, we use SV as a reference dimension reduction technique and show
that for collision detection more eﬃcient criteria exist.
2.5.4 Dimension reduction with signal difference (SD)
In the comparison of the two traces with the Euclidean distance, we try to dis-
tinguish between the collisions and non-collisions, i.e. between the distributions
E(τ1, τ2)a1 6=a2 and E(τ1, τ2)a1=a2 . As described above these statistics approximately
follow normal distribution for large numbers of trace points. To eﬃciently distin-
guish between these two statistics it is crucial to decrease their variances while
keeping the diﬀerence of their means high. For this purpose, to better distinguish
between the collisions and non-collisions, we proposed to discard [28] points of traces
with small minimal contribution to the diﬀerence of means2.
To illustrate this method of dimension reduction, we assume for the moment
that δ
(1,2)
j = 0 for j > l/2 and δ
(1,2)
j 6= 0 for j ≤ l/2 with l even, that is, the second
half of the trace does not contain any data dependent information. Then we can
discard the second halves of the both traces τ1 and τ2 in the comparison with the
Euclidean distance and compute two related statistics on the rest of the points:
E′(τ1, τ2)a1=a2 =
l/2∑
j=1
(τ1,j − τ2,j)2,
E′(τ1, τ2)a1 6=a2 =
l/2∑
j=1
(τ1,j − τ2,j)2.
This will adjust the means and variances of the approximating normal distribu-
tions: N (σ2l, 4σ4l) and N (2σ2(l/2 + λ), 8σ4(l/2 + 2λ)), respectively. Note that
the diﬀerence of means remains unaﬀected and equal to 2σ2λ. At the same time
both variances are reduced, one of them by factor 2, which allows one to distinguish
between these two distributions more eﬃciently and, thus, to detect collisions more
reliably.
2A more general way is weighting the points by their contribution to the difference of means and
using weighted Euclidean distance as a metric, however our experiments have shown that point
selection, being an extreme case of point weighting, is much more efficient.
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Definition of SD. More generally speaking, for AES we have to reliably
distinguish between inputs in each (ai1 , ai2) of the
(256
2
)
pairs of byte values, ai1 , ai2 ∈
F28 . Thus, the most informative points j of the traces are those with maximal
minimums of |δ(i1,i2)j | over all pairs of diﬀerent inputs, that is, points j with maximal
values of
min
ai1 6=ai2
|δ(i1,i2)j | (2.7)
with δ
(i1,i2)
j = si1,j − si2,j , where the value of signal si,j is estimated by trace av-
eraging in practice. In other words, we ﬁrst ﬁx a trace sample j and then go over
all pairs of non-equal inputs. For each pair, we compute the diﬀerence between sig-
nals. Among those diﬀerences, we take the minimum. Trace samples with maximal
minimums are expected to contribute more to collision detection.
We will denote this point selection criterion as SD (signal difference) for brevity.
For each point of a side-channel trace, the criterion gives its weight relevant for
collision detection: the higher the weight, the stronger the contribution of the point
to the comparison with Euclidean distance. So only points with maximal weights
are selected for collision detection.
Comparison to SV. We estimated the values of SD for all time instances j of
the two (most leaky) cycles of the S-box look-up in our reference AES implemen-
tation (i.e. for all points of corresponding side-channel traces) and compared this
to the signal variance SV in the same time points, var(si,j), see Figure 2.5(a). The
ﬁgure shows the normalized values of the two criteria (weights) for each point of
a side-channel trace of the S-box lookup. One can clearly see that values of each
criterion for diﬀerent points of a trace diﬀer signiﬁcantly. So one can select points
with the largest weights of a selected criterion, that is, perform dimension reduction
of side-channel traces. Figure 2.5(a) reveals that the point selection based on SD is
more ﬁne-grain than that based on SV. In Section 2.5.7 we will compare the eﬀect
of dimension reduction using diﬀerent criteria with an information-theoretic metric.
2.5.5 Dimension reduction with weighted signal difference (WSD)
Definition of WSD. To further amplify the selection of points for collision de-
tection, when calculating the contribution of the point j to the Euclidean distance
one can consider not only (2.7) but also noise variances in this point. Thus, a more
eﬃcient criterion, that we call WSD (weighted signal difference), can be deﬁned
choosing points that maximize
min
ai1 6=ai2
|δ(i1,i2)j |
var(ri1,j) + var(ri2,j)
with var(ri,j) being the variance of the noise for input i in trace sample j. In
practice, the variance is estimated using several traces for a single input. The
intuition behind this additional weighting of points by the inverse of the noise
variance value is to exclude points that contribute more noise to Euclidean distance.
Comparison to SD. In Figure 2.5(b), we compare WSD to SD for the same
two clock cycles of our reference implementation. One can see the diﬀerences:
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Figure 2.5: Diﬀerent dimension reduction criteria for each point j of a side-channel
trace for an AES S-box lookup: (a) signal diﬀerence (SD) versus signal variance
(SV); (b) signal diﬀerence (SD) versus signal diﬀerence weighted with noise variance
(WSD)
weighting by the noise variance increases the contribution of some points while de-
creasing the contribution of the others (WSD) compared to the pure signal diﬀerence
(SD). This diﬀerence will be well captured by the information-theoretic metric that
we will deﬁne below and use to compare the techniques in a sound way.
2.5.6 λ-divergence as an information-theoretic metric
As mentioned above, the goal of collision detection is to eﬃciently distinguish be-
tween collisions and non-collisions, that is, between the distribution of the Euclidean
distance for a pair of equal and non-equal inputs. Here we propose an information-
theoretic measure of diﬀerence between these distributions.
Let Pr [X] be the probability distribution over all possible secret values to be
recovered using side-channel information. In the case of collision attacks, X is a
set of two elements: X = {collision, non-collision}. Further let L = Pr [L] be the
probability distribution of side-channel leakage as measured by a collision detec-
tion method. For instance, L can be the set of all possible values of the Euclidean
distance between side-channel traces for pairs of inputs to the S-box. Correspond-
ingly, let Pr [L | X = x] be the probability distribution of leakage, taken separately
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for collisions and non-collisions, depending on X. We will denote the probabil-
ity distributions LC = Pr [L | X = collision] and LN = Pr [L | X = non-collision].
(Note that in Section 2.5.2 we have described these distributions in the independent
multivariate Gaussian model.)
Our metric uses the notion of Kullback-Leibler divergence between two distri-
butions A and B, DKL(A‖B). For discrete distributions, it is deﬁned as
DKL(A‖B) =
∑
i
A(i) log2
A(i)
B(i) . (2.8)
Note that DKL is not commutative and DKL(A‖B) 6= DKL(B‖A).
To compare collision detection methods, we use the λ-divergence between leak-
age distributions for collisions and non-collisions which is deﬁned as
Dλ(LC‖LN) = λDKL(LC‖λLC + (1− λ)LN) +
+(1− λ)DKL(LN‖λLC + (1− λ)LN) ,
(2.9)
where λ is the a priori probability of a collision, in other words, λ = Pr [X = collision].
Note that we have then
λLC + (1− λ)LN = L .
For the 8-bit S-box of the AES λ = 1/256.
It is well known that mutual information can be expressed in terms of the
Kullback-Leibler divergence. Similarly, it can be shown that the λ-divergence met-
ric as introduced above and the mutual information metric [152] when applied to
collision detection instead of template attacks are equivalent.
Proposition 3. I(X,L) = Dλ(LC‖LN).
Proof. The left-hand side of the above equality is I(X,L) = H(L) −H(L | X) by
deﬁnition. One can transform the right-hand side using deﬁnitions (2.8) and (2.9),
and knowing that λ = Pr [X = collision] obtain the left-hand side:
Dλ(LC‖LN) = λDKL(LC‖L) + (1− λ)DKL(LN‖L) =
= λ
∑
i
LC(i) log2
LC(i)
L(i) + (1− λ)
∑
i
LN(i) log2
LN(i)
L(i) =
=
[
−λ
∑
i
LC(i) log2 L(i)− (1− λ)
∑
i
LN(i) log2 L(i)
]
−
−
[
−λ
∑
i
LC(i) log2 LC(i)− (1− λ)
∑
i
LN(i) log2 LN(i)
]
=
= H(L)−H(L | X).
So the information-theoretic metric of the uniﬁed framework [152] applies well to
the collision detection procedure.
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The metric is interpreted in the sense that its higher values (i.e. higher mu-
tual information I(X,L)) mean better distinguishing between the distributions and
therefore better collision detection. In the following, we use the λ-divergence to
compare our collision detection techniques to each other and to the existing tech-
niques.
2.5.7 Comparison of dimension reduction techniques
For the comparison of collision detection techniques using the λ-divergence, one has
to know the distributions LC and LN. The only way to obtain these distributions
is to estimate them empirically. The same problem of estimating the leakage dis-
tribution arises in MIA attacks and several distribution estimation methods have
been reported to be used [121]. We have opted for the histogram method, that
is, we obtain the histograms for LC and LN from the samplings of Euclidean dis-
tance using the side-channel traces from our reference implementation for equal and
non-equal inputs, respectively. Then we compute Dλ(LC‖LN) following (2.9) in a
straightforward way, setting λ = 1/256.
Figure 2.6 shows an example of distributions LC and LN from our experiments.
More precisely, the histogram for LC describes the distribution of the Euclidean
distance between traces corresponding to pairs of colliding inputs, whereas the
histogram for LN presents the distribution of the Euclidean distance between the
traces corresponding to pairs of non-colliding inputs. The distributions in this
example are visually diﬀerent.
We have evaluated our two new dimension reduction techniques SD and WSD,
the technique SV commonly used in DPA, and detection without dimension re-
duction as a reference point. We tried averaging t traces to capture the eﬀect of
noise reduction. Figure 2.7 presents the experimental results for the considered
techniques. The ﬁgure demonstrates the gain of collision-related key information
brought by one comparison. The horizontal axis shows the data complexity, namely,
the number t of trace averagings before comparison. The vertical axis shows infor-
mation Dλ, measured in bits. Diﬀerent curves correspond to diﬀerent dimension
reduction methods. Dimension reduction by variance, SV, which works well in DPA
attacks, only moderately improves collision detection. Whereas both new methods,
SD and WSD, lead to clearly more eﬃcient collision detection, WSD being supe-
rior. In other words, they provide lower data complexity for the same amount of
information delivered by one comparison. As expected, the information gain grows
with the averaging, since the latter increases the SNR.
2.6 Practical evaluation
Here we show that the techniques we introduce in this work perform well in practice.
We implement (linear) collision attacks (Section 2.2) following our combination
framework with the DPA-driven test of chain (Section 2.3) and employing the new
collision detection methods (Section 2.5) against the target implementation. We
experimentally estimate the eﬃciency of these DPA-combined collision attacks.
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2.6.1 AES implementation and measurement equipment
We performed our attacks for a typical AES-128 implementation on the Atmel
ATmega16, a RISC µC from the 8-bit AVR family following a Harvard architecture.
8-bit AVR µC are widely used in embedded devices.
To run a collision attack, the attacker has to know when the AES S-boxes are
executed. So we measured the power consumption of the table look-ups corre-
sponding to the relevant S-box applications. These include instances in SubBytes,
ShiftRows, and MixColumns operations. The typical AES operations involving a
single state byte were implemented in the AVR assembly as follows.
; SubBytes
mov ZL, R16 ; load input byte, 1 cycle
lpm ; perform S-box lookup, 3 cycles
st Y, R0 ; store S-box output byte into SRAM, 2 cycles
; ShiftRows
ld R1, Y ; load state byte, 2 cycles
st X, R2 ; store it to another location in SRAM, 2 cycles
; pre-MixColumns
ld R2, X ; load it again, 2 cycles
The S-box lookup table was stored in the program memory and accessed with
the LPM instruction of the µC. SRAM was used to store the state byte. The trigger
signal was raised by the implementation on a microcontroller’s pin prior to execution
of the above instructions.
The µC was clocked at 3.68 MHz and supplied with an operating voltage of 5
V from a standard laboratory power source. The variations of the power consump-
tion were observed on a shunt resistor of 5.6 Ohm inserted into the ground line of
the microcontroller. Our target board with the µC is shown in Figure 2.8. The
measurements were performed with a LeCroy WaveRunner 104MXi DSO equipped
with ZS1000 active probe. The DSO has 8-bit resolution and 1 GHz input band-
width (with the speciﬁed probe). The acquisitions were performed at the maximum
sampling rate of 10 GS/s without any input ﬁlters. A Faraday cage made of the
copper foil was used, but the measurement setup was not noise-optimized in any
other way. For example, we did not use optical decoupling in the serial line, while
the level converter that is necessary in the case of the galvanic coupling is know to
be a source of noise [144].
With the given shunt resistor and 160 mV peak-to-peak vertical resolution set
on the DSO, variations of the consumed current as small as 110 µA could be ob-
served, while the average power consumption of the microcontroller in the given
conﬁguration was about 12 mA. The DSO, the power source and the target device
shared the common ground, also connected to the Faraday cage.
The DSO was controlled remotely via Gigabit Ethernet connection by the MAT-
LAB script running on the host PC and using LeCroy’s ActiveDSO ActiveX com-
ponent. The same script was sending the inputs to the microcontroller over the
serial line. The DSO was set to the sequence acquisition mode, which enabled to
achieve the acquisition rate of 150 traces per second. Each trace consisted initially
of 46000 samples.
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Figure 2.8: Our target board with ATmega16: photo (a) and schematics (b)
As in case of DPA [36], collision detection methods tend to be sensitive to the
pre-processing of measured signals. To pre-process the traces, we proceed in two
steps. First, the traces are decimated by applying a low-pass ﬁlter to the original
traces and subsequently resampling them at a lower rate. Additionally to noise
reduction, this was reported to weaken time jitter [144]. We decimated the traces
10 times, to 4600 samples. Second, the decimated traces are denoised by applying
a wavelet decomposition at a certain level, thresholding the detail coeﬃcients, and
subsequent wavelet reconstruction. Wavelets of the Symlet family proposed by
Daubechies that were used in [36] have shown to be most suitable for this operation
in our experiments as well (ﬁrst of all, the ’sym3’ wavelet). Pre-processed traces
were stored along with the corresponding input bytes.
Finally, we reduced the dimension of the pre-processed traces to 900 samples
using our techniques SD or WSD. This number was chosen empirically by observ-
ing when the attack eﬃciency reached saturation. The component of DPA was
implementing CPA in the Hamming weight model [31].
2.6.2 Practical combined attacks
Launching a series of 500 attacks for a given number of inputs γ and averagings
t, we experimentally estimated the eﬃciency parameters deﬁned in Section 2.4 of
all attacks in question. Namely, besides the online complexity Conline = t · γ, we
obtained the success probability π by counting the number of successful attacks:
we considered an attack successful if it was possible to recover the correct full AES
key with Crecovery ≤ 240.
Instead of using a ﬁxed or adaptive (like in [28]) threshold for the value of
Euclidean distance E in collision detection, we follow another approach that allows
to improve the attack eﬃciency. We consider a list of collision candidates consisting
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Figure 2.9: Attack success rate π in practice against the measurement complexity
Conline for diﬀerent number of inputs γ
of all (16 · γ)2/2 − 8 · γ S-box instance pairs sorted by E ascending. Taking c top
candidates out of this list, starting from c = 1, we determine the number of chains h
and their lengths ni, i = 1, . . . , h. In case of the collision-only attack, Crecovery = 2
8h
and we can have h at most 5 to stay within the admissible bound of 240. If h is
higher, we take one more collision (increment c). Once we have enough collisions
to attain h = 5, we perform the key recovery and check if the correct full key is
among the recovered candidates. A similar approach can be used in case of the
DPA-combined collision attack.
We experimentally characterized 4 speciﬁc attacks employing our techniques:
collisions using SD, collisions using WSD, collisions using SD combined with DPA,
and collisions using WSD combined with DPA. Comparison of these 4 attacks in
terms of the success rate π of the full key recovery for diﬀerent number of distinct
inputs γ against the total measurement complexity Conline = t · γ is presented in
Figure 2.9. As a reference, we also plot the success rate of the DPA-only attack with
N = Conline inputs (note that in a DPA attack t = 1) with Crecovery also bounded
by about 240, i.e. when about 240 most probable AES key candidates as suggested
by DPA are tested.
One can see that the combination of collision attacks with DPA clearly outper-
forms both collision-only and DPA-only attacks. The dimension reduction technique
WSD outperforms SD, thus, conforming to the information-theoretic comparison in
Section 2.5.7.
2.7 Conclusions and open problems
In this Chapter, we presented combined divide-and-conquer and collision attacks
using side-channel leakage against implementations of cryptographic algorithms.
Our experimental results suggest that combined attacks exploit more information
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in the side-channel scenario than their stand-alone components. Below we present
a relation of our attacks to the existing ones and outline some open problems.
Unlike collision attacks, template attacks require, in addition to a proper dimen-
sion reduction, detailed knowledge of the implementation for proﬁling. This appears
to be a much weaker attack model than the one we use. However, the evaluation of
template-combined collision attacks using our framework is still an open problem.
This combination can possibly reduce the cost of the proﬁling stage. Another line
of future research, initiated in [25], is using proﬁling to improve collision detection.
As collision and template attacks, MIA [12] can work with the leakage models
where DPA attacks do not work. However, as demonstrated in [121], MIA tends to
be signiﬁcantly less eﬃcient than DPA in terms of the required number of traces for
implementations exhibiting a simple (linear) leakage model, even in the presence
of strong noise. It is another open problem to evaluate MIA-combined collision
attacks using our framework. As in the case of template attacks, we expect this
combination to result in a reduced complexity.
While DPA, MIA and template techniques have been naturally incorporated
by the uniﬁed framework for comparing side-channel attacks [152], such analytical
techniques as collision attacks, considered here, and algebraic attacks [126], cannot
be reasonably captured by the uniﬁed framework directly. We consider it an impor-
tant open problem to come up with a development of the uniﬁed framework both
practically and generically applicable to analytic attacks. However, in this work we
successfully applied metrics similar to those of [152] to study some local properties
of collision attacks.
From an information-theoretic perspective, each comparison of two traces with
the purpose of collision detection, should yield in our attacks up to 0.03 bit key-
related information (see Figure 2.7). However, not all of it is used for key recovery
afterwards, where only collisions result in equations. At the same time, detected
non-collisions also carry useful information ignored by the current techniques. Their
usage seems to be technically problematic, since each non-collision would add an
equation of a high degree to the system of equations to be solved. We leave this as
another open problem.
To prevent attacks we described in this Chapter, the countermeasures commonly
used against side-channel attacks, namely masking and hiding [101], can be applied.
We note that, unlike stand-alone collision attacks, DPA-combined collision attacks
cannot naturally overpass certain masking schemes since masking will disable the
DPA component. Overpassing masking might be possible in case higher-order DPA
[101] or template attacks are used as a divide-and-conquer component of a combined
attack. Practicability of such combinations against a masked implementation is an
open question.
Chapter 3
Side-channel trace driven
cache-collision attacks
In this Chapter we elaborate on the attacks that exploit cache events, which are
visible in some side channel, to derive a secret key used in an embedded software
implementation of AES. We focus on making trace driven cache collision attacks
tolerant to errors in cache event detection that can take place in a noisy measure-
ment environment. Our basic known plaintext attack can recover the full 128-bit
AES secret key with approximately 30 side-channel measurements, with the oﬄine
working time of several seconds on a common PC. This is comparable to classi-
cal DPA; additionally, our attacks are able to overcome certain boolean masking
variants. We also improve the attack presented in ACISP 2006 [58].
We perform practical explorations of cache event detection in the electromag-
netic leakage of a 32-bit ARM µC. Finally, we show that previous univariate models
for estimating attack complexity are not good, and present the multivariate model
which is easy to simulate.
This is a joint work with Jean-François Gallais and Michael Tunstall, published
in [60], and with Jean-François Gallais, published in [59].
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3.1 Introduction
Fetching data from the random access memory or non-volatile memory in embedded
microprocessors can take a signiﬁcant number of clock cycles and a processor is
unable to perform any further instructions while it waits. The use of cache memory
aims to decrease the cost of memory accesses. Cache memory is a memory held
within the core of the microprocessor that can be accessed rapidly. When data
is accessed the line of data holding this address is moved to the cache, where the
amount of data moved is dictated by the architecture of the cache. This is based
on the assumption that when a certain address is accessed it is likely that the data
around this address is also likely to be accessed in the near future.
It has been noted that the power consumption of a microprocessor is dependent
on the instruction being executed and on any data being manipulated [88, 31].
An attacker can, therefore, observe where functions, and sequences of functions,
occur in a power consumption trace. This could, potentially, allow an attacker to
derive information on cryptographic keys if an observed sequence is aﬀected by the
value of the key. It has also been observed that the electromagnetic ﬁeld around a
microprocessor also has this property [61, 122].
3.1.1 Cache-collision attacks
Cache mechanism of the microprocessors has been known to be able to leak key-
dependent information and therefore to be exploitable in side-channel attacks for
about 10 years [78, 115]. Since then, many cache-based attacks were reported; they
fall into three diﬀerent types. Time-driven attacks like [15] exploit the dependence
of the execution time of an algorithm on the cache accesses. In access-driven attacks
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presented in [109, 114], an attacker learns which cache lines were accessed during the
execution by pre-loading the cache with the chosen data (which requires running a
spy process on the device in parallel to the target algorithm). Finally, in trace-driven
attacks ﬁrst suggested in [16] an adversary derives information from individual
cache events from the side-channel trace of an execution, such as registered power
consumption or electromagnetic emanations. Trace-driven attacks pose a particular
threat to embedded devices since the latter are exposed to a high risk of power or
electromagnetic (EM) analysis, as opposed to desktop and server implementations
that are a usual target in access- and time-driven cache attacks.
Like collision [141, 24] and algebraic attacks [126], trace-driven cache collision
attacks recover the key from the relations yielded by the side-channel leakage. In
this, they are diﬀerent from diﬀerential power analysis (DPA) [88] which is a divide-
and-conquer attack known to be very practical. Our motivation here is to make
trace-driven cache collision attacks comparable, if not superior, to DPA in terms
of both online (number of measurements) and oﬄine (recovering the key from the
measurements) complexity.
3.1.2 Our contributions
In this work we consider the eﬀect of a cache on an instantiation of AES. Given
the above observation, cache accesses should be visible in the power consumption
or electromagnetic emanations. The location of these cache accesses during the
computation of AES has been shown to reveal information on the secret key used [16,
58].
We start with presenting a signiﬁcant improvement of the adaptive chosen plain-
text trace-driven attack of [58] with a new adaptive algorithm for choosing plaintexts
enabling the recovery of the 60 bits of the key with the expected number of mea-
surement being 14.5 instead of 127 for the original attack (Section 3.3). Then we
present a known-plaintext attack requiring only 30 traces and a remaining exhaus-
tive search in 10 hypotheses to recover the full 128-bit AES secret key (Section 3.4).
This attack follows the same approach as in [2] and [30], however we treat the case
of conventional 256-byte S-box lookup tables (since such would be used in a very
constrained or masked implementation), and precisely describe the full key recovery
process, including the second round part of the attack. While being comparable
to DPA in terms of complexity, our attacks are able to overcome certain masking
techniques.
Our main contribution is in making the attacks tolerant to uncertainties in cache
event detection. Our practical explorations show that cache events corresponding
to AES S-box lookups are well distinguishable in the power consumption and EM
radiation of a microcontroller (Section 3.5). However, side-channel measurements
may be noisy in a real-life scenario, making it hard to distinguish cache events
reliably. We show (Section 3.6) that even for signiﬁcant probabilities of detection
uncertainties, the error-tolerant versions of our attacks still require a feasible number
of measurements to succeed. Our attacks can also deal with the condition when
the cache already holds a part of the S-box lookup table prior to the algorithm
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execution, in a manner described in [30].
Finally, we scrutinize the theoretical model of the attacks and show that while
a univariate model can be used to roughly estimate the attack measurement com-
plexity, the real attack follows a multivariate model (Section 3.7). Our practical
results match the theoretical estimations.
3.1.3 Notation
Throughout this Chapter, we denote
• the most and the least signiﬁcant nibbles of a byte b with b̂ and qb correspond-
ingly;
• the input of the SubByte function in the ﬁrst AES round as xi, equal to
pi ⊕ ki, where pi and ki respectively represent the plaintext byte and the
corresponding key byte, 0 ≤ i ≤ 15;
• addition and multiplication over GF(28) by ⊕ and • respectively.
We index the bytes row-wise and not column-wise as in the AES speciﬁcation
[171, 49], i.e. in our notation p0, p1, p2, p3 is the ﬁrst row of a 16-byte plaintext
(we assume that in an embedded software AES implementation S-box lookups are
performed row-wise, so indexing bytes in the order of S-box computation simpliﬁes
the description of our algorithms).
3.2 Generalities and previous work
In this Section, we present an overview of caching, our assumptions about the cache
mechanism, related work and relation to side-channel collision attacks.
3.2.1 Caching and performance
The gap between the increased speed at which modern microprocessors treat data
and the comparatively slow latencies required to fetch the data from the Non-
Volatile Memories to the registers raise performance issues. To reduce the “distance”
between the CPU and the NVM, i.e. the number of wasted clock cycles for which
the CPU has to wait for the data, the solution is to keep them quickly accessible
in a faster memory. Faster, however, typically means more expensive, hence this
choice aﬀects the size of available fast storage memory, the so-called cache memory.
Examples of embedded devices with cache memory are the microprocessors of the
widespread ARM9 family and of the subsequent ARM families [7].
Concretely, modern microprocessors typically come with a SRAM cache mem-
ory. When a byte of data must be paged in during the computation, the processor
ﬁrst looks for in the cache. If present in the cache, this results in a cache hit,
the data is brought to the registers within a single clock cycle without stalling the
pipeline. If not present in the cache, this results in the cache miss, and the desired
data fetched from Non-Volatile Memory (NVM), and the entire line containing the
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desired data is loaded into the cache. As suggested by the diﬀerent technologies
used in the cache and main memory, a cache miss typically takes more clock cycles
and consumes more energy than a cache hit.
3.2.2 Cache-based attacks: related work
Following the pioneering articles of Kelsey et al. [78] and Page [115], several notori-
ous attacks have been published involving the cache mechanism and targeting AES.
Cache-based attacks fall into three diﬀerent types. Time-driven attacks exploit the
dependence of the execution time of an algorithm on the cache accesses. Bernstein
described a simple cache-timing attack leading to a complete key recovery on a re-
mote server [15]. In access-driven attacks presented in [109, 114], an attacker learns
which cache lines were accessed during the execution by pre-loading the cache with
the chosen data.
Here, we elaborate on trace-driven attacks. In this type of cache attacks an
adversary derives information from individual cache events from the side-channel
trace of an execution, such as registered power consumption or electromagnetic
emanations. Trace-driven attacks pose a particular threat to embedded devices
since the latter are exposed to a high risk of power or electromagnetic analysis, as
opposed to desktop and server implementations that are a usual target in access-
and time-driven cache attacks (however, a cache-timing attack on embedded AES
implementation was presented recently in [26]).
Previous work on trace-driven attacks was described in [16, 91, 2, 58, 167].
However, most of these works target an optimized AES implementation that uses
large lookup tables, as described in the original Rijndael proposal [49]. Here we
focus on a conventional 256-byte lookup table since this would often be the choice
in a constrained device, e.g. in a smart card, for the reasons outlined above in
the Introduction. Also, previous works did not tackle the unreliable cache event
detection, at most considering the setting when a lookup table is partially pre-
loaded into the cache [30]. In [16, 91, 2, 30], the eﬀect of cache organization, and
in particular the cache line size, on the attack was considered. Here we develop our
attacks assuming the cache line size is 16 bytes, but they can be easily adapted to
other sizes. Another popular cache line size is 32 bytes; in this case our attack will
be more complex (however, the dependency of the attack complexity on the cache
organization is not straightforward, as detailed in [30]).
Also, previous work on trace-driven cache attacks rarely included experiments
with real embedded devices and assumed a noise-free environment. Simulations of
the side-channel leakage of the cache were performed in [16]. A novel trace-driven
cache attack against CLEFIA [124] exploiting diﬀerential cryptanalysis methods
has been carried out in practice using the power consumption measurements on the
PowerPC processor of a Xilinx Virtex-II FPGA.
3.2.3 Relation to side-channel collision attacks
We also note that there is a similarity between cache attacks and side-channel
collision attacks [141, 24], as already observed in [91], hence the name cache-collision
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attacks. Here we outline the commons and diﬀerences between the two attacks to
better explain the nature of the subject.
As opposed to DPA and other divide-and-conquer attacks, both collision attacks
and cache-collision attacks do not recover the individual key chunks. Instead, they
impose restrictions on the key through a set of equations in the key chunks and thus
reduce the key search space, belonging to the class of analytic attacks. Both attacks
get the equations involving key bytes from the collisions in the values of the sensitive
intermediate variables. Collisions are detectable through side-channel leakage. So
both attacks feature two distinct phases: a) detection of collisions in side-channel
traces, leading to a set of equations in the subkey chunks, and b) exploitation of
collisions by solving (simplifying) the system of equations and thus obtaining a set
of key candidates.
At the phase of collision detection, the similarity between the attacks is in the
loosened side-channel leakage model. In both attacks, one does not need to know
exactly how does the leakage behave, it suﬃces to know that it is diﬀerent for dif-
ferent values of the target variable and the same for the equal values. The diﬀerence
however is that in collision attacks, collisions are detected by explicit comparison
of side-channel traces using some measure of distance, like the sum of the squared
diﬀerences of corresponding trace points. Whereas in cache-collision attacks, the
comparison is implicitly performed by the cache access mechanism of the device
itself and the side-channel trace shows already the result of the comparison. So it
suﬃces to distinguish a cache miss from a cache hit in a side-channel trace. But,
again, the exact behaviour of the leakage in each of the cases (hit/miss) is not im-
portant. In both cases, the issue of reliable detection of collisions (cf. cache events)
arises when it comes to the real measurements “in the wild”. The approaches to
dealing with detection errors are similar, as described further in Section 3.6.
At the phase of collision exploitation, the attacks are distinct in the structure of
the systems of equations. In a cache-collision attack, one looks for collisions between
S-box inputs and the contents of the memory cache when the look-up occurs. This
is the place where the two important diﬀerences from collision attacks arise, namely:
1. the cache may contain multiple entries, which means that a single cache event
gives rise either to several possible collisions of which one and the only one is
true (in the case of a hit), or to several non-collisions that hold simultaneously
(in the case of a miss);
2. the cache entries are normally the entire memory lines corresponding to the
higher order part of the lookup address, which means that cache events
(hits/misses) are related to collisions in the higher order bits of the sensi-
tive variable; no information about the lower order bits is revealed.
Because of this, cache-collisions result in more complex systems of equations com-
pared to the ones arising in collision attacks.
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3.2.4 Our assumptions about cache mechanism
Here we present our assumptions about the cache mechanism and the implementa-
tion of the AES lookup table that will be used in our attacks. In general, we follow
the description made in [30] and assumptions of [58].
We assume that the AES implementation uses lookup tables of 256 entries. Let b
be the size of a table entry in bytes. In case of a standard S-box implementation b =
1 (unless the 8-bit entries are stored as words of native length for the platform), in
case of T-tables used in optimized implementations [49] b = 4. Let l be the cache line
size in bytes. In modern embedded microcontrollers common sizes are l = 16 and
l = 32. Then, we have δ = l/b entries per cache line and m = 256 · b/l cache blocks
per lookup table (note that δ ·m = 256). The value of δ (or, equivalently, m) has
eﬀect on the attack complexity (described in [30]) since cache events are determined
by equalities/inequalities of 8− log2 δ higher order bits of the inputs to the lookups.
We assume that the lookup table is aligned with the cache. Recent work [167] has
shown that the attack is also possible when lookup tables are misaligned.
We present our attacks for the case b = 1, l = 16. The attacks are adaptable
to other cache and lookup table conﬁgurations. We carry out theoretical analysis
(Section 3.7) in general for diﬀerent cache line sizes, i.e. for diﬀerent values of m.
We assume that in an embedded software AES implementation S-box lookups
are performed row-wise (and therefore our row-wise notation simpliﬁes the descrip-
tion of the attack algorithms). The adversary is dealing with a sequence of observed
cache events, misses or hits, occurred in the ﬁrst two rounds of the implementa-
tion. We call this sequence a cache trace. A cache trace can be recovered from a
side-channel trace, as we show in Section 3.6. Since there may be uncertainties in
distinguishing a miss from a hit, we also introduce an additional type of observed
cache event: the uncertain event.
Like the attacks of [30], our attack do not necessarily require the cache to be
clean of lookup table entries prior to each run of the implementation, but can be
more eﬃcient under the clean cache assumption.
3.3 Improved chosen plaintext attack
In this Section we recall the attack presented in [58]. We then show how to improve
the ﬁrst round part of this attack to achieve a signiﬁcant reduction in the number
of chosen plaintexts for the recovery of the 60 bits of the key. It will appear how-
ever that for the full key recovery the chosen plaintext strategy is ineﬃcient since
choosing plaintexts in the second round stage cannot be done eﬃciently, so we will
describe an eﬃcient known plaintext attack in Section 3.4.
3.3.1 Adaptive chosen plaintext attack of ACISP’06
The trace-driven cache-collision attack presented in [58] uses an adaptive chosen
plaintext strategy, i.e. each plaintext is chosen according to the result of the analysis
done beforehand. The attack follows the assumptions we made in Section 3.2.4.
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The ﬁrst round part of the attack works as follows. An attacker ﬁrst makes the
device encrypt a plaintext (we can assume all its bytes are zero without loosing the
generality). Since the cache is clean prior to the AES execution, during the initial
S-box lookup of the ﬁrst round the entire line indexed by the upper nibble of x0 is
loaded to the cache, inducing a ﬁrst cache miss. The subsequent lookup, indexed
by x1, will be a cache hit with probability
1
16 , as there is one chance over 16 that
the values S(x0) and S(x1) belong to the same line. If a cache hit occurs, then we
have
k̂0 ⊕ p0 = k̂1 ⊕ p1 .
By rearranging the terms in the equation, we obtain
k̂0 ⊕ k1 = p̂0 ⊕ p1 .
An attacker can search among the 16 possible values for the upper nibble of p1
(submitting further traces to the device) and ﬁnd the one inducing a cache hit
within an expected number of
∑16
i=1
i
16 = 8.5 acquisitions. Once the correct value for
the second lookup is found, she can reiterate the process for the 14 other lookups.
She will end up with the trace MHH. . . H and thus with the actual values for
k̂0 ⊕ k1, k̂0 ⊕ k2, . . . , ̂k0 ⊕ k15. This gives a system of 15 linear equations in 16 upper
nibbles of the key bytes. This system reduces the key search space by 60 bits.
Algorithm 3 presents this adaptive strategy.
Algorithm 3: Adaptive Chosen Plaintext Trace-Driven Cache-Collision At-
tack [58]
Input: AES
1: Plaintext ← (0, 0, 0, . . . , 0)
2: i← 1
3: while i < 16 do
4: CacheTrace ← AES(Plaintext)
5: if CacheTrace[i] == Miss then
6: ̂Plaintext[i]++
7: else
8: i++
9: end if
10: end while
Output: Plaintext=(p0, p1, p2, . . . , p15)
The expected number of plaintexts (traces) required for this algorithm to ﬁnish
is 15× 8.5 = 127.5. Below we show how to improve this ﬁgure,
3.3.2 Improved strategy
The attack strategy describe above does not optimally exploit the adaptive scenario.
Namely, we observe that in Algorithm 3 ignored are the events located in the
cache trace to the right of the current event (for which the plaintext nibble is
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being chosen). Below we show that by observing these events we can induce more
constraints on the choice of the subsequent plaintexts drastically reduce the total
number of plaintexts required to achieve the desired trace MHH. . . H.
We make use of the fact that a miss at position i, 0 < i < 16, indicates that
p̂j ⊕ kj 6= p̂i ⊕ ki for all j such that 0 ≤ j < i and event at position j is a miss.
This means that any plaintext with the particular diﬀerence p̂j ⊕ pi between the
nibbles in positions j and i will not lead to the desired trace MHH. . . H. So the
plaintexts with this diﬀerence can be omitted from the subsequent queries. On the
other hand, if there is a hit at position i, the plaintext nibble in this position may
already be the one which we are searching for, i.e. satisfying p̂0 ⊕ k0 = p̂i ⊕ ki. So
we cannot do better than keeping it for the next query, changing it only if the event
in position i becomes a miss in subsequent queries.
The formal description of our improved strategy is given in Algorithm 4. The
algorithm terminates with a plaintext (p0, p1, . . . , p15) yielding the desired cache
trace MHH. . . H and thus reducing the key search space by 60 bits. In the algorithm,
SelectNextPlaintext is the routine choosing the next plaintext satisfying the given
constraints. Namely, in every miss position j (except for the initial miss in position
zero), this routine chooses a plaintext nibble satisfying all the constraints with j
preceding nibbles, or, in case there is no such plaintext nibble, just the subsequent
value of the nibble.
Algorithm 4: Improved Chosen Plaintext Trace-Driven Cache-Collision At-
tack
Input: AES
1: Plaintext ← {0}16
2: Constraints ← {∅}16,16
3: i← 1
4: while i < 16 do
5: Plaintext ← SelectNextPlaintext(i, Plaintext, Constraints)
6: CacheTrace ← AES(Plaintext)
7: for j from i to 15 do
8: if CacheTrace[j] == Miss then
9: for k from 0 to j − 1 do
10: if CacheTrace[k] == Miss then
11: Constraints[j][k] ←− Constraints[j][k] ∪ ̂Plaintext[j]⊕ ̂Plaintext[k]
12: end if
13: end for
14: end if
15: end for
16: while (CacheTrace[i] == Hit) AND (i < 16) do
17: i++
18: end while
19: end while
Output: Plaintext={pl}15l=0
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of the number of plaintexts required to obtain a 60-bit
reduction of the key search space in a chosen plaintext attack
We have simulated this attack with 105 random keys both for the original Algo-
rithm 3 describing the strategy of [58] and our improved Algorithm 4. The results
are shown in Figure 3.1. The improvement is drastic: on average 14.5 plaintexts
for our improved attack to obtain a 60-bit reduction against 127.5 for the original
attack. These ﬁgures are for the case of absolutely reliable cache event detection.
In Sect. 3.6 we will show that this improved algorithm is in fact inherently tolerant
to uncertainties in cache event detection.
3.3.3 Drawback of the chosen plaintext strategy
To recover the remaining 68 bits of the key, the analysis of the second round lookups
is performed in [58]. It also exploits chosen plaintext strategy, continuing to look
for plaintexts leading to hits in the ﬁrst two second round lookups. This strategy
is quite ineﬃcient, requiring 1280 traces on average to succeed with the recovery
with the exhaustive search over the remaining 24 (and not 32 as stated in [58])
unknown bits. The ineﬃciency is due to picking the plaintexts from the pool of
unused one at random. Unlike the ﬁrst round stage, this cannot be improved: one
cannot introduce an eﬃcient way of inducing constraints on the plaintexts due to
the non-linearity of the equations emerging from the second round lookups. So our
improvement has an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on the full attack measurement complexity.
Therefore, we had to come up with a known plaintext attack which we will describe
in the next Section.
3.4 Known plaintext attack
Here we present a trace-driven attack that works in the known plaintext scenario.
That is, an attacker in possession of the target device implementing AES can submit
plaintexts (or ciphertexts, since the attack will work for decryption as well) to it
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and observe the corresponding cache traces for the ﬁrst AES round and 2 to 4 ﬁrst
lookups of the second AES round. Our attack strategy is similar to those already
described in [30] and [58]. We describe the exact algorithm of the attack, including
the second round stage. Our description is for the case of a common S-box lookup
table of 256 bytes and cache line size of 16 bytes. We will show in Section 3.6 that
our algorithm can be made tolerant to uncertainties in cache event detection.
The attack is composed of an online phase and an oﬄine phase. In the online
phase, the attacker makes the device encrypt a number of plaintexts and observes
the side-channel leakage that reveals cache traces. In the oﬄine phase, the cache
traces are used to recover the secret key used by the device. The oﬄine phase has
two stages. The ﬁrst stage deals with the ﬁrst round cache events and leads to the
recovery of 60 key bits. The second round stage recovers the remaining the bits (or
part of them enabling exhaustive search for the remaining unknown bits) using the
second round cache events.
3.4.1 Analysis of the first round
In this stage, we analyze the 16 cache events occurring in the ﬁrst AES round. Our
inputs are N plaintexts and the corresponding cache traces that are obtained from
N acquisitions. In a q-th acquisition, a plaintext P (q) is a 16-byte array and a cache
trace (CT )(q) is the array of the cache accesses observed in the ﬁrst round of AES,
while encrypting P (q) under the unknown key K = (k0, k1, . . . , k15). The result of
the analysis will be a set of linear equations in the high nibbles of ki, i ∈ {0, 15}
that will decreases the entropy of the key search space by 60 bits.
We recall that cache events observed in a side-channel trace allow an attacker
to determine whether at a certain lookup the S-box input belongs to a previously
loaded line of the lookup table or not. A cache miss occurring at the i-th lookup
can be algebraically expressed as the following inequation:
∀j ∈ Γ, k̂i ⊕ pi 6= k̂j ⊕ pj
where Γ denotes the set of indices where previously occurred a cache miss. In a
similar way a cache hit at the i-th lookup can be described with:
∃!j ∈ Γ, k̂i ⊕ pi = k̂j ⊕ pj
Using the relation k̂i ⊕ kj = k̂i ⊕ k0 ⊕ k̂0 ⊕ kj , the terms above can be rearranged
as follows:
∀j ∈ Γ, k̂i ⊕ k0 6= p̂i ⊕ pj ⊕ k̂j ⊕ k0
when the i-th cache event is a miss, and
∃!j ∈ Γ, k̂i ⊕ k0 = p̂i ⊕ pj ⊕ k̂j ⊕ k0
when it is a hit.
We aim to recover k̂0 ⊕ ki, 1 ≤ i ≤ 15, for which we deﬁne the inital set of pos-
sible values: κi = {0, . . . , 15}. If we assume to know the values of (k̂0 ⊕ kj)1≤j≤i−1,
60 Side-channel trace driven cache-collision attacks
the above equations and inequations resulting from cache events gradually reduce
the number of possible values for k̂0 ⊕ ki from 16 to 1, i ranging from 1 to 15,
allowing a recursive recovery of the values for all k̂i ⊕ k0. Hence we analyze the
traces lookup by lookup, instead of trace by trace. Finally, the high nibbles of the
key bytes form a system of 15 linearly independent equations, reducing the entropy
of the key down to 128− 4× 15 = 68 bits. The formal description of the ﬁrst round
analysis is given by Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5: Known plaintext analysis of the ﬁrst round
Input: (P (q), CT (q)), q ∈ [1, N ]
1: κi ← {0, . . . , 15}, 1 ≤ i ≤ 15
2: for i← 1 to 15 do
3: q ← 0
4: while |κi| > 1 do
5: q ← q + 1
6: κ′ ← ∅
7: for j ← 0 to i− 1 do
8: if CT
(q)
j = Miss then
9: κ′ ← κ′ ∪
{
̂
p
(q)
i ⊕ p(q)j ⊕ κj
}
10: end if
11: end for
12: if CT
(q)
i = Miss then
13: κi ← κi \ κ′
14: else
15: κi ← κi ∩ κ′
16: end if
17: end while
18: end for
Output: κi, i ∈ [1, 15]
To estimate the number of traces required to complete the ﬁrst round analysis,
we ran the implementation of Algorithm 5 in 105 simulated attacks, each with a
random key. Figure 3.2(a) presents the results of this simulation. On average 19.43
acquisitions are required to reduce the entropy of the key to 68 bits. We stress that
this is less than for the original chosen plaintext attack of [58] that we recalled here
in Section 3.3.1.
Our strategy also works if we do not take into account the information available
from the cache hits, that is, if κi is not modiﬁed when a cache hit is observed in
a cache trace at the i-th lookup (line 15 of Algorithm 5). The resulting analysis
is less eﬃcient than the one of the misses and the hits, as depicted in the plotted
distribution of the number of required inputs (Figure 3.2(b)). The average number
of inputs required to perform a 60-bit reduction of the entropy of the key is in this
case 54.19. However, it was shown in [30] using only misses enables the analysis
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of the required number of plaintexts to obtain a 60-bit
reduction of the key search space in the known plaintext attack
in the case the cache already contains S-box lookup table lines prior to encryption.
We will recall this in Section 3.6.4.
3.4.2 Analysis of the second round
After the ﬁrst round analysis we are left with 68 unknown key bits. In this Section
we show how to recover these remaining bits by analyzing the cache events occurring
during the second AES encryption round. Our approach in general resembles that
of [58], however we exploit the cache events much more eﬃciently. Similar approach
was brieﬂy sketched in [2], they did not present the analysis for the number of traces
required, whereas we perform theoretical analysis in Sect. 3.7. We assume that the
round keys are pre-computed and pre-stored, thus no access to the S-box lookup
table occurs between the encryption rounds1.
The second round analysis re-uses the known inputs from the ﬁrst round analysis
(we assume that a 2-round cache trace is acquired for each input) and in most cases
require some additional known inputs. It covers 4 lookups and ﬁnishes with a small
exhaustive search, namely:
1. from the ﬁrst lookup, recover k̂0, qk0, qk5, qk7, qk10, qk15, 24 bits in total;
2. from the second lookup, recover qk1, qk6, qk11, qk12, 16 bits in total;
3. from the third lookup, recover (qk2,qk8,qk13), 12 bits in total;
4. from the fourth lookup, recover (qk3,qk4,qk9,qk14), 16 bits in total;
1Meanwhile, the strategy presented here would be straightforward to adapt to an AES imple-
mentation with an on-the-fly key schedule, and a similar strategy can be applied using xtimes
operation of AES MixColumns transform in case the former is implemented as a lookup table (see
[58] for using xtimes in a chosen plaintext attack).
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5. at this point we can have at most 10 full key candidates, the correct one can
be found by checking each against a known plaintext-ciphertext pair
The ﬁnal multiplicity of full key candidates is due to the fact that analysis of some
lookups may result in several candidates that are indistinguishable with any number
of inputs. Note that one can launch exhaustive search already after the analysis
of the second lookup, since at that point one is left with 228 unknown key bits,
so along with the possible multiplicity of candidates this leads to at most 230 full
key candidates to be tested. This is already practical, however the analysis of the
subsequent lookups has much less computational complexity while requiring almost
the same measurement complexity.
We describe our algorithm in detail for the ﬁrst lookup of the second round, and
brieﬂy for the subsequent lookups since the technique is the same.
First lookup of the second round
The ﬁrst lookup is indexed by
y0 = 2 • s(x0)⊕ 3 • s(x5)⊕ s(x10)⊕ s(x15)⊕ s(k7)⊕ k0 ⊕ 1.
The fact that this lookup is a miss, i.e. for a cache trace of the form M**. . . *|M. . . ,
leads to the following system of inequations:
ŷ0 6= x̂j1
. . .
ŷ0 6= x̂jL
, j1, . . . , jL ∈ Γ,
where Γ is set of indices of misses observed in the 16 previous lookups (of the ﬁrst
round), |Γ| = L. After rearranging the terms the system becomes
̂2 • s(x0)⊕ 3 • s(x5)⊕ s(x10)⊕ s(x15)⊕ s(k7) 6=

δ̂j1
. . .
δ̂jL
, j1, . . . , jL ∈ Γ, (3.1)
where δ̂j are some known values depending on the plaintext bytes and the XOR
diﬀerences of key byte nibbles recovered in the ﬁrst part of the analysis. Similarly,
in case the ﬁrst lookup is a hit, i.e. for a cache trace of the form M**. . . *|H. . . , we
have 〈 ŷ0 = x̂j1
. . .
ŷ0 = x̂jL
, j1, . . . , jL ∈ Γ
which after rearrangement becomes
̂2 • s(x0)⊕ 3 • s(x5)⊕ s(x10)⊕ s(x15)⊕ s(k7) =
〈 δ̂j1
. . .
δ̂jL
, j1, . . . , jL ∈ Γ. (3.2)
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We have only 24 unknown bits in the left part of (3.1) or (3.2) since from the
ﬁrst round analysis we know the high nibble of the XOR diﬀerence between any two
bytes of the key. Solving (3.1) or (3.2) for a single trace by exhaustive search over
224 candidates for these bits will leave us with some fraction of these candidates.
The next trace will result in a diﬀerent set of equations either of the form (3.1) or
of the form (3.2), and we can further reduce the amount of candidates.
After several traces, we will remain with the key bytes k0, k5, k10, k15 completely
recovered. However, up to 4 candidates will remain for k7, since for a given input
high nibble of the SubByte table, 1, 2, 3 or 4 input low nibbles may yield the same
output high nibble. Hence having just ŝ(k7) in the (in)equation it is not possible
to distinguish between several possibilities for qk7. In the analysis of the subsequent
lookups one has to consider this multiplicity, so in the end of the analysis one may
end up with several full key candidates.
Second lookup of the second round
Once done with the analysis of the ﬁrst lookup, we proceed to the second lookup
of the second round. This lookup is indexed by
y1 = 2 • s(x1)⊕ 3 • s(x6)⊕ s(x11)⊕ s(x12)⊕ s(k7)⊕ k0 ⊕ k1 ⊕ 1
Similarly, the fact that this lookup is a miss leads to the following system of in-
equations (after rearranging the terms):
̂2 • s(x1)⊕ 3 • s(x6)⊕ s(x11)⊕ s(x12) 6=

δ̂j1
. . .
δ̂jR
, j1, . . . , jR ∈ Γ, (3.3)
and if it is a hit, to the set of equations
̂2 • s(x1)⊕ 3 • s(x6)⊕ s(x11)⊕ s(x12) =
〈 δ̂j1
. . .
δ̂jR
, j1, . . . , jR ∈ Γ, (3.4)
where Γ is set of indices of misses observed in the 17 previous lookups (i.e. in
the ﬁrst round and in the ﬁrst lookup of the second round), |Γ| = R, and δ̂j are
some known values depending on the plaintext bytes and the previously recovered
nibbles of key bytes. The diﬀerence from the ﬁrst lookup analysis is that one of
the (in)equations in (3.3) or (3.4) may emerge from ŷ1 6= ŷ0 (if the ﬁrst lookup is
a miss). From the analysis of the ﬁrst lookup we already know y0 and thus can
consider this inequation here.
We have only 16 unknown bits in the left part of (3.3) or (3.4), namely the
nibbles qk1, qk6, qk11 and qk12, the rest having been recovered in the previous steps.
Solving the equations for several traces like in the analysis of the ﬁrst lookup, we
will get a single candidate for these unknown nibbles (for each of the candidates
from the ﬁrst lookup analysis, if they were multiple).
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After the analysis of the ﬁrst and second lookups of the second round the re-
maining unknown key chunks are qk2, qk3, qk4, qk8, qk9, qk13, qk14. They comprise 28 bits.
Considering up to 4 possible candidates for k7, the number of full key candidates
at this point is 230. So an exhaustive search can be already launched. But further
analyzing the third and the fourth lookups of the second round leads to a faster
attack, since a single evaluation of equation like 3.3 is much faster than the single
AES run, and we will have to perform at most about 216 evaluations.
Third and fourth lookups
The third lookup is indexed by
y2 = 2 • s(x2)⊕ 3 • s(x7)⊕ s(x8)⊕ s(x13)⊕ s(k7)⊕ k0 ⊕ k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ 1
where the nibbles (qk2,qk8,qk13), thus 12 bits, are unknown. Like for the ﬁrst 2
lookups, an adversary can run through the 212 possibilities for these nibbles and
retain only the candidate that satisﬁes all the (in)equations and inequations derived
from the previous lookups and plaintexts. These (in)equations may involve ŷ0 and
ŷ1, which are known from the previous steps.
The fourth lookup is indexed by
y3 = 2 • s(x3)⊕ 3 • s(x4)⊕ s(x9)⊕ s(x14)⊕ s(k7)⊕ k0 ⊕ k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ k3 ⊕ 1
where the unknown nibbles (qk3,qk4,qk9,qk14), 16 bits in total, are determined in the
same manner.
Like the ﬁst round analysis,the second round analysis can exploit only misses
to be robust to the pre-loaded cache condition.
3.4.3 Attack complexity
For the ﬁrst round part, the computational complexity is negligible: it runs in
seconds on a PC. The average measurement complexity of this part was already
presented in Section 3.4.1: about 19 traces in case both hits and misses are used.
For the second round part, we have to perform at most O(224) evaluations of
equations like 3.3. The ﬁnal exhaustive search is negligible. This part runs in
less than a minute on a PC. We mounted simulated attacks to determine average
measurement complexity; it is about 29 traces (re-using the traces from the ﬁrst
round part) in case both hits and misses are used.
We will present more detailed measurement complexity data after introducing
error-tolerant attack versions for a real-life noisy environment in Section 3.6. We
will also present the theoretical model for determining the measurement complexity
(Section 3.7), which is matched by our practical results.
3.5 Cache events in side-channel leakage
Here we describe our experiments with a µC and show that cache events can be
distinguished in the EM leakage with a very simple measurement setup.
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Figure 3.3: (a) EM traces of an ARM7 µC with distinguishable cache event se-
quences: miss-miss-miss (top) versus miss-hit-miss (bottom); (b) the µC with the
passive EM probe
We have experimented with Olimex LPC-H2124 development board [112] (Fig-
ure 3.3(b)) carrying NXP LPC2124 [111], an ARM7 µC. Though ARM7 family
devices do not normally have cache, this particular µC features a Memory Acceler-
ation Module (MAM). The MAM is a single-line cache that increases the eﬃciency
of accesses to the onboard ﬂash memory. In Figure 3.3(a) we present the EM traces
acquired while the µC with MAM enabled was performing a series of lookups in
the AES S-box table that was stored in the ﬂash memory. The acquisition was per-
formed with Langer RF-B 0.3-3 H-ﬁeld probe, Langer PA 203 20 dB pre-ampliﬁer
and LeCroy WaveMaster 104MXi oscilloscope. The CPU clock frequency of the µC
was 59 MHz, the sampling rate of the oscilloscope was set to 5 GS/s. The probe
was ﬁxed by a lab stand with the probe tip touching the surface of the µC package;
the precise position of the probe was determined experimentally.
The top trace shows a sequence of 3 cache misses, whereas the bottom trace
shows a miss-hit-miss sequence. Cache misses can be seen as distinguished peaks.
Note also the timing diﬀerences: Figure 3.3(a) suggests that the cache hit takes
2 CPU clock cycles less than the cache miss. We would like to stress that the
traces were acquired without any averaging in an unshielded setup depicted in Fig-
ure 3.3(b).
Since MAM is a single-line cache, the full attack we describe in this work cannot
be implemented with this µC. Still our experiments are a sound example of cache
event leakage for an ARM µC, which has not been considered in earlier works except
for [124], exploiting cache event leakage in the power consumption of a PowerPC
processor within a Xilinx Virtex-II FPGA to mount an attack against CLEFIA.
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3.6 Error-tolerant attack
In this Section, we will describe the full attack version resistant to uncertainties in
cache event detection. We begin with describing a general approach to dealing with
detection uncertainties, then explain how to make our attack algorithms deal with
uncertainties and ﬁnally present the resulting attack measurement complexities for
diﬀerent uncertainty levels.
3.6.1 General approach to distinguishing cache events
Although our experiments have shown a very clear and strong leakage of cache
events in EM traces, in general measurements can be contaminated with noise
which can disturb the extraction of the cache sequence from the side-channel trace.
Here we outline a way to deal with the noisy measurements in the case of cache
event detection, that will allow us to make our attacks work even in a noisy setting.
We assume that we can measure some statistic in a side-channel trace like the
height of the peak in the cycles corresponding to the table look-up, the value of
the statistic being larger in case of a cache miss and smaller in case of a cache hit.
We have shown above that this is a sound assumption which holds in practice. We
further assume that the statistic for hits and misses will follow the distributions
that are close to normal (due to the noise that is usually Gaussian). Distinguishing
between hits and misses is then a task of distinguishing between the two distribu-
tions.
A simple distinguishing solution would be in ﬁxing a single threshold for the
value of the statistic, like in practical collision detection of [28]. This will result
in an unavoidable trade-oﬀ between Type I and Type II errors. However, in our
algorithms both taking a miss for a hit and a hit for a miss will often lead to the
incorrect key recovery. Therefore, our approach is in ﬁxing 2 thresholds tH and tM ,
tH ≤ tM . In this setting, we distinguish between three types of events.
1. If the statistic is smaller than tH we consider the event to be a hit.
2. If the statistic is larger than tM , we consider the event to be a miss.
3. If the value of the statistic falls between the thresholds, we consider the event
to be “uncertain”.
We assume that the thresholds tH and tM are chosen such that it is highly unlikely
for a miss to be misinterpreted as a hit and vice versa. We denote the probability
of the “uncertain event” by p, which we also refer to as error probability. Below
we show how the additional “uncertain” category helps in making our algorithms
resistant to errors when p is non-zero. Obviously, our error-tolerant attacks require
more traces in order to succeed in the presence of errors.
3.6.2 Error-tolerant chosen plaintext attack
To make our attack of Sect. 3.3 error-tolerant, we keep the plaintext nibbles un-
changed if the event is “uncertain” since we cannot do anything better than wait for
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another trace. This means that for the cache events following the currently analyzed
cache event, the uncertainties are treated just as hits. For the currently analyzed
cache event, where a hit leads to the desired equation and thus to proceeding to the
next position, in case of an “uncertain” event we keep the current plaintext nibble
and proceed with the next trace. In fact, Algorithm 4 does not need to be changed:
it automatically implements the described strategy when the cache trace includes
3 event types: Miss, Hit, Uncertain.
We performed 104 simulated attacks with random keys in the presence of de-
tection errors. The results show that our Algorithm 4 tolerates errors very well.
For the error probability 0.2 it requires 22.6 traces on average, and for the the er-
ror probability 0.5 – 47.2 traces on average. Note that this is better than for the
original adaptive algorithm of [58] without detection errors.
3.6.3 Error-tolerant known plaintext attack
Along with the cache hit H and the cache miss M, the uncertain cache event U
integrates in our analysis. We show in detail how to adapt ﬁrst and second round
analysis. Results based on simulated attacks are provided in Section 3.6.5.
Adaptation of the first round
We consider the lookup i of the ﬁrst round, eventually with uncertain events oc-
curred before it. For this lookup, there are 3 possibilities.
1. If CTi is a cache hit, then the eventual uncertain previous events of the trace
are considered as misses, such that when shrinking the set κi to the set of
values k̂0 ⊕ kj for CTj = M , the correct value of k̂0 ⊕ ki is still included in
κi. Hence, the latter is reduced to the set {k̂0 ⊕ kj | j ∈ Γ∪Υ}, where Γ and
Υ denote the sets of indices where previously occurred respectively a cache
miss and an uncertain event.
2. If CTi is a cache miss, then the uncertain previous events of the trace are
considered as hits, such that when evicting from κi the values k̂0 ⊕ kj for
CTj = M , the correct value of k̂0 ⊕ ki is not evicted. Hence, κi is deﬁned as
κi \ {k̂0 ⊕ kj | j ∈ Γ}.
3. If CTi is an uncertain event, no action is performed on κi.
This strategy is explicitly written in Algorithm 6.
Adaptation of the second round
The second round adapts itself to uncertain events similarly. Considering lookup i
in the second round, i = 0, 1, 2, 3 :
1. if CTi is a cache hit, for every possible vector of the unknown nibbles involved
in yi, ŷi must belong to {k0⊕k0,j⊕pj | j ∈ Γ1∪Υ1}∪{ŷj | j ∈ Γ2∪Υ2}, where
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Algorithm 6: Known plaintext analysis of the ﬁrst round with uncertain
cache events
Input: (P (q), CT (q)), q ∈ [1, N ]
1: κi ← {0, . . . , 15}, 1 ≤ i ≤ 15
2: for i← 1 to 15 do
3: q ← 0
4: while |κi| > 1 do
5: q ← q + 1
6: κ′,κ∗ ← ∅
7: for j ← 0 to i− 1 do
8: if CT
(q)
j = Miss then
9: κ′ ← κ′ ∪
{
̂
p
(q)
i ⊕ p(q)j ⊕ κj
}
10: else if CT
(q)
j = Uncertain then
11: κ∗ ← κ∗ ∪
{
̂
p
(q)
i ⊕ p(q)j ⊕ κj
}
12: end if
13: end for
14: if CT
(q)
i = Miss then
15: κi ← κi \ κ′
16: else if CT
(q)
i = Hit then
17: κi ← κi ∩ (κ′ ∪ κ∗)
18: end if
19: end while
20: end for
Output: κi, i ∈ [1, 15]
Γr and Υr denote the sets of indices where previously occurred respectively a
cache miss and an uncertain event in the round r, r = 1, 2.
2. if CTi is a cache miss, for every possible vector of the unknown nibbles
involved in yi, ŷi must not belong to {k0 ⊕ k0,j ⊕ pj | j ∈ Γ1} ∪ {ŷj | j ∈ Γ2}.
3. if CTi is an uncertain event, no action is performed on the set of possible
vectors of the unknown nibbles involved in yi.
3.6.4 Partially preloaded cache
Our attacks can tolerate the setting when the cache already contains some S-box
lines at the beginning of the ﬁrst AES round in the way described in [30]. If the
lookup table is partially loaded in the cache prior to the encryption, the cache trace
will result in having more hits than one could have got with a clean cache.
Our adaptive Algorithm 4 straightforwardly tolerates this setting because it
exploits only misses, and a partially preloaded cache means that some misses will
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not be observed. This does not lead to an incorrect key recovery since we will not
exclude the correct key hypotheses from our set but only leave some additional
incorrect key hypotheses.
In the case of our known plaintext attack, the claims from Sect. 3.4.1 when a
hit occurs at the i-th lookup are no longer true: there does not necessarily exist an
index j ∈ Γ such that x̂i = x̂j . If one applies Algorithm 5 (or Algorithm 6) to such
inputs, when CTi = Hit, the set κi will be intersected with a set κ
′ possibly not
containing the correct value for k̂i ⊕ k0, thus evicting the latter from κi. However,
when CTi = Miss, one can subtract κ
′ from κi because the former contains only
incorrect values for k̂0 ⊕ ki, although κ′ may be smaller than if the cache did not
contain any lines prior to the encryption.
This suggests that in order to avoid a failure in the key recovery, Algorithm 5
should be adapted to perform an action on κi only when misses occur, as mentioned
in Section 3.4.1. The analysis of the second round can exploit misses only in the
same manner to tolerate the partially preloaded cache. In case a noisy environment
is combined with a partially pre-loaded cache, our solutions described in Sect. 3.6.3
and here are perfectly compatible, though requiring a higher number of inputs. The
results showing the average measurement complexity for several cases of preloaded
cache are below.
3.6.5 Practical results
We have conducted simulated attacks against AES-128 with diﬀerent values for the
probability p of uncertainty for a cache event and the number of preloaded lines in
the cache for 104 random keys in every case. The results are depicted in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Average number of traces required for the full AES key recovery
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One can see that our algorithm tolerates errors well: in case error probability
is 0.8, one would need about 160 measurements to preform the full key recovery in
case it is known that the cache is clean prior to each run of the algorithm. If the
cache is not clean from the lookup table lines, then the numbers of traces (required
for the misses-only analysis) are of course higher, but the attack is still feasible.
3.7 Theoretical model
In this Section we deal with theoretically estimating the number of traces required
for the attack. In [2], a theoretical model was already presented to estimate the
number of traces required for the analysis of the 15 cache events in the ﬁrst round.
This model however did not take into consideration the dependency between the
cache events and assumed an error-free cache event detection. Here we ﬁrst describe
the sound model to obtain the number of traces required for the error-tolerant
analysis of each of the cache events individually, both for the ﬁrst and second round.
This model takes detection errors into account. Then we show that this model, being
univariate, still does not estimate the number of traces for the full attack precisely
due to the statistical dependency between the cache events. The distribution in
the multivariate model is however too complex to be expressed theoretically, so we
present some illustrations based on experimental data.
3.7.1 Univariate model for the error-tolerant attack
The model we develop here will provide an expected number of traces ENi required
for the analysis of an i-th lookup, 1 ≤ i ≤ 15 in the ﬁrst round, 16 ≤ i ≤ 19 in
the second round (i.e. the enumeration of the cache events continues in the second
round, to simplify writing the formulae), for a given error probability p, for the
general case ofm cache lines per S-box lookup table. We note that we will implicitly
assume that the inputs to the second round lookups are statistically independent of
the inputs to the ﬁrst round lookups. Strictly speaking, this is not true. However,
the statistical dependency in this case is not signiﬁcant and so can be omitted for
practical reasons; this is veriﬁed by the empirical results that we obtain running
attack simulations.
We start with obtaining the expectation ERi for the fraction of candidates Ri
remaining after analyzing lookup i of a single cache trace. This expectation is
expressed as
ERi =
i∑
s=1
Pr(Ti = s) ·R(s)i , i ≥ 1 (3.5)
where Tk is the number of lookup table lines in cache (i.e. |Γ|) after k lookups, and
R
(s)
i is the fraction of the key candidates remaining after analysis of the i-th lookup
of a single cache trace when the number of lines previously loaded into cache is s.
Note that (3.5) works for the second round lookups as well.
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The distribution Pr(Tk = s) is a classical allocation problem [89]. We have
Pr(Tk = s) =
(
m
m− s
)(
s
m
)k
Pr0k(s) , (3.6)
where
Pr0k(s) =
s∑
l=0
(
s
l
)
(−1)l
(
1− l
s
)k
.
Note that this distribution describes the process within the device and not the
attacker’s observations and therefore does not depend on the error probability p.
The fraction R
(s)
i is expressed as the sum of the products of the conditional
probabilities of the three possible cache event observations (miss, hit, uncertain)
and corresponding remaining fractions R
(s)
i,M , R
(s)
i,H , R
(s)
i,U ) (so, strictly speaking, this
fraction is the expected value under a ﬁxed s):
R
(s)
i = Pr(CTi =M | Ti = s) ·R(s)i,M
+ Pr(CTi = H | Ti = s) ·R(s)i,H
+ Pr(CTi = U) ·R(s)i,U .
(3.7)
Now, the three probabilities are
Pr(CTi =M | Ti = s) = (1−p)(m−s)m ,
Pr(CTi = H | Ti = s) = (1−p)sm ,
Pr(CTi = U) = p .
Finally, recalling the error-tolerant attack description in Section 3.6.3, the fractions
for the cases of a miss, a hit and an uncertain event are
R
(s)
i,M =
m−(1−p)s
m ,
R
(s)
i,H =
s+p(i−s)
m ,
R
(s)
i,U = 1 .
Now, from equations (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7) we can obtain ERi for 1 ≤ i ≤ 19, i.e.
both for the ﬁrst and second round round lookups.
Knowing ERi, we can estimate the expected number of traces ENi required for
the analysis of an i-th lookup. We recall from Section 3.4.2 that in the analysis
of each lookup in the ﬁrst round (1 ≤ i ≤ 15), we want to reduce the number of
candidates for the corresponding XOR diﬀerence of the key nibbles from m to 1.
The traces are statistically independent if the inputs are independent (which is the
assumption of our known plaintext attack), and each trace leaves us with a fraction
ERi of the remaining candidates, so we have
m · (ERi)Ni ≤ 1 ,
ENi ≈ − logERi m .
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We obtain ERi and estimate ENi for all the lookups of the ﬁrst round being
analyzed assuming m = 16. The values for the case there are no errors in detection,
i.e. p = 0, are shown in Table 3.1. Note that these values are larger than the ones
obtained in [2] (denoted there by Rkexpected, k being i in our terms) since in our model
we have correctly considered the dependency of the analysis of an i-th lookup on
the events in the previous i lookups (recall that the enumeration of lookups starts
from 0).
Table 3.1: Expected ratios of the remaining candidates and expected numbers of
traces for the ﬁrst round lookups, m = 16, p = 0.
i 1 2 3 4 5
ERi 0.882813 0.787598 0.711151 0.650698 0.603836
ENi 22.24 11.61 8.13 6.45 5.50
i 6 7 8 9 10
ERi 0.568490 0.542866 0.525418 0.514812 0.509903
ENi 4.91 4.54 4.31 4.18 4.12
i 11 12 13 14 15
ERi 0.509705 0.513373 0.520184 0.529519 0.540853
ENi 4.11 4.16 4.24 4.36 4.51
In Figure 3.5, we compare the theoretical estimates for the ﬁrst round events
with the empirical results that we obtained in attack simulations for the cases p = 0,
p = 0.25 and p = 0.5. One can see that our model captures the behaviour of the
attack and the eﬀect of the errors.
Similarly, for the lookups of the second round (16 ≤ i ≤ 19) the numbers of
traces can be estimated from the inequality
zi · (ERi)Ni ≤ 1 ,
where zi is the initial number of candidates in the system of (in)equations for the
lookup i. From Section 3.4.2 we recall that z16 = 2
24, z17 = 2
16, z18 = 2
12 and
z19 = 2
16. The theoretical estimates of ERi and ENi for the second round, for the
case m = 16, p = 0, are given in Table 3.2. The numbers of traces observed in
our experiments are correspondingly 26.86, 19.47, 15.02 and 20.36, thus perfectly
matching the theoretical ﬁgures.
The model is also easily adjustable for the misses-only analysis in the case of
partially preloaded cache.
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Figure 3.5: Expected number of traces for the lookups of the ﬁrst round. Theoretical
and empirical ﬁgures for diﬀerent error probabilities p are shown.
Table 3.2: Theoretical expected ratios of the remaining candidates and expected
numbers of traces for the second round lookups
Theoretical estimates of ERi and ENi for the second round lookups, m = 16,
p = 0.
i 16 17 18 19
ERi 0.553737 0.567792 0.582699 0.598187
ENi 28.15 19.59 15.40 21.58
3.7.2 The multivariate model
The full attack measurement complexity is determined by the maximum number of
traces required for the analysis of each lookup. If the cache events were statistically
independent, the expectation for the maximum number of traces E(maxiNi) would
be equal to the maximal expected number of traces among each of the lookups
maxi(ENi), so one could use the model described above.
However, the cache events are dependent, therefore
E(max
i
Ni) 6= max
i
(ENi) ,
and so the univariate model is not applicable for the estimation of the full attack
complexity. This is well shown by the results of attack simulations: for example,
in case p = 0 for the ﬁrst round in the univariate model we observed maxi(ENi) =
EN1 = 15, whereas E(maxiNi) = 19. The same holds for the second round, though
not as explicit: the the observed average maximum number of traces for the full
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Figure 3.6: (a): empirical bivariate distribution for (N1, N2); (b): empirical uni-
variate distributions for N1, N2, and for max(N1, N2), dashed lines showing the
corresponding means.
analysis of the second round is 29, whereas the observed maximal number of traces
for an individual lookup is 27.
So, to estimate the number of traces required for the full attack, one has to con-
sider the distribution of maxiNi for the case of statistically dependent random vari-
ables Ni, which requires the multivariate distribution for (N1, N2, . . . , N19). This
multivariate distribution is hard to express analytically, therefore it is easier to sim-
ulate it carrying out the attack and sampling the values of maxiNi. This is what
we do to obtain the results presented in Section 3.6.5.
To better illustrate the behaviour of the attack, in Figure 3.6(a) we present the
empirical bivariate distribution for the case of the ﬁrst round lookups 1 and 2. In
Figure 3.6(b) we show the distribution for max(N1, N2) against the independent
distributions for N1 and N2. The mean of the former is 18.04. One can see that
it is greater than the maximum of the means for N1 and N2 and is actually quite
close to the number of traces required for the analysis of all the 15 lookups in the
ﬁrst round.
Nevertheless, the univariate model provides an estimate for the lower bound for
the number of traces required for the full attack, so it can be still applied when one
requires this bound.
3.8 Conclusion
In this Chapter we described side-channel analysis that can be applied to implemen-
tations of AES on embedded devices featuring a cache mechanism. We improved the
adaptive chosen plaintext attack described in [58] and presented a known plaintext
attack that recovers a 128-bit AES secret key with approximately 30 measurements.
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Our experiments with an ARM µC showed that cache events can be detected in
the EM leakage. We have presented the versions of our attacks that can tolerate
uncertainties in cache event detection from a side-channel trace that may occur in
a noisy environment, as well as the setting when the cache is not clean of the S-box
lookup table lines prior to the AES execution.
The attack measurement complexity for low error probabilities (which are quite
realistic looking at our practical explorations in Section 3.5) is comparable to that
of the DPA. The oﬄine complexity is negligible: recovering the full key from a set of
cache traces takes less than a minute on a standard PC. At the same time, cache-
collision attacks are resistant to Boolean masking in the case where all S-boxes
share the same random mask, as detailed in [58]. When such a masking scheme is
used, our attacks will outperform higher order DPA attacks that typically require
thousands of traces.
The countermeasures against trace-driven cache-collision attacks have been dis-
cussed in the previous works on the subject [16, 91, 58, 30] and are similar to the
countermeasures against cache attacks in general [116]. They include pre-fetching
the lookup table into the cache prior to encryption and shuﬄing the order of table
lookup computations.

Chapter 4
Analysis of the AVR XMEGA
cryptographic engine
AVR XMEGA is a recent general-purpose 8-bit µC from Atmel featuring symmetric
crypto engines. In this Chapter we analyze the resistance of XMEGA crypto en-
gines to side-channel attacks. We reveal the relatively strong side-channel leakage
of the AES engine that enables full 128-bit AES secret key recovery in a matter
of several minutes with a measurement setup cost about 1000 USD. 3000 power
consumption traces are suﬃcient for our attack. Our analysis was performed with-
out knowing the details of the crypto engine internals; quite the contrary, it reveals
some details about the implementation. We sketch other feasible side-channel at-
tacks on XMEGA and suggest the countermeasures that can raise the complexity
of the attacks but not fully prevent them.
This is an independent work of the author that was published in [85].
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4.1 Introduction
XMEGA [168] is the recent 8-bit RISC microcontroller (µC) in the Atmel’s AVR
family. To our knowledge, it is the ﬁrst general-purpose µC available “over-the-
counter” with AES [171] and DES [172] acceleration. Others µC’s with crypto-
graphic acceleration are either “prescription-only” secure versions (like Atmel’s
AT9xSC series) that are relatively hard to obtain for experiments, or dedicated
wireless chips (for example, Ember EM250 or Jennic JN5121 ZigBee SoC’s, or Chip-
Con CC2420 RF transceiver used in MICAz motes). The AES engine of XMEGA
provides 128-bit encryption and can maintain a throughput of about 10 Mbps.
Apart from the cryptographic features, XMEGA boasts a broad set of peripherals
and functionalities including DMA controller, event system for CPU- and DMA-
independent inter-peripheral communication, advanced clocking and energy saving
options. Along with the low power consumption and an attractive price of less
than 10 USD apiece, this makes XMEGA a promising device for a wide range of
embedded applications.
Motivation De jure, XMEGA is not claimed by Atmel to be a microcontroller
for secure applications. De facto however, the presence of the cryptographic fea-
tures suggests the contrary. A scenario where an embedded device implementing
cryptography is subject to implementation attacks, in particular, attacks exploiting
side-channel leakage of the device, is very realistic.
The typical scenario of a side-channel attack is when the secret key is stored
within the device. This secret key is used by the device to perform cryptographic
operations but never exposed through the communication channels of the device.
The attacker can try to deduce the secret key by analyzing physical parameters of
the device during an execution like timing of operations, power consumption and
electromagnetic radiation, since these side channels may leak information about the
internal variables processed by the device. side-channel attacks are posing a real
threat for unprotected devices since they can be mounted by an attacker with a
modest budget.
The XMEGA symmetric crypto engines can be of course used in non-keyed
constructions like block-cipher based hash functions. In this scenario side-channel
attacks are irrelevant. But (a) there are many more keyed scenarii and (b) there are
no widespread AES and DES-based hash functions that could be used. Also, AES
in XMEGA is implemented as an atomic full encryption/decryption, which means
that hash functions that are based on AES building blocks (like some of SHA-3
candidates) will not beneﬁt from this acceleration.
Related Work To date, we are not aware of any works studying XMEGA imple-
mentation security issues. In [134] and [135], XMEGA crypto engines were utilized
for acceleration of AES- and DES-based hash functions. Same application was men-
tioned in [133]. In [52], XMEGA DES engine was used for the fast implementation
of a cryptographic pseudo random number generator.
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Side-channel attacks on hardware implementations of AES were performed in
several works; see [113], [10] and [155] for examples.
Our Contribution The work presented here is very practical. We do not develop
new attacks but apply the more or less standard attack to the implementation
without any detailed knowledge of the internals of this implementation. We look
at XMEGA cryptographic features from the side-channel attacker’s point of view
and highlight their weaknesses in the side-channel scenario. Then, experimentally
we reveal the relatively strong side-channel leakage of the XMEGA AES engine.
Exploiting this leakage in a practical power analysis attack, we recover the full
128-bit AES secret key with only 3000 acquisitions and post-processing time of
several minutes. Acquisition can be performed with quite modest (around 1000
USD) measurement setup without any noise reduction measures.
With our attack we can reveal some details about the implementation. Namely,
we discover that the AES implementation is non-parallelized. We suggest the pos-
sible countermeasures that can be used to partially hinder the attacks.
Semi-invasive and invasive attacks like fault analysis are beyond the scope of
this work. However, we believe that faults can be induced quite eﬃciently on this
µC.
4.2 XMEGA cryptographic features
We begin with a description of XMEGA cryptographic functionality, following the
preliminary manual [168].
4.2.1 DES instruction
DES is implemented in XMEGA as an instruction set extension. A CPU instruction
DES K executes a single DES round and operates with the state and the key loaded
in the main register ﬁle. The round number K is passed to the instruction as a
parameter. Direction is controlled by the half-carry ﬂag of the µC’s status register.
Encryption/decryption is done as follows:
1. the 64-bit plaintext/ciphertext is placed in CPU registers R0-R7;
2. the full 64-bit key (including the parity bits) is placed in CPU registers R8-R15;
3. the CPU half-carry ﬂag is set to 0 for encryption or to 1 for decryption;
4. DES instruction is executed 16 times with increasing K (DES 0, DES 1, . . . ,
DES 15);
The 64-bit result (cihertext/plaintext) will be in the registers R0-R7. Intermedi-
ate states in R0-R7 diﬀer from the FIPS standard [172] since the initial permutation
and the inverse initial permutations are performed each iteration [170].
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The instruction takes 1 CPU clock cycle. Another CPU clock cycle is added if
the instruction is followed by a non-DES instruction. Thus, the full DES execution
(not counting data and key loading/unloading) takes 17 clock cycles.
4.2.2 AES peripheral
XMEGA implements AES-128 [171], a variant of AES with 128-bit secret key and
10 rounds. Unlike DES, AES engine in XMEGA is interfaced through 5 dedicated
registers in the I/O address space. Encryption/decryption is performed as follows:
1. set encryption direction and other parameters (see below) in AES CTRL
register, enable/disable AES interrupts in AES INTCTRL register;
2. the 16 key bytes are sent one-by-one to the AES key memory through the
AES KEY register;
3. the 16 plaintext/ciphertext bytes are sent one-by-one to the AES state mem-
ory through the AES STATE register;
4. the start bit in the control register is set to start AES execution (this step
can be omitted if the auto start ﬂag was set in the status register).
When the execution is ﬁnished, the interrupt ﬂag in the AES STATUS register
is set and AES interrupt is optionally generated. The result can be read out byte-
by-byte from the AES STATE register. If the XOR ﬂag in the AES CTRL register
is set, the data loaded in the AES STATE register is XOR’ed with the current AES
state. This allows to implement CBC and other modes of operation eﬃciently.
After the execution the AES key memory will contain the last round subkey, so
for another encryption the key should be reloaded. For decryption, the last round
subkey should be loaded into the key register. It can be obtained either by running
AES key expansion in software or by running a single AES engine encryption with
a dummy state and the original key.
AES execution takes 375 peripheral1 clock cycles not counting data and key
loading/unloading (cf. about 3 thousand CPU cycles for a software implementation
[119]). The CPU can execute any code in parallel. Combined with the DMA transfer
(that relieves the CPU from data and key loading/unloading) and event system
triggering at the end of AES execution, this deﬁnitely makes AES implementation in
XMEGA quite eﬃcient and attractive for embedded developers: when operated at
its maximum clock frequency of 32 MHz, XMEGA can maintain AES-128 encrypted
communication bandwidth of about 10 Mbps.
In the following Sections we will show that crypto engines of XMEGA are sus-
ceptible to eﬃcient side-channel attacks.
1The peripheral clock frequency is the same as of the CPU clock; this is not the fast peripheral
clock used by some of the XMEGA modules.
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4.3 Security model and potential weaknesses
We consider a simple security model when an attacker aims at recovering the secret
key stored within the device. An attacker knows inputs or corresponding encrypted
or decrypted outputs (known plaintext or ciphertext scenario) of the cryptographic
module and can observe physical parameters of the device while it performs cryp-
tographic operations. This model is quite realistic when there is a chance for an
embedded device to fall for a while into the hands of a technically prepared male-
factor.
Resistance of XMEGA to implementation attacks was not claimed by Atmel: our
research does not result in any statements regarding implementation security either
in XMEGA documentation [168] or in other publicly available sources. However
a scenario where an embedded device implementing cryptography is subject to
implementation attacks is quite probable. One may therefore think that some
countermeasures that are declared for AT9xSC secure series of µC’s [169] were
implemented in XMEGA as well.
In case there are no countermeasures implemented, we see the following potential
weaknesses of XMEGA in the model deﬁned above:
• AES and DES: the crypto engines themselves can exhibit side-channel leakage;
• AES and DES: direct manipulation of the secret key bytes by the AVR core
is required, in particular transferring the secret key bytes over the memory
buses;
• DES: intermediate state is stored in the main register ﬁle;
• AES: key expansion for decryption can be done manually in software.
Therefore, the threats for AES and DES modules are as follows:
• side-channel attacks on the secret key bytes manipulated by the AVR core;
• side-channel attacks on the cryptographic engine execution.
In the next Section, we show that the AES engine exhibits signiﬁcant side-
channel leakage (which suggests that no sound countermeasures were foreseen in
XMEGA) and present an eﬃcient practical full key recovery side-channel attack on
the AES engine.
4.4 Practical attack
Here we present our practical side-channel attack on the XMEGA AES engine,
recovering full key in a matter of several minutes of acquisition and post-processing.
Our attack is based on the standard Diﬀerential Power Analysis (DPA) technique,
but the attack ﬂow for the full key recovery is speciﬁc to our particular case. We
refer the reader to the book [101] for the basics of the diﬀerential power analysis.
We would like to stress that we discovered the attack without any prior knowledge
about the internals of the AES implementation in XMEGA.
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Figure 4.1: Measurement setup around ATXMEGA128A1
4.4.1 Measurement setup
We experimented with an ATXMEGA128A1-AU µC [168]. The µC was clocked at
3.6864 MHz (this is both CPU and peripheral clock frequency) using a quartz crystal
and was provided with 3.6 V from a standard laboratory power supply. Connection
to the host PC was performed via serial interface through the ADM202E level
converter.
A 50 Ohm shunt resistor was inserted in the ground line of the µC for measuring
the power consumption. Measurements were performed with the LeCroy WaveRun-
ner 104MXi DSO equipped with ZS1000 active probes and connected to the host
PC via a 100 Mbit Ethernet link. One of the pins of the µC was dedicated to the
trigger signal. The setup did not include any speciﬁc measures for noise reduction.
Figure 4.1 depicts the setup.
To verify the setup, we have ﬁrst mounted a CPA attack in the Hamming
weight leakage model [31] on an unprotected software implementation of AES [119]
on XMEGA. Then we compared its results with those obtained for the same soft-
ware implementation on the ATmega16 µC in the same measurement conditions.
The results are consistent: for the software AES-128 implementation, around 50
acquisitions (i.e. random plaintexts) are required in our setup for the successful full
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key recovery both on ATmega16 and ATXMEGA128A1.
The acquisition parameters in the attack on the software implementation were
as follows:
• analog low-pass ﬁltering of the signal with 20 MHz cut-oﬀ frequency;
• sampling rate 100 MS/s;
• post-processing: power consumption curves were compressed to 1 sample per
µC’s CPU clock cycle by selecting cycle maxima.
We decided to start attacking the hardware AES implementation on XMEGA keep-
ing these acquisition parameters.
4.4.2 Implementation details
We have implemented AES-128 encryption utilizing the AES crypto engine of the
XMEGA. The encryption key was stored in the the program ﬂash memory and
loaded into the AES module. Then the plaintext bytes were obtained from the
host PC via the serial line and loaded into the AES module. Then the encryption
was started and the core entered a loop waiting for encryption to ﬁnish. When
encryption was ﬁnished, the ciphertext was read from the AES module and returned
to the host PC over the serial line.
We have acquired power consumption traces of the full encryption (375 clock
cycles) for 10000 random plaintexts with the same acquisition parameters as for the
attack on the software implementation.
4.4.3 The attack
Here we will describe our attack on the XMEGA AES peripheral. The attack
consists of a basic step which is a more or less standard CPA attack recovering one
key byte, and the algorithm for the full key recovery that is simple but speciﬁc to
our particular case.
Basic attack
First, we have tried exactly the same CPA attack in the Hamming weight model
as for the software implementation described above. No signiﬁcant correlation was
observed with 10000 traces for most of the bytes2. Knowing that hardware im-
plementations typically follow the Hamming distance model (see [113] and [10] for
examples of attacks on ASIC implementations of AES), we tried several combina-
tions of various internal bytes that did not show any sensible correlation until we
came to the following target value in the attack:
bi = (pi ⊕ ki)⊕ (pi+1 ⊕ ki+1), 1 ≤ i ≤ 15 ,
2only bytes 2 and 12 exhibited significant leakage
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where pi and ki are corresponding plaintext and key bytes counted in a standard way
(column-wise). So by taking the Hamming weight of bi, HW (bi), we get the Ham-
ming distance between the successive bytes of the state after the ﬁrst AddRoundKey
transform of AES.
A straightforward approach would require to compute 28× 28 = 216 correlation
traces for all possible pairs of the two key bytes ki and ki+1 involved. To reduce the
number of correlation traces, we have assumed byte ki to be known (like in [10])
and calculated correlation traces for 256 guesses of ki+1 (below we will show that
this approach leads to a very eﬃcient full key recovery attack). Since we targeted
the operations in the 1st round of AES, we decided to consider only ﬁrst 80 cycles
of encryption and this turned out to be suﬃcient. Figure 4.2 shows the correlation
coeﬃcient ρ against clock cycles of AES encryption for the pairs of bytes k1, k2 and
k4, k5. Correlation traces for the guesses corresponding to the correct 1st-2nd and
4th-5th subkey bytes correspondingly are highlighted.
We can clearly see up to three distinct (in time) correlation peaks. The ﬁrst
peak is for the key byte ki (the one we assume to be known): the correlation
trace highlighted in black corresponds to ki+1 = ki and and exhibits the maximal
correlation in the region of the peak. The 2nd peak reveals the second subkey byte
ki+1 (the one we are guessing): the correlation trace highlighted in red corresponds
to the correct guess of ki+1 and shows maximal correlation among all traces in the
region of the peak. By checking all 15 possible byte pairs we discovered that the
3-rd peak also revealing the correct guess of ki+1 is present for byte pairs 1-2 to
3-4 and 9-10 to 11-12, as shown in Figure 4.2(a). This 3-rd peak can be used to
increase the reliability of the attack.
Such distinct pattern emerges for all i = 1, 2, . . . , 15, that is, for all successive
pairs of adjacent state bytes after the initial key addition. The evolution of the
correlation coeﬃcients in the region of the 2-nd peak with the increase of the number
of available power consumption traces is shown in Figure 4.3. We can see that 2-3
thousand traces is already suﬃcient to recover the correct (relative to the 1st byte)
guess of the 2nd key byte. For other byte pairs these ﬁgures are the same.
Full key recovery
Above we have presented the basic CPA attack recovering the single key byte under
the assumption that the previous key byte is known. Here we present the algorithm
for the full 128-bit key based on this attack. The algorithm is straightforward:
1. guess the ﬁrst key byte k1 (256 guesses in total);
2. determine k2 with the basic CPA attack as described above: with our guess
of k1 calculate the correlation traces for all 256 guesses of k2 and obtain the
correct guess by choosing the trace that exhibits the maximal correlation value
in the region of the second peak; note that the peaks can be identiﬁed quite
easily since we know the trace corresponding to the guess of k1 and it shows
its maximum in the region of the ﬁrst peak;
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Figure 4.2: Results of CPA in HD model on XMEGA AES engine, for byte pairs
1-2 (a) and 4-5 (b)
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Figure 4.3: Evolution of the correlation coeﬃcient in the region of the 2nd CPA
peak against the number of traces, for bytes 1 and 2. Correlation trace for the
correct 2nd subkey byte guess is highlighted.
3. determine k3, k4, . . . , k156 sequentially in the same way: knowing k2, recover
k3 and so on;
4. having ended up with 256 full key candidates, ﬁnd the correct one among
them by an exhaustive search; note that this requires at least one known
plaintext-ciphertext pair from the attacked device.
As already shown (see Fig. 4.3), the attack requires less than 3000 traces in
our setup; with our acquisition rate of 15 traces per second this on-line phase takes
about 3 minutes. Since compressed traces are used, the off-line stage of the attack
(obtaining correlation curves, determining key candidates and running exhaustive
search) takes about a minute. The relatively low sampling rate allows one to use an
inexpensive DSO. Thus, the whole attack takes several minutes and requires 1000
USDs’ worth of equipment.
4.4.4 Insight into AES hardware
Our attack was performed without any knowledge about the internals of the AES
implementation. However, the results of the attack reveal some information about
the AES implementation in XMEGA.
For example, in Figure 4.2 we can see that the correlation peaks for byte pair 4-5
occur later than the ones for the byte pair 1-2. The observation holds for all byte
pairs. We conclude that operations are executed sequentially and not in parallel as
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one would expect from a hardware AES implementation. This is further supported
by the fact that the similar behaviour of the correlation peaks were observed for
all successive byte pairs, which suggests that all the 16 state bytes are processed
sequentially.
Another example is the observed third correlation peak for some byte pairs that
indicates re-use of these values, however we have not ﬁgured out the possible reason.
Refer to [37] for details on SCARE—side-channel analysis for reverse engineer-
ing. Such information can be in particular helpful for mounting fault attacks since
it can indicate where to inject a fault.
4.5 Discussion and countermeasures
In the previous Section we have presented a practical attack on the XMEGA AES
module recovering the full 128-bit key from 3000 acquisitions. While being almost
100 times larger than for an unprotected software implementation, this number is
still so small that the whole attack takes several minutes.
We have not performed experimental investigation of the DES engine since we
believe that AES engine will be used in most of XMEGA applications: XMEGA
is highly suitable for wireless applications like ZigBee that imply AES usage. We
suppose that DES engine does not include any side-channel attack countermeasures
as well, though attacking it might require more traces due to the higher level of
parallelism in DES implementation (17 cycles per full DES vs. 375 for full AES).
4.5.1 Attack practicability
Those familiar with embedded development might argue that in our attack we had
several conditions that simplify it, namely:
1. perfect synchronization via the dedicated trigger signal in the beginning of
encryption;
2. the CPU core running a deterministic loop during encryption;
3. the chip was clocked at only 3.7 MHz (and using a stable quartz oscillator)
while it allows a maximum of 32 MHz.
Regarding synchronization, it can be often done in a real application by ob-
serving the transfer over the communication line that is being encrypted. What
concerns the second condition, it is quite probable that even in a real application
the CPU core will execute some deterministic sequence of operations while AES
engine is running or will even be in the idle sleep mode (it is possible in XMEGA
to stop the CPU clock while all peripherals are kept running).
With the higher clock frequency the amount of traces required for the successful
attack should increase since the power consumption observations in consecutive
clock cycles will be superposed due to the unchanging discharge time of the internal
capacitances of the chip. However, for a low-power operation XMEGA can only be
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clocked at low frequencies (less than 16 MHz), so a relatively cheap DSO could still
be used for acquisition.
4.5.2 Countermeasures
As a countermeasure against side-channel attacks both for AES and DES engines,
we suggest deliberate aggravation of all the 3 conditions mentioned above.
Synchronization can be made diﬃcult for an adversary by adding software ran-
dom delays (see Chapter 6) prior and after execution, and for DES also between
rounds. Using less stable internal oscillators of XMEGA as the clock source can
be considered; however alone they seem to be still stable enough for acquisitions
of several hundreds clock cycles. Finally, clocking at higher frequency will increase
the number of traces required for the successful attack.
For AES, these can be combined with hiding in the amplitude domain by making
the CPU core manipulate randomized data or even execute a randomized sequence
of instructions while encryption/decryption is running, for example, running a soft-
ware pseudo random number generator.
More eﬃcient countermeasures are hardly possible for the crypto engines of
XMEGA since the low granularity of the implementation (the entire execution for
AES and a single round for DES) seems not to allow for any other software counter-
measures like masking or shuﬄing, and sound hardware countermeasures are absent.
However it is an interesting research question whether the round-level granularity of
DES in XMEGA can be used to implement any eﬃcient software countermeasure.
See also [103] for an approach to protocol-level countermeasures against diﬀerential
side-channel attacks that can be applicable in some cases.
Another weak link in our view is the direct manipulation of the secret key bytes
by the CPU core that can be susceptible to template attacks (refer to Section 5.3 of
[101]). These operations can be also protected by desynchronization. Unfortunately,
shuﬄing of the AES key byte loading order cannot be used since key bytes should
be loaded sequentially, so only random delays are applicable here.
We stress that the suggested countermeasures only raise the complexity of at-
tacks while lowering performance, but do not render them completely impossible.
4.6 Conclusion
In this Chapter we have presented an eﬃcient side-channel attack against the cryp-
tographic module of AVR XMEGA, a recent general-purpose 8-bit microcontroller.
Our practical side-channel attack against the AES engine recovers the full 128-bit
secret key from 3000 power consumption traces that can be acquired with a very
modest measurement setup. The attack results indicate that the AES implemen-
tation in XMEGA is not parallelized. We have pinpointed potential weaknesses
of XMEGA allowing other eﬃcient side-channel attacks. We have suggested the
possible countermeasures that can be implemented to raise the complexity of at-
tacks. However, these countermeasures do not prevent the attacks completely and
decrease performance.
4.6 Conclusion 89
Therefore, we conclude that utmost care should be taken when using XMEGA
in embedded applications dealing with security, i.e. implementing suggested coun-
termeasures and using it only in those applications where the presented attacks are
tolerated by the security level.
Our result demonstrates how easy it is to attack an unprotected device with
more or less standard techniques even without knowing the details of the actual
implementation of the cryptographic algorithm. Attacking a 10 USD device for
1000 USD may seem ridiculous but it is in fact not—attacking 100 devices repays
the setup and a potential application may be worth much more.

Chapter 5
Fault attacks on RSA
signatures with partially
unknown messages
Fault attacks exploit hardware malfunctions to recover secrets from embedded elec-
tronic devices. In the late 90’s, Boneh, DeMillo, and Lipton [29] introduced fault-
based attacks on CRT-RSA. These attacks factor the signer’s modulus when the
message padding function is deterministic. However, the attack does not apply when
the message is partially unknown, for example when it contains some randomness
which is recovered only when verifying a correct signature.
In this Chapter we successfully extend RSA fault attacks to a large class of
partially known message conﬁgurations. The new attacks rely on Coppersmith’s
algorithm for ﬁnding small roots of multivariate polynomial equations. We illustrate
the approach by successfully attacking several randomized versions of the ISO/IEC
9796-2 encoding standard. Practical experiments show that a 2048-bit modulus can
be factored in less than a minute given one faulty signature containing 160 random
bits and an unknown 160-bit message digest.
This is a joint work with Jean-Sébastien Coron, Antoine Joux, David Naccache,
and Pascal Paillier, published in [43].
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5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Background
RSA [132] is undoubtedly the most common digital signature scheme used in embed-
ded security tokens. To sign a message m with RSA, the signer applies an encoding
(padding) function µ to m, and then computes the signature σ = µ(m)d mod N .
To verify the signature, the receiver checks that
σe = µ(m) mod N.
As shown by Boneh, DeMillo and Lipton [29] and others (e.g. [77]), RSA implemen-
tations can be vulnerable to fault attacks, especially when the Chinese remainder
theorem (CRT) is used; in this case the device computes
σp = µ(m)
d mod p , σq = µ(m)
d mod q
and the signature σ is computed from σp and σq by Chinese remaindering.
Assuming that the attacker is able to induce a fault when σq is computed while
keeping the computation of σp correct, one gets
σp = µ(m)
d mod p , σq 6= µ(m)d mod q
and the resulting (faulty) signature σ satisﬁes
σe = µ(m) mod p , σe 6= µ(m) mod q .
Therefore, given one faulty σ, the attacker can factor N by computing
gcd(σe − µ(m) mod N,N) = p . (5.1)
Boneh et al.’s fault attack is easily extended to any deterministic RSA encoding,
e.g. the Full Domain Hash (FDH) [14] encoding where
σ = H(m)d mod N
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and H : {0, 1}∗ 7→ ZN is a hash function. The attack is also applicable to prob-
abilistic signature schemes where the randomizer used to generate the signature
is sent along with the signature, e.g. as in the Probabilistic Full Domain Hash
(pfdh) encoding [42] where the signature is σ‖r with σ = H(m ‖ r)d mod N . In
that case, given the faulty value of σ and knowing r, the attacker can still factor N
by computing
gcd(σe −H(m ‖ r) mod N,N) = p.
5.1.2 Partially-known messages: the fault-attacker’s deadlock
However, if the message is not entirely given to the opponent the attack is thwarted,
e.g. this may occur when the signature has the form σ = (m‖r)d mod N where r is a
random nonce. Here the veriﬁer can recover r only after completing the veriﬁcation
process; however r can only be recovered when verifying a correct signature. Given
a faulty signature, the attacker cannot retrieve r nor infer (m‖r) which would be
necessary to compute
gcd(σe − (m‖r) mod N,N) = p.
In other words, the attacker faces an apparent deadlock: recovering the r used
in the faulty signature σ seems to require that σ is a correctly veriﬁable signature.
Yet, obviously, a correct signature does not factor N . These conﬂicting constraints
cannot be conciliated unless r is short enough to be guessed by exhaustive search.
Inducing faults in many signatures does not help either since diﬀerent r values are
used in successive signatures (even if m remains invariant). As a result, randomized
RSA encoding schemes are usually considered to be inherently immune against fault
attacks.
5.1.3 The new result
We overcome this apparent deadlock by showing how to extract in some cases the
unknown message part (UMP) involved in the generation of faulty RSA signatures.
We develop several techniques that extend Boneh et al.’s attack to a large class
of partially known message conﬁgurations. We nonetheless assume that certain
conditions on the unknown parts of the encoded message are met; these conditions
may depend on the encoding function itself and on the hash functions used. To
illustrate our attacks, we have chosen to consider the ISO/IEC 9796-2 standard
[75]. ISO/IEC 9796-2 is originally a deterministic encoding scheme often used in
combination with message randomization (e.g. in EMV [53]). The encoded message
has the form:
µ(m) = 6A16 ‖m[1] ‖H(m) ‖ BC16
where m = m[1] ‖m[2] is split into two parts. We show that if the unknown part
of m[1] is not too large (e.g. less than 160 bits for a 2048-bit RSA modulus), then
a single faulty signature allows to factor N as in [29]1. The new method is based
1In our attack, it does not matter how large the unknown part of m[2] is.
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on a result by Herrmann and May [72] for ﬁnding small roots of linear equations
modulo an unknown factor p of N ; [72] is itself based on Coppersmith’s technique
[41] for ﬁnding small roots of polynomial equations using the LLL algorithm [94].
We also show how to extend our attack to multiple UMPs and to scenarii where
more faulty signatures can be obtained from the device.
It is trivially seen that other deterministic signature encoding functions such as
PKCS#1 v1.5 can be broken by the new attack even when the message digest is
unknown. We elaborate on this in further detail at the end of this Chapter.
5.1.4 The ISO/IEC 9796-2 standard
ISO/IEC 9796-2 is an encoding standard allowing partial or total message recovery
[75, 76]. The encoding can be used with hash functions H(m) of diverse digest sizes
kh. For the sake of simplicity we assume that kh, the size of m and the size of
N (denoted k) are all multiples of 8. The ISO/IEC 9796-2 encoding of a message
m = m[1] ‖m[2] is
µ(m) = 6A16 ‖m[1] ‖H(m) ‖ BC16
where m[1] consists of the k − kh − 16 leftmost bits of m and m[2] represents the
remaining bits of m. Therefore the size of µ(m) is always k− 1 bits. Note that the
original version of the standard recommended 128 ≤ kh ≤ 160 for partial message
recovery (see [75], §5, note 4). In [46], Coron, Naccache and Stern introduced an
attack against ISO/IEC 9796-2; the authors estimated that attacking kh = 128 and
kh = 160 would require respectively 2
54 and 261 operations. After Coron et al.’s
publication, ISO/IEC 9796-2 was amended and the current oﬃcial requirement (see
[76]) is now kh ≥ 160. In a recent work Coron, Naccache, Tibouchi and Weinmann
successfully attack the currently valid version of ISO/IEC 9796-2 [47].
To illustrate our purpose, we consider a message m = m[1] ‖m[2] of the form
m[1] = α ‖ r ‖α′ , m[2] = data
where r is a message part unknown to the adversary, α and α′ are strings known
to the adversary and data is some known or unknown string2. The size of r is
denoted kr and the size of m[1] is k − kh − 16 as required in ISO/IEC 9796-2. The
encoded message is then
µ(m) = 6A16 ‖α ‖ r ‖α′ ‖H(α ‖ r ‖α′ ‖data) ‖ BC16 (5.2)
Therefore the total number of unknown bits in µ(m) is kr + kh.
5.2 Fault attack on partially-known message ISO/IEC
9796-2
This Section extends [29] to signatures of partially known messages encoded as
described previously. We assume that after injecting a fault the opponent is in
2The attack will work equally well in both cases.
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possession of a faulty signature σ such that:
σe = µ(m) mod p , σe 6= µ(m) mod q . (5.3)
From (5.2) we can write
µ(m) = t+ r · 2nr +H(m) · 28 (5.4)
where t is a known value. Note that both r andH(m) are unknown to the adversary.
From (5.3) we obtain:
σe = t+ r · 2nr +H(m) · 28 mod p .
This shows that (r,H(m)) must be a solution of the equation
a+ b · x+ c · y = 0 mod p (5.5)
where a := t − σe mod N , b := 2nr and c := 28 are known. Therefore we are left
with solving equation (5.5) which is linear in the two variables x, y and admits a
small root (x0, y0) = (r,H(m)). However the equation holds modulo an unknown
divisor p of N and not modulo N . Such equations were already exploited by Her-
rmann and May [72] to factor an RSA modulus N = pq when some blocks of p
are known. Their method is based on Coppersmith’s technique for ﬁnding small
roots of polynomial equations [41]. Coppersmith’s technique uses LLL to obtain
two polynomials h1(x, y) and h2(x, y) such that
h1(x0, y0) = h2(x0, y0) = 0
holds over the integers. Then one computes the resultant between h1 and h2 to
recover the common root (x0, y0). To that end, we must assume that h1 and h2 are
algebraically independent. This ad hoc assumption makes the method heuristic;
nonetheless it turns out to work quite well in practice. Then, given the root (x0, y0)
one recovers the randomized encoded message µ(m) and factors N by GCD.
Theorem 1 (Herrmann-May [72]). Let N be a sufficiently large composite integer
with a divisor p ≥ Nβ. Let f(x, y) = a + b · x + c · y ∈ Z[x, y] be a bivariate
linear polynomial. Assume that f(x0, y0) = 0 mod p for some (x0, y0) such that
|x0| ≤ Nγ and |y0| ≤ N δ. Then for any ε > 0, under the condition
γ + δ ≤ 3β − 2 + 2(1− β)3/2 − ε (5.6)
one can find h1(x, y), h2(x, y) ∈ Z[x, y] such that h1(x0, y0) = h2(x0, y0) = 0 over
Z, in time polynomial in logN and ε−1.
We only sketch the proof and refer the reader to [72] for more details. Assume
that b = 1 in the polynomial f (otherwise multiply f by b−1 mod N) and consider
the polynomial
f(x, y) = a+ x+ c · y
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We look for (x0, y0) such that f(x0, y0) = 0 mod p. The basic idea consists in
generating a family G of polynomials admitting (x0, y0) as a root modulo pt for some
large enough integer t. Any linear combination of these polynomials will also be a
polynomial admitting (x0, y0) as a root modulo p
t. We will use LLL to ﬁnd such
polynomials with small coeﬃcients. To do so, we view any polynomial h(x, y) =∑
hi,jx
iyj as the vector of coeﬃcients
(
hi,jX
iY j
)
i,j and denote by ‖h(xX, yY )‖
this vector’s Euclidean norm. Performing linear combinations on polynomials is
equivalent to performing linear operations on their vectorial representation, so that
applying LLL to the lattice spanned by the vectors in G will provide short vectors
representing polynomials with root (x0, y0) mod p
t.
We now deﬁne the family G of polynomials as
gk,i(x, y) := y
i · fk(x, y) ·Nmax(t−k,0)
for 0 ≤ k ≤ m, 0 ≤ i ≤ m − k and integer parameters t and m. For all values of
indices k, i, it holds that
gk,i(x0, y0) = 0 mod p
t.
We ﬁrst sort the polynomials gk,i by increasing k values and then by increasing i
values. Denoting X = Nγ and Y = N δ, we write the coeﬃcients of the polynomial
gk,i(xX, yY ) in the basis x
k′ ·yi′ for 0 ≤ k′ ≤ m and 0 ≤ i′ ≤ m−k′. This results in
the matrix of row vectors illustrated in Table 5.1. The matrix is lower triangular;
we only represent the diagonal elements.
Let L be the corresponding lattice; L’s dimension is
ω = dim(L) =
m2 + 3m+ 2
2
=
(m+ 1)(m+ 2)
2
and we have
detL = XsxY syN sN
where
sx = sy =
m∑
k=0
m−k∑
i=0
i =
m(m+ 1)(m+ 2)
6
and
sN =
t∑
i=0
(m+ 1− i)(t− i) = t
6
(t+ 1)(t− 3m− 4).
We now apply LLL to the lattice L to ﬁnd two polynomials h1(x, y) and h2(x, y)
with small coeﬃcients.
Theorem 2 (LLL [94]). Let L be a lattice spanned by (u1, . . . , uω). Given the
vectors (u1, . . . , uω), the LLL algorithm finds in polynomial time two linearly inde-
pendent vectors b1, b2 such that
‖b1‖, ‖b2‖ ≤ 2ω/4(detL)1/(ω−1) .
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Therefore using LLL we can get two polynomials h1(x, y) and h2(x, y) such that
‖h1(xX, yY )‖, ‖h2(xX, yY )‖ ≤ 2ω/4 · (detL)1/(ω−1) . (5.7)
Using Howgrave-Graham’s lemma (below), we can determine the required bound
on the norms of h1 and h2 to ensure that (x0, y0) is a root of both h1 and h2 over
the integers:
Lemma 1 (Howgrave-Graham [73]). Assume that h(x, y) ∈ Z[x, y] is a sum of at
most ω monomials and assume further that h(x0, y0) = 0 mod B where |x0| ≤ X
and |y0| ≤ Y and ‖h(xX, yY )‖ < B/
√
ω. Then h(x0, y0) = 0 holds over the integers.
Proof. We have
|h(x0, y0)| =
∣∣∣∑hijxi0yi0∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∑hijXiY j
(
x0
X
)i (y0
Y
)j∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑∣∣∣∣∣hijXiY j
(
x0
X
)i (y0
Y
)j∣∣∣∣∣ ≤∑∣∣∣hijXiY j∣∣∣
≤ √ω‖h(xX, yY )‖ < B
Since h(x0, y0) = 0 mod B, this implies that h(x0, y0) = 0 over the integers.
We apply Lemma 1 with B := pt. Using (5.7) this gives the condition:
2ω/4 · (detL)1/(ω−1) ≤ N
βt
√
ω
. (5.8)
[72] shows that by letting t = τ ·m with τ = 1−√1− β, we get the condition:
γ + δ ≤ 3β − 2 + 2(1− β)3/2 − 3β(1 +
√
1− β)
m
Therefore we obtain as in [72] the following condition for m:
m ≥ 3β(1 +
√
1− β)
ε
.
Since LLL runs in time polynomial in the lattice’s dimension and coeﬃcients, the
running time is polynomial in logN and 1/ε.
5.2.1 Discussion
For a balanced RSA modulus (β = 1/2) we get the condition:
γ + δ ≤
√
2− 1
2
∼= 0.207 (5.9)
This means that for a 1024-bit RSA modulus N , the total size of the unknowns
x0 and y0 can be at most 212 bits. Applied to our context, this implies that
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for ISO/IEC 9796-2 with kh = 160, the size of the UMP r can be as large as
52 bits. Section 5.3 reports practical experiments conﬁrming this prediction. In
Section 5.6.1 we provide a Python code for computing the bound on the size of the
unknown values (kr + kh) as a function of the modulus size.
In the next paragraph we extend the method to 1) several disjoint UMP blocks
in the encoding function, 2) to two dissimilar faults (one modulo p and one modulo
q) and 3) to two or more faults modulo the same prime factor.
5.2.2 Extension to several unknown blocks
Assume that the UMP used in ISO/IEC 9796-2 is split into n diﬀerent blocks,
namely
µ(m) = 6A16 ‖α1 ‖ r1 ‖α2 ‖ r2 ‖ · · · ‖αn ‖ rn ‖αn+1 ‖H(m) ‖ BC16 (5.10)
where the UMPs r1, . . . , rn are all part of the message m. The αi blocks are known.
We use the extended result of Herrmann and May [72], allowing to (heuristically)
ﬁnd the solutions (y1, . . . , yn) of a linear equation modulo a factor p of N :
a0 +
n∑
i=1
ai · xi = 0 mod p
with p ≥ Nβ and |yi| ≤ Nγi , under the condition [72]
n∑
i=1
γi ≤ 1− (1− β)
n+1
n − (n+ 1)(1− n√1− β)(1− β) .
For β = 1/2 and for a large number of blocks n, one gets the bound
n∑
i=1
γi ≤ 1− ln 2
2
∼= 0.153
This shows that if the total number of unknown bits plus the message digest is less
than 15.3% of the size of N , then the UMPs can be fully recovered from the faulty
signature and Boneh et al.’s attack will apply again. However the number of blocks
cannot be too large because the attack’s runtime increases exponentially with n.
5.2.3 Extension to two faults modulo different factors
Assume that we can get two faulty signatures, one incorrect modulo p and the other
incorrect modulo q. This gives the two equations
a0 + b0 · x0 + c0 · y0 = 0 mod p
a1 + b1 · x1 + c1 · y1 = 0 mod q
with small unknowns x0, y0, x1, y1. By multiplying the two equations, we get the
quadri-variate equation:
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a0a1 + a0b1 · x1 + b0a1 · x0 + a0c1 · y0 + c0a1 · y1 +
+ b0b1 · x0x1 + b0c1 · x0y1 + c0b1 · y0x1 + c0c1 · y0y1 = 0 mod N
We can linearize this equation (replacing products of unknowns with new vari-
ables) and obtain a new equation of the form:
α0 +
8∑
i=1
αi · zi = 0 mod N
where the coeﬃcients α0, . . . , α8 are known and the unknowns z1, . . . , z8 are small.
Using LLL again, we can recover the zi’s (and then x0, x1, y0, y1) as long as the
cumulated size of the zi’s is at most the size of N . This yields the condition
6 · (kr + kh) ≤ k
which, using the notation of Theorem 1, can be reformulated as
γ + δ ≤ 1
6
∼= 0.167 .
This remains weaker than condition (5.9). However the attack is signiﬁcantly faster
because it works over a lattice of constant dimension 9. Moreover, the 16.7% bound
is likely to lend itself to further improvements using Coppersmith’s technique in-
stead of plain linearization.
5.2.4 Extension to several faults modulo the same factor
To exploit single faults, we have shown how to use lattice-based techniques to recover
p given N and a bivariate linear equation f(x, y) admitting a small root (x0, y0)
modulo p. In this context, we have used Theorem 1 which is based on approximate
GCD techniques from [74]. In the present Section we would like to generalize this
to use ℓ diﬀerent polynomials of the same form, each having a small root modulo
p. More precisely, let ℓ be a ﬁxed parameter and assume that as the result of ℓ
successive faults, we are given ℓ diﬀerent polynomials
fu(xu, yu) = au + xu + cuyu (5.11)
where each polynomial fu has a small root (ξu, νu) modulo p with |ξu| ≤ X and
|νu| ≤ Y . Note that, as in the basic case, we re-normalized each polynomial fu to
ensure that the coeﬃcient of xu in fu is equal to one. To avoid double subscripts, we
hereafter use the Greek letters ξ and ν to represent the root values. We would like
to use a lattice approach to construct new multivariate polynomials in the variables
(x1, · · · , xℓ, y1, · · · , yℓ) with the root R = (ξ1, · · · , ξℓ, ν1, · · · , νℓ). To that end we ﬁx
two parameters m and t and build a lattice on a family of polynomials G of degree
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at most m with root R modulo B = pt. This family is composed of all polynomials
of the form
yi11 y
i2
2 · · · yiℓℓ f1(x1, y1)j1 f2(x2, y2)j2 · · · fℓ(xℓ, yℓ)jℓ Nmax(t−j,0) ,
where each iu, ju is non-negative, i =
∑ℓ
u=1 iu, j =
∑ℓ
u=1 ju and 0 ≤ i + j ≤ m.
Once again, let L be the corresponding lattice. Its dimension ω is equal to the
number of monomials of degree at most m in 2ℓ unknowns, i.e.
ω =
(
m+ 2ℓ
2ℓ
)
.
Since we have a common upper bound X for all values |ξu| and a common bound
for all |νu| we can compute the lattice’s determinant as
det(L) = XsxY syN sN ,
where sx is the sum of the exponents of all unknowns xu in all occurring monomials,
sy is the sum of the exponents of the yu and sN is the sum of the exponents of N
in all occurring polynomials. For obvious symmetry reasons, we have sx = sy and
noting that the number of polynomials of degree exactly d in ℓ unknowns is
(d+ℓ−1
ℓ−1
)
we ﬁnd
sx = sy =
m∑
d=0
d
(
d+ ℓ− 1
ℓ− 1
)(
m− d+ ℓ
ℓ
)
=
ℓ(2ℓ+m)!
(2ℓ+ 1)!(m− 1)! .
Likewise, summing on polynomials with a non-zero exponent v for N , where the
sum of the ju is t− v we obtain
sN =
t∑
v=1
v
(
t− v + ℓ− 1
ℓ− 1
)(
m− t+ v + ℓ
ℓ
)
=
(
1 + ℓ+m− t
ℓ
)(
−2 + ℓ+ t
ℓ− 1
)
3F2
 21− t
2 + ℓ+m− t
;
2− ℓ− t
2 +m− t; 1

where 3F2 is the generalized hypergeometric function.
As usual, assuming that p = Nβ we can ﬁnd a polynomial with the correct root
over the integers under the condition of formula (5.8).
Concrete bounds:
Using the notation of Theorem 1, we compute eﬀective bounds on γ+δ = log(XY )/ log(N)
from the logarithm of condition (5.8), dropping the terms
√
ω and 2ω/4 which be-
come negligible as N grows. For concrete values of N , bounds are slightly smaller.
Dividing by log(N), we ﬁnd
sx · (γ + δ) + sN ≤ βtω .
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Thus, given k, t and m, we can achieve at best
γ + δ ≤ βtω − sN
sx
.
We have computed the achievable values of γ + δ for β = 1/2, for various
parameters and for lattice dimensions 10 ≤ ω ≤ 1001. Results are given in Table 5.5,
Section 5.6.2.
Recovering the root:
With 2ℓ unknowns instead of two, applying usual heuristics and hoping that lattice
reduction directly outputs 2ℓ algebraically independent polynomials with the pre-
scribed root over the integers becomes a wishful hope. Luckily, a milder heuristic
assumption suﬃces to make the attack work. The idea is to start with K equations
instead of ℓ and iterate the lattice reduction attack for several subsets of ℓ equations
chosen amongst the K available equations. Potentially, we can perform
(K
ℓ
)
such
lattice reductions. Clearly, since each equation involves a diﬀerent subset of un-
knowns, they are all diﬀerent. Note that this does not suﬃce to guarantee algebraic
independence; in particular, if we generate more than K equations they cannot be
algebraically independent. However, we only need to ascertain that the root R can
be extracted from the available set of equations. This can be done, using Gröbner
basis techniques, under the heuristic assumption that the set of equations spans a
multivariate ideal of dimension zero i.e. that the number of solutions is ﬁnite.
Note that we need to choose reasonably small values of ℓ and K to be able
to use this approach in practice. Indeed, the lattice that we consider should not
become too large and, in addition, it should be possible to solve the resulting
system of equations using either resultants or Buchberger’s algorithm which means
that neither the degree nor the number of unknowns should increase too much.
Asymptotic bounds:
Despite the fact that we cannot hope to run the multi-polynomial variant of our
attack when parameters become too large, it is interesting to determine the theo-
retical limit of the achievable value of γ + δ as the number of faults ℓ increases. To
that end, we assume as previously that β = 1/2, let t = τm and replace ω, sx and
sN by the following approximations:
ω ∼= m
2ℓ
(2ℓ)!
, sx ∼=
m∑
d=0
dℓ (m− d)ℓ
(ℓ− 1)! ℓ! , sN
∼=
t∑
v=1
v
(t− v)ℓ−1(m− t+ v)ℓ
(ℓ− 1)! ℓ! .
For small ℓ values we provide in Table 5.2 the corresponding bounds on γ + δ.
Although we do not provide further details here due to lack of space, one can show
that the bound γ + δ tends to 1/2 as the number of faults ℓ tends to inﬁnity and
that all γ + δ values are algebraic numbers.
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ℓ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
γ + δ 0.207 0.293 0.332 0.356 0.371 0.383 0.391 0.399 0.405 0.410
Table 5.2: Bound for the relative size γ + δ of the unknowns as a function of the
number of faults ℓ
5.3 Simulation results
Assuming that fault injection can be performed on unprotected devices (see Sec-
tion 5.4), we simulated the attack. In the experiment we generated faulty signatures
(using the factors p and q) and applied to them the attack’s mathematical analysis
developed in the previous Sections to factor N . We refer the reader to Section 5.4
for more on physical fault injection experiments.
5.3.1 Single-fault attack simulations
We ﬁrst consider a single-UMP, single-fault attack when H = sha-1 i.e. kh = 160.
Using the SAGE library LLL implementation, computations were executed on a
2 GHz Intel notebook.
k, bits kr, bits m t ω runtime
1024 6 10 3 66 4 minutes
1024 13 13 4 105 51 minutes
1536 70 8 2 45 39 seconds
1536 90 10 3 66 9 minutes
2048 158 8 2 45 55 seconds
Table 5.3: Single fault, single UMP 160-bit digests (kh = 160). LLL runtime for
diﬀerent parameter combinations.
Experimental results are summarized in Table 5.3. We see that for 1024-bit
RSA, the randomizer size kr must be quite small and the attack is less eﬃcient than
exhaustive search3. However for larger moduli, the attack becomes more eﬃcient.
Typically, using a single fault and a 158-bit UMP, a 2048-bit RSA modulus was
factored in less than a minute.
5.3.2 Multiple-fault simulations
To test the practicality of the approach presented in Section 5.2.4, we have set
(ℓ, t,m) = (3, 1, 3) i.e. three faulty signatures. This leads to a lattice of dimension
84 and a bound γ + δ ≤ 0.204. Experiments were carried out with 1024, 1536 and
2048 bit RSA moduli. This implementation also relied on the SAGE library [136]
3Exhausting a 13-bit randomizer took 0.13 seconds.
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running on a single PC. Quite surprisingly, we observed a very large number of
polynomials with the expected root over the integers. The test was run for three
random instances corresponding to the parameters in Table 5.4.
k, bits kr, bits runtime
1024 40 49 seconds
1536 150 74 seconds
2048 250 111 seconds
Table 5.4: Three faults, single UMP, 160-bit digests (kh = 160). LLL runtime for
diﬀerent parameter combinations.
For each parameter set, the ﬁrst 71 vectors in the reduced lattice have the
expected root. In fact, it is even possible to solve the system of equations without
resorting to Buchberger’s algorithm. Instead, we use a much simpler strategy.
We ﬁrst consider the system modulo a prime p′ above 2160 (or above 2250 in the
2048-bit experiment). With this system, linearization suﬃces to obtain through
echelonization the polynomials xi − ξi and yi − νi. Since p′ is larger than the
bounds on the values, this yields the exact values of ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ν1, ν2 and ν3. Once
this is done, the factors of N are easily recovered by computing the GCD of N with
any of the values fi(ξi, νi).
Three faults turn-out to be more eﬃcient than single-fault attacks (Table 5.4
vs. Table 5.3). In particular for a 1024-bit RSA modulus, the three-fault attack
recovered a 40-bit UMP r in 49 seconds4, whereas the single-fault attack only
recovered a 13-bit UMP in 51 minutes.
5.4 Physical fault injection experiments
We performed fault injection on an unprotected device to demonstrate the entire
attack ﬂow. We obtain a faulty signature from a general-purpose 8-bit microcon-
troller running an RSA implementation and factor N using the mathematical attack
of Section 5.2.
Our target device was an Atmel ATmega128 [8], a very popular RISC µC with
an 8-bit AVR core. The µC was running an RSA-CRT implementation developed
in C using the BigDigits multiple-precision arithmetic library [18]. The µC was
clocked at 7.3728 MHz using a quartz crystal and powered from a 5V source.
We induced faults using voltage spikes (cf. to [138] and [82] for more information
on such attacks on similar µCs). Namely, we caused brief power cut-oﬀs (spikes)
by grounding the chip’s Vcc input for short time periods. Spikes were produced by
an FPGA-based board counting the µC’s clock transitions and generating the spike
at a precise moment. The cut-oﬀ duration was variable with 10ns granularity and
4We estimate that exhaustive search on a 40-bit UMP would take roughly a year on the same
single PC.
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Figure 5.1: Spike captured with a DSO: control signal from FPGA, power supply
cut-oﬀ, and induced glitch in the clock signal
the spike’s temporal position could be ﬁne-tuned with the same granularity. The
fault was heuristically positioned to obtain the stable fault injection in one of the
RSA-CRT branches (computing σp or σq). A 40ns spike is presented in Figure 5.1.
Longer spike durations caused a µC’s reset.
5.5 Conclusion
This Chapter introduced a new breed of partially-known message fault attacks
against RSA signatures. These attacks allow to factor the modulus N given a
single faulty signature. Although the attack is heuristic, it works well in practice
and paradoxically becomes more eﬃcient as the modulus size increases. As several
faulty signatures are given longer UMPs and longer digests become vulnerable.
The new techniques are more generally applicable to any context where the
signed messages are partially unknown, in which case we provide explicit size con-
ditions for the fault attack to apply. This has a direct impact on other encoding
functions, such as PKCS#1 v1.5 standard where a message m is encoded as
µ(m) = 000116 ‖ FF16 . . . FF16︸ ︷︷ ︸
k1 bytes
‖ 0016 ‖T ‖H(m)
where T is a known sequence of bytes which encodes the identiﬁer of the hash
function and k1 is a size parameter which is adjusted to make µ(m) have the same
number of bytes than the modulus. With a single unknown bounded by N δ the
condition is δ < 0.25. Therefore assuming a 2048-bit modulus and H = sha-512, we
obtain that the modulus can be eﬃciently factored using a single faulty signature
σ even when the signed message is totally unknown. This enables fault attacks in
complex cryptographic scenarii where e.g. a smart-card and a terminal exchanging
RSA signatures on encrypted messages.
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5.6 Supplementary material
5.6.1 Python script for root size estimation
from math import log,sqrt
def LatticeExpo(t,m):
sy=sx=sn=w=0
for k in range(m+1):
for i in range(m-k+1):
j=max(t-k,0)
sy+=i; sx+=k; sn+=j; w+=1
return (sx,sy,sn,w)
def bound(t,m,n):
(sx,sy,sn,w)=LatticeExpo(t,m)
nxy=(w*(n*t*.5-.25*w-log(sqrt(w),2))-n*sn)/sx
return nxy,w
5.6.2 Achievable bound on γ + δ
We provide in Table 5.5 the achievable bound on γ+ δ, as a function of the number
of faults ℓ and parameters (t,m).
5.6.3 Example of a faulty signature
Table 5.6 presents an example of a faulty 1536-bit RSA-CRT signature obtained dur-
ing our fault injection experiments. Values known to the opponent are underlined.
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rsa parameters
96 p = 0x99c72d76722f217240dea9dead9339ed0f610e47166a6b995c5b4dd62532f0bf
3c7a1875431f3b98af2b5fc284d13956e2f58a819ba9e5be28b300ae99a43c08
e601cf6da250cd2902dde345b90632201cc2eebfe776151a53409d87aa1f27a5
96 q = 0xca60434275ea27e7eedba94fac9947986569b321a8784c1b1283f2b3c62746f9
8ca4fbe00609750e11c239ca222a52c540ababba6133504ec3610556e46ba6ca
a52f63dcb5f081ae58adfeb6ef41fc744528af66bfdb79a026631af8568fbcbd
192 N = 0x7990fcf78f986a4bd285a5f8c4ac98d546c98d95fea23f3034bfc306cc22d9c3
423743ecbc346add601a94eff298f84f5476896c704fd364121c0d9d6873cebe
3124339bd3298a98ce4da3d42efe3a863e25979613e7e357c17e248e928bf01f
1abe69e6cd0c761cc54a21edc60466e5c49fa0abdf57fabc21ec41ca51f58d7b
44f08666b408a0508c6e114efdbbc6de3c2d65d350d18720044d5410d1afbbb6
9dc0cf57da519aa7aec644b9f792e369cf6501359305b059475696a80d4870d1
1 e = 0x03
96 d = 0x510b534fb51046dd3703c3fb2dc865e384865e63ff16d4cacdd52caf32c1e682
2c24d7f32822f1e8eabc634aa1bb5034e2f9b0f2f58a8ced616809139af7df29
76182267e21bb1bb3433c28d74a97c597ec3ba640d45423a80fec309b707f569
2464a61e98a21dd70e5fdf2a47e543958a8dea2cc04e2cafccb3562aef12392c
528ba160f1ea9fc687aafa818f2ad1d6bb081fba37f8360cbad0deb237bfe5ec
b70a68090160328ae226ec7e34dc788e48fb975f47cd6bbf33cc941ab311084b
message formatting
71 text = Fault Attacks on RSA Signatures with Partially Unknown Message Encoding
81 α = O for a Muse of fire, that would ascend the brightest heaven of invention,
a king
8 r = 0xb43558c5e4aeb6e8
81 α′ = dom for a stage, princes to act and monarchs to behold the swelling scene!
Then s
20 H(α||r||α′) = 0xb27dd515171666e807e48cc7d811d91eb824cb27
192 µ(m) = 0x6a4f20666f722061204d757365206f6620666972652c207468617420776f756c
6420617363656e6420746865206272696768746573742068656176656e206f66
20696e76656e74696f6e2c2061206b696e67b43558c5e4aeb6e8646f6d20666f
7220612073746167652c207072696e63657320746f2061637420616e64206d6f
6e617263687320746f206265686f6c6420746865207377656c6c696e67207363
656e6521205468656e2073b27dd515171666e807e48cc7d811d91eb824cb27bc
faulty signature (fault in σp)
96 σ′p = 0x23ebbf4274295ed52ec83f6d67da3f08ead22455b956d6e8f4eadf3662462761
6c632b3899a64e0e2e5bec2d66f66e67146974fb441365dcab1a7a33e4fe4868
a9e8955fa2f2f0572c66333e6898e3e5ad9ed88665126d182ab3677b172733af
96 σq = 0x2e0505263d4e7eebbfd294f06ffb9cb00816730d30cc27a52918920d9bdcb9d8
08fc4cbddb5fae85dd40f50fef20aafbe73917e8daae4d7c9f96ac102bf64b80
e4947f3509ed11a659c62a6e5f24ed611e7dffc9e77fbd1a42f41e946be7561e
192 σ′ = 0x5defad0dc0082ec43c48860dbc3cf4160a66deb6c2304cd1323920941ad5a184
bf92da34608e407042e8db9f3778b181f58f3fd3b6851ca0fd8fb975419c9f28
8d13f2f82a161be25a8fb27810f83a118f6a4f2f7e5cfc54582d88862ba3eec9
a3ceb7330fe4dde64c3f99ef23a07a78180dd43d2c455e52c3bc55553d25e36c
f8265eb4bf4c7b9198a8b89d622ffcd52ed1702988f40602064bae6a7d599884
b8d23f5394d2b4aeecbd33d177f46baf71cdff70cafabfd0ac1ea2548c5ab5a6
additional data: correct signature (σq same as above)
96 σp = 0x8c0bd7487bd14111703e1c7d3d94cdbf6cc37f1c7f958d764e93285c3ef94c1e
8dae46a4fe1615b194515c3f646bd01a358756dad5abdab19bf95b118ce98002
fda41ae0cc583442cf7b50cea8740d1428c1451bb6d9daceb55d33dfb3363194
192 σ = 0x5a67520fb1a049a1b027905867280e66fadbdb2d375c05ea6678e77db836f991
48134a673e009d4e09e02e68513228d986f580340f3b474012d28fb0f0aa221c
d5a6485d5a17ec0993240b923c4167ebd959bac0c3194bade0de8baa3e3782da
4981465e8d721709be01d70242cafdd6c7d031bb6ca32d9dececf4ad06fdeca8
5e5b6b6f63a4284241ffe5c9f8937499607ae67c3c5852663f39c48f8e69526d
475af6214f36d09e66b17268e2c3b674c08248592164f45328721e3f75c9c0ac
Table 5.6: Faulty 1536-bit RSA signature example (H = SHA-1)
Chapter 6
Efficient generation of random
delays in embedded software
Random delays are a countermeasure against a range of side-channel and fault at-
tacks which is often implemented in embedded software to protect cryptographic
implementations. In this Chapter we propose a new method for generation of
random delays and a criterion for measuring the eﬃciency of a random delay coun-
termeasure. We implement this new method along with the existing ones on an
8-bit platform and mount practical side-channel attacks against the implementa-
tions. We show that the new method is signiﬁcantly more eﬃcient and secure in
practice than the previously published solutions.
This is a joint work with Jean-Sébastien Coron which was published in [44] and
[45].
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6.1 Introduction
Insertion of random delays in the execution ﬂow of a cryptographic algorithm is a
simple yet rather eﬀective countermeasure against side-channel and fault attacks.
To our knowledge, random delays are often used for protection of cryptographic
implementations in embedded devices. It belongs to a group of hiding counter-
measures, that introduce additional noise (either in time, amplitude or frequency
domain) to the side-channel leakage while not eliminating the informative signal
itself. This is in contrary to masking countermeasures, that eliminate dependency
between the instantaneous side-channel leakage and the sensitive data processed by
an implementation.
Hiding countermeasures increase complexity of attacks while not rendering them
completely impossible. They are not treated in academia as extensively as masking
but are of great importance in industry. A mixture of multiple hiding and masking
countermeasures would often be used in a real-life protected implementation to raise
the complexity of attacks above the foreseen capabilities of an adversary.
There are two connected problems that arise in this ﬁeld. The ﬁrst one is
to develop eﬃcient countermeasures, and the second one is how to measure the
eﬃciency of the countermeasures. In this Chapter we tackle both tasks for the case
of the random delays.
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Our contribution. We propose a new algorithm for generating random delays in
software which is signiﬁcantly more eﬃcient and secure than the existing methods.
Our main idea is to generate random delays non-independently in order to introduce
greater uncertainty for the attacker for the same mean of the cumulative delay. Our
method allows to use more frequent shorter delays compared the previous methods.
We thoroughly analyze our new method and present its improved method that
allows for a wider choice of parameters and better security.
We also introduce a criterion for estimating the eﬃciency of random delays.
This criterion shows how much uncertainty is introduced the sum of the delays for
a given performance overhead. Our eﬃciency criterion is directly linked with the
number of traces in a DPA attack and is information-theoretically sound.
We present and eﬃcient implementation of our method for and 8-bit Atmel AVR
paltform. We demonstrate by mounting practical side-channel attacks that our new
method is indeed more eﬃcient and secure than the existing solutions.
6.2 Random delays as a countermeasure
We begin with an overview of random delays in countering implementation attacks
and ﬁguring out assumptions about attacker’s capabilities and the design criteria
for the countermeasure. For another discussion on random delays in software we
refer the reader to [156].
Most side-channel and fault attacks require an adversary to know precisely when
the target operations occur in the execution ﬂow. This enables her to synchronize
multiple traces at the event of interest as in the case of DPA and to inject some
disturbance into the computations at the right time as in the case of fault attacks.
By introducing random delays into the execution ﬂow the synchronization is broken,
which increases the attack complexity. This can be done in hardware with the
Random Process Interrupts (RPI) [39] as well as in software. In this work we focus
on the software random delays.
6.2.1 Random delays in software
A common way of implementing random delays in software is placing loops of
“dummy” operations (like NOP instructions) at some points of the program. The
number of loop iterations varies depending on the delay value.
A straightforward method is to generate individual delays independently with
durations uniformly distributed in the interval [0, a] for some a ∈ N. We refer to this
method as plain uniform delays. It is easily implementable in cryptographic devices
as most of them have a hardware random number generator (RNG) on board.
Work [156] presents an example of a loop of “dummy” operations in an 8051
assembly language. We will present implementation of random delays for an 8-bit
Atmel AVR µC in Section 6.8.
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6.2.2 Countering the effect of random delays
As already mentioned, introducing random delays into the execution ﬂow breaks
the synchronization for the attacker. More precisely, the traces (or parts of the
traces if multiple dealys are used) in a side-channel attack will be misaligned, and
in a fault attack the fault injection precision will be lost.
The ways of overcoming the random delay countermeasure are important in
order to have proper assumptions about the attacker’s capabilities and to ﬁgure
out the design criteria for the countermeasure. So we look into this in detail.
In a side-channel attack, an attacker facing random delays has several choices:
• proceed with the attack as is;
• pre-process the traces using integration techniques to reconstruct the signal;
• re-synchronize the traces, removing the delays.
If the attacker proceeds with a side-channel attack as is, without any trace pre-
processing or delay removal, the informative signal will be distributed over many
points in time which will lead, for example, to a smeared DPA peak as shown in
Figure 6.1(b), and therefore greater averaging will be required the succeed. The
signal may be reconstructed with the integration techniques, as ﬁrst described in
[39].
time
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(a) No delays
time
co
rr
el
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io
n
(b) Traces misaligned with a delay
Figure 6.1: Eﬀect of random delays in a DPA attack
It was shown in [39] that that the complexity of a DPA attack, expressed as
the number of power consumption traces required, grows quadratically (in case
traces are used as is) or linearly (in case integration techniques are used) with the
standard deviation of the trace displacement in the attacked point. That is why
here we are initially interested in making the variance of random delays as large
as possible. However, here we will argue that variance is not a good measure of
security for complex delay distributions, and one must look instead more generally
at the uncertainty introduced by the delay. We will recall the relation from the
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work [100] between the parameters of the timing disarrangement distribution and
the complexity of the DPA attack in Section 6.7.
Regarding side-channel trace resynchronization, note that it could be possible
to place two suﬃciently large and uniformly distributed delays in the beginning and
in the end of the execution. That would make each point in the trace uniformly
distributed over time when looking from the start of from the end, which is actually
the worst case for an attacker in terms of the uncertainty introduced. Unfortunately,
in this case it would be relatively easy to synchronize the traces with the the help
of cross-correlation [108] or frequency-based techniques [92]. This is called static
alignment.
So we assume that the static alignment of traces can be performed by an at-
tacker. Therefore, the execution should be interleaved with delays in multiple
places. To minimize the performance overhead in this setting, individual delays
should be possibly shorter. An attacker would typically face a cumulative sum of
the delays between the synchronization point and the target event. The cumulative
delay should increase the uncertainty of an attacker about the location of the target
event in time.
Removing multiple delays from a side-channel trace is called dynamic alignment.
A dynamic alignment technique from [158] called elastic alignment was reported to
be able to reduce the eﬀect of multiple delays. It can be also possible to detect
software random delays in a side-channel trace because of a regular instruction
pattern. To partially hinder this, “dummy” random data may be processed within
a loop. Work [98] applied spectral analysis techniques to eliminate the eﬀect of
multiple random delays. Within the scope of this work we do not address dynamic
alignment, assuming that even with this technique it is harder to eliminate multiple
delays than just a few ones.
In a fault attack spoiled by random delays, an attacker does not have an option
of post-processing. One could think of on-the-ﬂy synchronization of fault injection
by observing patterns in side-channel leakage, but this seems hard to implement and
to our knowledge no concrete implementations were reported, though a technical
solution for on-the-ﬂy synchronization exists [127]. An approach similar to the
computational safe-error attack [165] could also be applicable in some cases, but it
will anyway require an increased amount of fault injection attempts.
6.2.3 Assumptions and design criteria
To summarize, here are our preliminary assumptions about the attacker’s capabili-
ties.
1. An attacker knows the times when the cryptographic algorithm execution
starts and ends. This is commonly possible by monitoring I/O operations of
a device, or operations like EEPROM access.
2. It is harder for an attacker to eliminate multiple random delays than a few
ones.
3. The method of delay generation and its parameters are known to an attacker.
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So an attacker will typically face the cumulative sum of several random delays.
Following the Central Limit Theorem, the distribution of the sum of N indepen-
dent (and not necessarily uniform) delays converges to normal with mean Nµd and
variance Nσ2d, where µd and σ
2
d are correspondingly the mean and the variance of
the duration of an individual random delay. In other words, the distribution of the
sum of independent delays depends only on the mean and the variance of individual
delays but not on their particular distribution. In this case, increasing the uncer-
tainty for the attacker is equivalent to increasing the variance of the (approximately)
normal distribution of the cumulative sum.
With all the above in mind, we adhere to the following criteria for random delay
generation.
1. Multiple random delays should be introduced in the execution ﬂow.
2. The sum of random delays from start or end of the execution to some target
event within the execution should introduce the maximum possible uncer-
tainty for the attacker about the location of the target event.
3. The performance overhead should be possibly minimal.
6.2.4 Related work
First detailed treatment of the countermeasure was done by Clavier et al. in [39].
As already mentioned, they showed that the number of traces for a successful DPA
attack against RPI grows quadratically or linearly (when integration is used) with
the standard deviation of the delay. Mangard presented statistical analysis of ran-
dom disarrangement eﬀectiveness in [100]. Amiel et al. [3] performed practical
evaluation of random delays as a protection against fault attacks. Works of Bucci
et al. [33] and Lu et al. [97] on random delays in hardware should also be men-
tioned here, the former suggesting the architecture for delay generation at the gate
level, the latter implementing it on FPGA and addressing the optimization of delay
generation parameters for this architecture. Frequency-based side-channel attacks
were applied to severeal random delay generation algorithms (including our new
algorithm presented here) in [98].
To date, the only eﬀort to improve the random delays countermeasure in soft-
ware was published by Benoit and Tunstall in [156]. They suggested to modify
the distribution of an individual independently generated random delay so that the
variance of the sum increases and the mean, in turn, decreases. As a result, they
achieve some improvement. We outline their method brieﬂy here in Sect. 6.3.
6.3 Method of Benoit and Tunstall
In [156], Benoit and Tunstall propose a way to improve the eﬃciency of the ran-
dom delays countermeasure. Their aim is to increase the variance and decrease the
mean of the sum of random delays while not spoiling the distribution of an indi-
vidual random delay. To achieve this aim, the authors modify the distribution of
6.4 New method: Floating Mean 115
50 100 150 200 2500
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Delay
R
el
a
ti
v
e
fr
eq
u
en
cy
500 1000 1500 2000 25000
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Plain uniform
Benoit-Tunstall
Figure 6.2: Distribution for the method of Benoit and Tunstall [156] compared to
plain uniform delays: 1 delay (left) and sum of 10 delays (right)
an independently generated individual delay from the uniform to a pit-shaped one
(see Figure 6.2). This increases the variance of the individual delay. Furthermore,
some asymmetry is introduced to the pit in order to decrease the mean of an indi-
vidual delay. The pit-shaped distribution is implemented by tabulating its inverse
cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.).
The delays are generated independently, so if an individual delay has mean µbt
and variance σ2bt, the distribution of the sum of N delays converges to normal (as
in the case of plain uniform delays) with mean Nµbt and variance Nσ
2
bt.
The authors estimate eﬃciency of their method by comparing it to plain uniform
random delays. In an example, they report an increase of the variance by 33% along
with a decrease of the mean by 20%. Distributions for a single delay and for the
sum of 10 delays (for the parameters from the example mentioned above, see [156])
are shown in Figure 6.2 in comparison to plain uniform delays.
We note that the authors also pursued an additional criterion for the diﬃculty of
deriving the distribution of the random delay. But it seems reasonable to consider
this distribution to be known to an adversary, at least if the method is published.
6.4 New method: Floating Mean
In this Section we present our new method for random delay generation in software.
The main idea of the method is to generate random delays non-independently. This
signiﬁcantly improves the variance of the cumulative delay and the method is also
more eﬃcient compared to [156] and to plain uniform random delays.
By x ∼ DU [y, z] we will denote a random variable x following discrete uniform
distribution on [y, z], y, z ∈ Z, y < z. We consider the parameters of the method
below to be integers as in an embedded device integer arithmetic would be the only
option when generating delays.
6.4.1 Description
Our method is as follows. First, we ﬁx some a ∈ N which is the maximum delay
length. Additionally, we ﬁx another parameter b ∈ N, b ≤ a. These implementation
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Figure 6.3: Distribution for the Floating Mean method with diﬀerent b/a ratio
compared to plain uniform delays: histogram for 1 delay (left), for 1 delay within
a single trace, i.e. for some ﬁxed m (center) and for the sum of 10 delays (right),
a = 255; delay duration counted in atomic delay units
parameters a and b are ﬁxed in an implementation and do not change between
diﬀerent executions of an algorithm under protection.
Now, in each execution, we ﬁrst produce a value m ∈ N randomly uniformly
on [0, a − b], and then generate individual delays independently and uniformly on
[m,m + b]. In other words, within any given execution individual random delays
have a ﬁxed mean m+b/2. But this mean varies from execution to execution, hence
our naming of the method1.
The resulting histograms in comparison to plain uniform delays are depicted in
Figure 6.3. This ﬁgure also shows how the properties of the method vary dependent
on the ratio b/a of the parameters of the method, that can take possible values
between 0 and 1.
In fact, Floating Mean is a pure trade-oﬀ between the quality of the distribution
of single delay within a trace and that of the sum of the delays. When b/a is small
(like the case b = 50, a = 255, b/a ≈ 0.2 in Figure 6.3), the distribution of an
individual delay within a trace has a comparatively small variance, but the variance
of a single delay across traces and of the sum of the delays is large. When b/a is
large (like the case b = 200, a = 255, b/a ≈ 0.8 in Figure 6.3), the distribution of an
individual delay within a trace has large variance, but the distribution of the sum of
the delays converges to normal. The extreme case b/a = 0 just means that within
an execution all delays have same length m, while the distribution of the sum of N
delays is uniform on the N -multiples in [0, aN ]. In the other extreme case, b/a = 1,
the methods simply converges to plain uniform delays with each delay generated
uniformly on [0, a].
6.4.2 Parameters of the distribution
To calculate the parameters of the distribution of the sum SN of N delays, we
represent an individual delay as a random variable di = m+vi, wherem ∼ DU [0, a−
1Not to be confused with the floating mean counting algorithms that exist in other domains of
computer science
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b] and vi ∼ DU [0, b] for i = 1, 2, . . . N are independent random variables. The sum
is then expressed as
SN =
N∑
i=1
di = Nm+
N∑
i=1
vi .
For the mean, we have
E(SN ) = E(Nm) + E
(
N∑
i=1
vi
)
= N · a− b
2
+N · b
2
=
Na
2
.
For the variance, since m and vi are independent, all vi are identically distributed
and
Var(m) =
(a− b+ 1)2 − 1
12
, Var(vi) =
(b+ 1)2 − 1
12
, i = 1, 2, . . . , N
we have
Var(SN ) = Var
(
Nm+
N∑
i=1
vi
)
= N2 ·Var(m) +N ·Var(v1)
= N2 · (a− b+ 1)
2 − 1
12
+N · b
2 + 2b
12
.
So, the variance of the sum of N delays is in Θ
(
N2
)
, in comparison to plain
uniform delays and the method of [156] that both have variances in Θ (N). This is
because we generate random delays non-independently; namely in our solution the
lengths of the individual random delays are correlated: they are short if m is small,
or they are longer if m is larger. This enables us to get a much larger variance than
if the delays were generated independently, as in the plain uniform method and the
method of [156]. Figure 6.4 further shows the advantage of our new method, for
parameters a = 200, b = 40, N = 100.
6.4.3 Adding independence from m
At the same time, if we look at the delays within a single execution and thus under
ﬁxed m, the mean for the sum of N delays becomes N(m+ b/2). This implies that
the cumulative delay for a given execution and therefore the length of the execution
depends on m. An adversary can thus accept only the short traces, as they have
short individual delays, and reject the long ones; this can lower the complexity of
the attack.
In order to relieve an adversary of such a beneﬁt, we can generate the ﬁrst half
of random delays (in the ﬁrst half of the execution) uniformly on [m,m+b] (that is,
with mean m+ b/2), and the second half of delays – uniformly on [a−m− b, a−m]
(that is, with mean a −m − b/2). In this way, the distribution of the sum of all
the N = 2M delays for a given execution is independent of m (the mean is aN/2
and the variance is N(b2 + 2b)/12). So an adversary cannot gain any additional
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Figure 6.4: Empirical distributions of the sum of 100 delays for random delay
generation algorithms, for the case of equal means; delay length counted in atomic
delay units
information about the distribution of the delays within an execution by observing
its length. Still, the variance of the sum of L < M delays from start or end to some
point up to the middle of the execution is in Θ(L2).
In [44] we presented another method that was based on the same principle of
non-independent individual delay generation but did not quite work because it was
not possible to make the distribution of the cumulative sum independent from m.
6.4.4 Full algorithm
The full Floating Mean method is described in Algorithm 7. It is easily imple-
mentable in software on a constrained platform that has a built-in RNG producing
uniformly distributed bytes. The method requires no additional memory, as op-
posed to [156]. We are describing eﬃcient implementation of Floating Mean in
Sect. 6.8.
Algorithm 7: Floating Mean method for generation of random delays
Input: a, b ∈ N, b ≤ a,N = 2M ∈ N
1: m← DU [0, a− b]
2: for i = 1 to N/2 do
3: di ← m+DU [0, b]
4: end for
5: for i = N/2 + 1 to N do
6: di ← a−m−DU [0, b]
7: end for
Output: d1, d2, . . . , dN
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6.5 Analysis of Floating Mean
In this Section, we show that the Floating Mean method provides less security than
expected for small a and b. We explain how to choose the parameters a and b
depending on the number of delays N .
6.5.1 Behaviour with different parameters
We begin with taking a detailed look at the distributions of diﬀerent methods by
simulating them with the parameters that we will use in our practical implemen-
tation (Section 6.8). In Figure 6.5 we present histograms of the distributions for
diﬀerent methods. Namely, the number of delays in the sum is N = 32 and the
parameters of the Floating Mean method are a = 18, b = 3. The histograms present
the relative frequency of the cumulative delay against its duration2. We clearly see
a multimodal distribution for the Floating Mean method: the histogram has a dis-
tinct shape of a saw with 16 cogs, and not a ﬂat plateau as onw wold expect from
Section 6.4 (Figure 6.4).
These cogs are not good for security since they make it easier for an attacker
to mount an attack. The classical DPA will be more eﬃcient since the signal
is concentrated on the top of the 16 cogs instead of being spread over the clock
cycles. In case of an attack with windowing and integration [39], the attacker
would integrate the values around cog maximums, omit the minimums to reduce
the noise (assuming noise is the same in all the points of the trace) and thus gain
a reduction in the number of traces required for an attack.
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Figure 6.5: Empirical distributions of the sum of 32 delays in our experiments from
Section 6.9
2As in Figure 6.4, the duration in Figure 6.5 is expressed in atomic delay units, i.e. as the total
number of delay loop iterations. To obtain the value in clock cycles one should multiply this by
the length of a single delay loop, which will be 3 clock cycles in our implementation reported in
Section 6.8.
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6.5.2 Explaining the cogs
Here we explain how cogs arise in the distribution of the Floating mean and we
show how to choose the parameters to avoid the cogs.
The distribution for the Floating Mean is in fact a finite mixture [104] of a−b+1
components with equal weights. Every component corresponds to a given integer
valuem in [0, a−b]. For a givenm, the cumulative sum of random delay durations is
the sum of N random variables uniformly and independently distributed in [m,m+
b]. Therefore it can be approximated by a Gaussian distribution with mean
µm = N · (m+ b/2)
and variance
V = N
(b+ 1)2 − 1
12
.
Therefore the probability density of the distribution for random integerm ∈ [0, a−b]
can be approximated by:
f(x) =
a−b∑
m=0
1
(a− b+ 1)σ√2π exp
(
−(x− µm)
2
2σ2
)
where all components have the same standard deviation σ =
√
V :
σ =
√
N ·
√
(b+ 1)2 − 1
12
.
The cog peaks are the modes of the components, located in their means µm.
The distance between the means of successive components is µm+1 − µm = N . We
can consider the cogs distinguishable by comparing the standard deviation σ of
the components to the distance N between the means. Namely, the distribution
becomes multimodal whenever σ ≪ N . In Figure 6.5 for the Floating Mean we have
a = 18, b = 3 and N = 32, which gives σ = 6.3; therefore we have σ < N which
explains why the 16 cogs are clearly distinguishable in the distribution. However
for a = 200, b = 40 and N = 100 we get σ = 118 so σ > N which explains why the
cogs are indistinguishable in Figure 6.4 and a ﬂat plateau is observed instead.
6.5.3 Choosing correct parameters
From the above we derive the simple rule of thumb for choosing Floating Mean
parameters. To ensure that no distinct cogs arise, parameter b should be chosen
such that σ ≫ N . For suﬃciently large b we can approximate σ by:
σ ≃
√
3
6
· b ·
√
N
Therefore this gives the condition:
b≫
√
N . (6.1)
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However as observed in Section 6.2 it is better to have a large number of short
random delays rather than a small number of long delays; this is because rare longer
delays are a priori easier to detect and remove than multiple short delays. But we
see that condition (6.1) for Floating Mean requires longer delays since by deﬁnition
the length of random delays is between [m,m + b] with m ∈ [0, a − b]. In other
words, condition (6.1) contradicts the requirement of having many short random
delays.
In the next Section we describe a variant of the Floating Mean which does not
suﬀer from this contradiction, i.e. we show how to get short individual random
delays without having the cogs in the cumulative sum.
6.6 Improved Floating Mean
In the previous Section we have shown that parameters for the Floating Mean have
to be chosen so that b >
√
N to provide better distribution. Here we improve the
method itself so that the parameters can be chosen in a wider range.
6.6.1 Description
In the original Floating Mean method an integerm is selected at random in [0, a−b]
before each new execution and the length of individual delays is then a random
integer in [m,m+ b]. The core idea of the new method we develop in this Section is
to improve the granularity of random delay generation by using a wider distribution
for m. More precisely, the improved method works as follows:
1. Initially the integer parameters a and b are chosen so that b < a; additionally
we generate a non-negative integer parameter k.
2. Prior to each execution, we generate an integer valuem′ in the interval [0, (a−
b) · 2k[.
3. Throughout the execution, the integer length d of an individual delay is ob-
tained by ﬁrst generating a random integer d′ ∈ [m′,m′+(b+1) ·2k[ and then
letting d← ⌊d′ · 2−k⌋.
6.6.2 Analysis
We see that as in the original Floating Mean method, the length of individual delays
is in the interval [0, a]. Moreover if the integer m′ generated at step 2 is such that
m′ = 0 mod 2k, then we can write m′ = m ·2k and the length d of individual delays
is uniformly distributed in [m,m+ b] as in the original Floating Mean method.
When m′ 6= 0 mod 2k, writing m′ = m · 2k + u with 0 ≤ u < 2k, the delay’s
length d is distributed in the interval [m,m + b + 1] with a slightly non-uniform
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distribution:
Pr[d = i] =

1
b+1 · (1− u · 2−k) for i = m
1
b+1 for m+ 1 ≤ i ≤ m+ b
1
b+1 · u · 2−k for i = m+ b+ 1
Therefore when m′ increases from m ·2k to (m+1) ·2k the distribution of the delay
length d moves progressively from uniform in [m,m+ b] to uniform in [m+ 1,m+
b+ 1]. In Section 6.6.3 below we show that for a ﬁxed m′:
E[d] = m′ · 2−k + b
2
Var[d] = E[d2]− E[d]2 = (b+ 1)
2 − 1
12
+ 2−k · u · (1− 2−k · u)
where u = m′ mod 2k.
6.6.3 Distribution of delay’s length d
We have:
E[d] =
1
(b+ 1)2k
m′+(b+1)·2k−1∑
i=m′
⌊i · 2−k⌋
Write m′ = m · 2k + u with 0 ≤ u < 2k. This gives:
E[d] =
1
(b+ 1)2k
(m+b+1)2k+u−1∑
i=m2k+u
⌊i · 2−k⌋
=
1
(b+ 1)2k
(m+1)2k−1∑
i=m2k+u
⌊i · 2−k⌋+
(m+b+1)2k−1∑
i=(m+1)2k
⌊i · 2−k⌋+
(m+b+1)2k+u−1∑
i=(m+b+1)2k
⌊i · 2−k⌋

=
1
(b+ 1)2k
m · (2k − u) + 2k m+b∑
j=m+1
j + (m+ b+ 1) · u

=
1
(b+ 1)2k
(
m · 2k + (b+ 1) · u+ b · 2k ·
(
m+
b+ 1
2
))
=
1
(b+ 1)2k
(
m · (b+ 1) · 2k + (b+ 1) · u+ b · 2k · b+ 1
2
)
= m+ u · 2−k + b
2
= m′ · 2−k + b
2
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Similarly we have:
E[d2] =
1
(b+ 1)2k
(m+b+1)2k+u−1∑
i=m2k+u
⌊i · 2−k⌋2
=
1
(b+ 1)2k
(m+1)2k−1∑
i=m2k+u
⌊i · 2−k⌋2 +
(m+b+1)2k−1∑
i=(m+1)2k
⌊i · 2−k⌋2 +
(m+b+1)2k+u−1∑
i=(m+b+1)2k
⌊i · 2−k⌋2

=
1
(b+ 1)2k
m2 · (2k − u) + 2k m+b∑
j=m+1
j2 + (m+ b+ 1)2 · u

After simpliﬁcations this gives:
Var[d] = E[d2]− E[d]2 = (b+ 1)
2 − 1
12
+ 2−k · u(1− 2−ku)
6.6.4 Analysis continued
For a ﬁxed m′ the cumulative sum of random delay durations is the sum of N
independently distributed random variables. Therefore it can be approximated by
a Gaussian distribution with mean:
µm′ = N · E[d] = N ·
(
m′ · 2−k + b
2
)
(6.2)
and variance
Vm′ = N ·Var[d] = N ·
(
(b+ 1)2 − 1
12
+ 2−k · u · (1− 2−k · u)
)
For random m′ ∈ [0, (a− b) · 2k[ the probability density of the cumulative sum
can therefore be approximated by:
f(x) =
(a−b)·2k−1∑
m′=0
1
(a− b)2kσm′
√
2π
exp
(
−(x− µm′)
2
2σ2m′
)
where σm′ =
√
Vm′ . We have:
σm′ > σ =
√
N ·
√
(b+ 1)2 − 1
12
where σ is the same as for the original Floating Mean method.
As previously we obtain a multimodal distribution. The distance between the
means of successive components is µm′+1−µm′ = N ·2−k and the standard deviation
of a component is at least σ. Therefore the cogs become indistinguishable when
σ ≫ N · 2−k which gives the condition:
b≫
√
N · 2−k
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instead of b ≫ √N for the original Floating Mean. Therefore by selecting a suﬃ-
ciently large k we can accommodate a large number of short random delays (large
N and small b). In practice, already for k as small as 3 the eﬀect is considerable;
we conﬁrm this practically in Section 6.9.
We now proceed to compute the mean and variance of the cumulative sum for
random m′. Let us denote by SN the sum of the N delays. We have from (6.2):
E[SN ] = E[µm′ ] = N ·
(
a
2
− 2−k−1
)
which is the same as the original Floating Mean up to the 2−k−1 term.
To compute the standard deviation of SN , we represent an individual delay as
a random variable di = m + vi where m = ⌊m′ · 2−k⌋ and vi is a random variable
in the interval [0, b + 1]. Since m′ is uniformly distributed in [0, (a − b) · 2k[, the
integer m is uniformly distributed in [0, a − b[; moreover the distribution of vi is
independent of m and the vi’s are identically distributed. From
SN =
N∑
i=1
di = Nm+
N∑
i=1
vi .
we get:
Var(SN ) = N
2 ·Var(m) +N ·Var(v1)
For large N we can neglect the term N ·Var(v1) which gives:
Var(SN ) ≃ N2 ·Var(m) = N2 · (a− b)
2 − 1
12
which is approximately the same as for the original Floating Mean method. As
for the original Floating Mean the variance of the sum of N delays is in Θ
(
N2
)
in comparison to plain uniform delays and the method of [156] that both have
variances in Θ (N).
6.6.5 Illustration
The result is shown in Figure 6.6 compared to the original Floating Mean. The
parameters of both methods were the same as in Figure 6.5: a = 18, b = 3 and
N = 32. We take k = 3 for our Improved Floating Mean method. We can see that
we have ﬂattened out the cogs while keeping the same mean. This is because we still
have σ ≃ 6.3 but the distance between successive cogs is now N · 2−k = 32 · 2−3 = 4
instead of 32 so the cogs are now almost indistinguishable.
6.6.6 Full algorithm
The Improved Floating Mean method is formally deﬁned by Algorithm 8. By
DU [y, z[ we denote discrete uniform distribution on [y, z[, y, z ∈ Z, y < z. Note
that as with the Floating Mean, we apply the technique of “ﬂipping” the mean in the
middle of the execution to make the duration of the entire execution independent
of m′. In Section 6.8 we will show that Improved Floating Mean can be eﬃciently
implemented on a constrained platform.
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Figure 6.6: Improved Floating Mean with k = 3 compared to the original Floating
Mean; a = 18, b = 3 and N = 32 for both methods.
Algorithm 8: Improved Floating Mean
Input: a, b, k,M ∈ N, b ≤ a,N = 2M
1: m′ ← DU [0, (a− b) · 2k[
2: for i = 1 to N/2 do
3: di ←
⌊(
m′ +DU
[
0, (b+ 1) · 2k
[)
· 2−k
⌋
4: end for
5: for i = N/2 + 1 to N do
6: di ←
⌊(
a · 2k −m′ −DU
[
0, (b+ 1) · 2k
[)
· 2−k
⌋
7: end for
Output: d1, d2, . . . , dN
6.7 Criterion for efficiency of random delays
In this Section we address the problem of measuring and comparing the eﬃciency
of diﬀerent random delay generation methods. We demonstrate that the variance
of the cumulative delay is an inappropriate measure of the security introduced by
the countermeasure and can even be misleading. We suggest a criterion which is
optimal with the respect to the desired properties of the countermeasure. The
criterion is information-theoretically sound.
6.7.1 Variance as a bad measure of security
As already mentioned, in the work [156] the design criterion for the delay genera-
tion method was increasing the variance of the cumulative sum of the delays while
decreasing its mean. In our initial work [44] we also followed this approach and
suggested to use the coeﬃcient of variation σ/µ to measure and compare the eﬃ-
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ciency of the random delay generation methods3, where a higher value of this ratio
meant a better eﬃciency. This criterion has shown that the Floating Mean counter-
measure has great advantage over the methods with independent individual delays
since its variance grows quadratically with the number of delays in the cumulative
sum, and so the coeﬃcient of variation tends to a constant, as Table 6.1 shows. The
theoretical expectations were roughly matching the experimental data that will be
presented here in Section 6.9.
Table 6.1: Eﬃciency ratios σ/µ for diﬀerent random delay generation methods
Plain uniform Benoit-Tunstall Floating Mean
1√
3N
= Θ
(
1√
N
)
σbt
µbt
· 1√
N
= Θ
(
1√
N
) √
N((a−b+1)2−1)+b2+2b
a
√
3N
= Θ(1)
However, the correct criterion for the security introduced by the countermeasure
is the amount of uncertainty introduced by the cumulative delay. We will show
below that the number of traces required for a side-channel attack is directly linked
to the uncertainty introduced by the countermeasure. The standard deviation σ is
in general a very rough way to estimate the uncertainty and therefore the security
of the countermeasure. It works well only for very similar distributions like two
approximately normal distributions, as is the case of plain uniform delays and the
method of Benoit and Tunstall. We have already shown in the analysis of Floating
Mean in Section 6.5 that for a complex distribution the variance does not reﬂect
the real security against side-channel attacks.
We further illustrate this with a simple example. Consider the uniform distri-
bution U of integers on some interval [a, b], a, b ∈ Z, and the distribution X with
Pr[X = a] = Pr[X = b] = 1/2. We have Var(U) = ((a − b + 1)2 − 1)/12 and
Var(X) = (a − b)2/4, so Var(X) > Var(U). Therefore the eﬃciency of X counted
in σ/µ will be higher than for U . But with X the DPA signal is only divided by 2
instead of (b− a+ 1) with U , so the number of traces required to break an imple-
mentation with U will be smaller than with X. So in this case the criterion based
on the variance is misleading.
6.7.2 Recalling the effect of timing disarrangement
An accurate estimate for the security introduced by the random delay countermea-
sure is the maximum pˆ of the probability mass function (p.m.f.)4 of the distribution
of the cumulative sum.
From [39] and [100] we recall that the number of traces T required for a DPA
attack is determined by the maximal correlation coeﬃcient ρmax observed in the
correlation trace for the correct key guess. Namely, the number of traces can be
3Here σ is the standard deviation of the cumulative sum across various executions, as opposed
to Sections 6.5 and 6.6 where σ was the standard deviation for a single execution with a fixed m
4and not p.d.f. since the distribution is discrete
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estimated as
T = 3 + 8
 Zα
ln
(
1+ρmax
1−ρmax
)
2 (6.3)
where Zα is a quantile of a normal distribution for the 2-sided conﬁdence interval
with error 1− α. Since for x < 0.2, ln
(
1+x
1−x
)
≈ 2x holds, we can approximate (6.3)
for Zα=0.9 = 1.282 as
T ≈ 3/ρ2max
when ρmax < 0.2. So the number of traces is in ρ
−2
max. In turn, the eﬀect of the
timing disarrangement on ρmax is in pˆ in case no integration is used. So the number
of traces is in 1/pˆ2.
6.7.3 The new criterion
We propose a better criterion for the eﬃciency E of the random delays counter-
measure:
E = 1/(2pˆ · µ)
where pˆ is the maximum of the probability mass function and µ is the mean of the
distribution of the cumulative sum of the delays. This criterion is normalized and
optimal with respect to the desired properties of the countermeasure, as we show
below.
With the countermeasure, we want to maximize the number of traces in an
attack, i.e. minimize pˆ, while keeping the smallest possible overhead, i.e. smallest
mean µ. One can see that from all distributions with the given pˆ, the one with the
smallest µ is uniform on [0, 1/pˆ]. In this case, µ = 1/(2pˆ) and the criterion E is
equal to 1. In all other cases (same pˆ but larger µ) the value of the criterion will
be smaller, and the closer to zero – the farther is the distribution from the optimal
one (i.e. the uniform one).
This tightly relates the criterion to the entropy of the distribution. Namely,
the new criterion is directly linked to min-entropy, which is deﬁned for a random
variable S as
H∞(S) = − logmax
i
pi = −log pˆ.
Note that H∞(S) ≤ H(S), where H(S) = −∑i pi log pi is the Shannon entropy,
so min-entropy can be considered as a worst-case measure of uncertainty. Now we
have pˆ = 2−H∞(S) and the new eﬃciency criterion is expressed as
E =
2H∞(S)−1
µ
.
Indeed, for a ﬁxed worst-case cumulative delay, the distributions with the higher en-
tropy, i.e. maximizing uncertainty for the attacker, will have lower pˆ, larger number
of traces to attack and thus more eﬃcient as a countermeasure.
This criterion is easily computable once the designer have simulated the real
distribution for the concrete parameters of a method (taking into consideration the
number of clock cycles per delay loop) and obtained pˆ.
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6.8 Implementation for an 8-bit AVR platform
Here we show that our new method can be eﬃciently implemented on an embedded
µC. We present the reference implementation of diﬀerent delay generation methods
for 8-bit AVR µCs. The implementation is written in the 8-bit AVR assembly
language. We tested it on the ATmega16 µC, using Atmel AVR Studio 4 as a
development environment.
In our implementation we make use of the fact that we can eﬃciently produce
uniform random integers in the interval [0, 2i − 1] by a bit-wise AND of an 8-bit
uniform random value with a bit mask 2i − 1, i = 1, 2, ..., 8.
Throughout the code, the following registers are reserved:
RND for obtaining the random numbers and delay durations;
FM for storing the value of m used in the Floating Mean and in the Improved
Floatimg Mean during the execution;
MASKB for the bitmask applied to the delay length;
MASKM for the bitmask applied to obtain the value of m in Floating Mean;
TMP temporary helper register.
RNG simulation. Common 8-bit AVR µCs do not have a built-in RNG. Hence,
we have simulated the RNG by pre-loading a pool of pseudorandom numbers to
µC’s SRAM from the host PC prior to each execution and pointing the X register
at the beginning of the pool. Random numbers are then loaded successively from
SRAM to RND register by calling the randombyte function:
randombyte:
ld RND, X+ ; X is the dedicated address register
ret ; that is used only in this function
Basic delay generation routine. First, here is the basic delay generation rou-
tine. It produces delays of length 3·RND+C cycles, where C is the constant overhead
per delay. To reduce this overhead, the delay generation can be implemented in-
line to avoid the cost of entering and leaving the function (the same can be done
with the randombyte function). So, each delay is a multiple of 3 µC cycles; this
granularity cannot be further reduced for this platform.
randomdelay:
rcall randombyte ; obtain a random byte in RND
; <placeholder for method-specific code>
tst RND ; balancing the cycle length between
breq zero ; zero and non-zero delay values
nop
nop
dummyloop:
dec RND
brne dummyloop
zero:
ret
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Since the conditional instructions breq (branch if equal) and brne (branch if not
equal) of the 8-bit AVR take diﬀerent amount of cycles depending on whether the
condition is satisﬁed or not, the loop code is specially arranged to balance the case
when the delay duration value is zero. Otherwise, the resulting delay distribution
would be biased from the original one.
The part of the code speciﬁc for delay generation methods is omitted (the po-
sition in the above code is marked by a placeholder) and will be given below.
Plain uniform delays. The method-speciﬁc code part for plain uniform delays
is just a single instruction:
and RND, MASKB ; truncate random value to the desired length
Method of Benoit and Tunstall. For the method of Benoit and Tunstall, the
delay value is generated as follows:
ldi ZH, high(bttable) ; load the table address high byte
mov ZL, RND ; load the table address low byte (lookup index)
ld RND, Z ; perform the lookup
Here bttable is the table of 256 byte entries with the inverse c.d.f. of the pit-shaped
distribution that is pre-loaded into SRAM along with the pool of random numbers.
The table used in our experiments reported in Section 6.9 is given in Table 6.2. Note
that the table should be aligned with the 256-byte boundary to facilitate indexing
as it is done in the above code snippet.
Table 6.2: Tabulated inverse c.d.f. of the pit-shaped distribution, in hexadecimal
notation
00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,
00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,01,01,01,01,01,01,01,
01,01,01,01,01,01,01,01,01,01,01,01,01,01,01,01,01,01,01,01,01,01,02,02,
02,02,02,02,02,02,02,02,02,02,02,02,02,02,02,02,02,02,03,03,03,03,03,03,
03,03,03,03,03,03,03,03,04,04,04,04,04,04,04,04,04,04,05,05,05,05,05,05,
05,06,06,06,06,06,06,07,07,07,07,08,08,08,09,09,09,0a,0a,0a,0b,0b,0b,0c,
0c,0c,0c,0d,0d,0d,0d,0d,0e,0e,0e,0e,0e,0e,0f,0f,0f,0f,0f,0f,0f,0f,0f,10,
10,10,10,10,10,10,10,10,10,10,10,11,11,11,11,11,11,11,11,11,11,11,11,11,
11,11,11,11,12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12,
12,12,12,12,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,
13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13
(Improved) Floating Mean. The method-speciﬁc code for the Improved Float-
ing Mean includes addition of the valuem and then “squeezing” the range by shifting
the register with the delay right by k bits.
and RND, MASKB ; truncate to the desired length including k
add RND, FM ; add ’floating mean’
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lsr RND ;
... ; logical shit right by k bits
lsr RND ;
The value of k is hard-coded by k right shift instructions since there are no multiple-
bit shift instructions in the AVR instruction set. Note that when k = 0 the method
is just Floating Mean and the code is just 1 single-cycle instruction longer than in
plain uniform delays.
Floating Mean also requires initialization (namely, generation of m) in the be-
ginning of each execution:
rcall randombyte ; obtain a random byte in RND
and RND, MASKM ; truncate ’foating mean’ to the desired length
mov FM, RND ; store ’floating mean’ on register FM
and “ﬂipping” FM in the middle of the execution to make the total execution length
independent of the value of m.
mov TMP, MASKM
sub TMP, FM
mov FM, TMP
Practical parameter choice. Here we explain how to translate the delay gen-
eration method parameters a and b used in the previous Sections into the bitmasks
MASKB and MASKM.
For the plain uniform delays, the bitmask for the delay duration is set as
MASKB = 0 . . . 0 1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
With this mask, the delay durations will be generated in the interval [0, a], a = 2t−1.
For example, for our experiments we have chosen t = 4 which yields a = 15. In
general, for a device with n-bit registers t ≤ n should hold.
For the Floating Mean and its improved version, the bitmasks for the delay
duration and for the value of m have the following form:
MASKB = 0 . . . 0 1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
MASKM = 0 . . . 0 1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
s
1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
In the case of Floating Mean (when k = 0), this yields b = 2t−1 and a− b = 2s−1.
In the case of Improved Floating Mean (when k > 0), this yields b = 2t − 1 but
a − b = 2s, which is slightly diﬀerent and consistent with the Improved Floating
Mean description. For example, for Floating Mean we have chosen s = 4 and t = 2
which yields a = 18 and b = 3. For the Improved Floating Mean, we have chosen
s = 4, t = 2 and k = 3 which yield a = 19 and b = 3. To ensure that the operations
are performed on a single register and no overﬂow occurs on an n-bit µC, s, t, and
k here should be chosen such that max(s, t) + k + 1 ≤ n.
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Comparison. It can be seen that Improved Floating Mean is more “lightweight”
in terms of both memory and code than the table method of Benoit and Tunstall.
Our method requires no additional memory, as opposed to [156], and can take less
cycles for the computation of delay duration. Compared to the plain uniform delays,
our Floating Mean requires 1+k more cycles for the computation of delay duration
(the duration of the single delay loop iteration is the same for all methods in our
implementation), the additional generation of the m value and “ﬂipping” it once
per execution; thus the overhead is negligible.
6.9 Resistance to practical attacks
Here we present comparison between the practical implementations of plain uni-
form delays, table method of Benoit and Tunstall [156] and the new Floating Mean
method by mounting a Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack [31] against them.
We applied the random delays to protect AES encryption implemented on an AT-
mega16 µC.
6.9.1 Protected AES implementation
Random delays were introduced into AES-128 encryption. The delay generation
was implemented as described in Section 6.8. We put 10 delays per each round:
before AddRoundKey, 4 per SubBytes+ShiftRows, before each MixColumn and after
MixColumns. 3 “dummy” AES rounds that also incorporated random delays were
added in the beginning and in the end of the encryption. Thus, the ﬁrst SubByte
operation of the ﬁrst encryption round, which is the target for our attacks, is sep-
arated from the start of the execution, which is in turn our synchronization point,
by N = 32 random delays.
The parameters of the methods were chosen to ensure (nearly) the same perfor-
mance overhead across the methods. They were made suﬃciently small to enable
attacks with a reasonable number of traces; for a real application the values can be
larger.
• For the plain uniform delays (PU), the individual delay values were generated
on [0, 15].
• For the table method of Benoit and Tunstall, the p.d.f. of the pit-shaped
distribution was generated using the formula y = ⌈akx + bkM−x⌉ from [156]
with the parameters M = 19, a = 40, b = 34 and k = 0.7. These parameters
were chosen so that they lead to the table of 256 entries with the inverse c.d.f.
of the distribution (see Table 6.2 in Section 6.8). We use this table to produce
delay values on [0, 19] by indexing it with a random byte.
• For Floating Mean (FM) we used a = 18, b = 3.
• For Improved Floating Mean (IFM), the parameters were a = 19, b = 3, k = 3.
The value of a is diﬀerent from the one in FM, as discussed in Section 6.8, so
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the mean for IFM is larger that for FM, but still the estimated eﬃciency is
1.8 times higher.
Due to the implementation eﬃciency considerations we could not make the perfor-
mance overhead for all the methods to be exactly the same, but it is close enough
for comparison.
6.9.2 CPA attack
We mounted a CPA attack [31] in the Hamming weight power consumption model
against the ﬁrst AES key byte for each of the methods, ﬁrst SubByte operation
being the attack target. As a reference benchmark for our measurement conditions
we performed a CPA attack against the implementation without random delays.
For implementations with random delays, we used power consumption traces as is
without any alignment or integration to make a consistent comparison. Figure 6.7
presents CPA attack results for the 4 methods. The correlation coeﬃcient evolution
plot is not presented for Improved Floating Mean since even with 150000 traces the
attack did not succeed.
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Figure 6.7: CPA against random delays: correlation coeﬃcient for all key byte
guesses against the number of power consumption traces. The trace for the correct
guess is highlighted.
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It can be seen that our new methods are more secure in practice already for
small delay durations and for a small number of delays. To break our implemen-
tation, we require 45000 traces for Floating Mean and 7000 traces for the method
of Benoit and Tunstall. That is, for the same performance penalty the Floating
Mean method requires 6 times more curves to be broken. The Improved Floating
Mean we require > 150 · 103 traces to be broken, which is > 20 times more than for
the method of Benoit and Tunstall for the same performance overhead. This ratio
will increase with the number of delays. This is important for symmetric algorithm
implementations that are relatively short. For inherently long implementations of
public key algorithms the number of delays in the sum will be naturally large.
6.9.3 Comparing efficiency
In our example in Sect. 6.6.5, with the Improved Floating Mean method we have
decreased pˆ by a factor 2, as illustrated in Figure 6.6. So the number of traces
for the successful straightforward CPA attack must be in principle almost 4 times
larger (around 160 · 103), and according to the optimal criterion the eﬃciency must
be almost 2 times higher. This is what we observed in practice: we could not break
the Improved Floating Mean with these parameters with 150 · 103 traces.
Table 6.3 presents the values of the new eﬃciency criterion E we introduced
for random delays in Section 6.7 and the practically observed attack measurement
complexities from Figure 6.7. The values for E were computed from the maximum
pˆ of the p.m.f. and the mean µ of the cumulative delay (the distributions were
shown in Figures 6.5 and 6.6), taking into consideration the real granularity of the
delay loop (3 cycles).
Table 6.3: New eﬃciency criterion for diﬀerent random delay generation methods
ND PU BT [156] FM IFM
µ, cycles 0 720 860 862 953
pˆ 1 0.0144 0.0092 0.0040 0.0020
E = 1/(2pˆµ) − 0.048 0.063 0.145 0.259
Tcpa, traces 50 2500 7000 45000 > 150000
Due to its deﬁnition, the new criterion reﬂects well the number of traces observed
in the experimental attack. For example, looking at the new criterion we expect
the number of traces for the Floating Mean be 0.1452/0.0632 = 5.3 times higher
than for the table method of Benoit and Tunstall [156]. In the experiment, it was
45000/7000 = 6.4 times higher.
6.10 Conclusion
In this Chapter we proposed a new method for random delay generation in em-
bedded software—the Floating Mean method. We suggested how to choose the
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parameters of the method so that it generates a good distribution; however this
requires to generate longer delays while in practice it is preferable to have multiple
shorter delays. We proposed the Improved Floating Method that allows for a wider
choice of parameters.
We suggested an information-theoretically sound criterion for measuring the
eﬃciency of the random delays countermeasure. The criterion reﬂects how much
traces are requires to break an implementation relatively to the performance over-
head introduced by the countermeasure
We presented the lightweight implementation of our method for protection of
AES encryption on an 8-bit AVR platform. Finally, we mounted practical DPA
attacks showing that for the same level of performance the reference implementation
of the new method requires signiﬁcantly more power curves to be broken compared
to the existing methods. Thus, our method is signiﬁcantly more eﬃcient and secure.
In an independent work [98], our Floating Mean method was used to counteract
a frequency-based DPA attack; in this case its security was still higher than that of
the other methods.
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